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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1993 Supp.). 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Insurance Environmental Litigation Association 
("IELA") is a trade association of major property and 
casualty insurers. IELA was formed, in part, to appear as 
amicus curiae in environmental insurance coverage cases and 
to assist courts in the determination of important insurance 
coverage questions presented in such litigation. IELA 
members have entered into insurance contracts in Utah and 
throughout the nation containing provisions similar to the 
pollution exclusion at issue in the instant case. IELA is 
therefore vitally interested in the judicial interpretation 
of these coverage provisions.1 
1
 IELA files this brief as amicus curiae on behalf 
of IELA member companies Allstate Insurance Company, American 
International Group, Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 
Continental Insurance Company, Crum & Forster Corporation, 
Hanover Insurance Company, Hartford Insurance Group, Home 
Insurance Company, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Royal 
Insurance, Prudential Reinsurance Company, St. Paul 
Companies, Selective Insurance Group of America, State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Company, and United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Company. IELA members CIGNA Property and Casualty 
Companies, Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies, Maryland 
Insurance Group and The Travelers Insurance Companies, or 
their affiliates, are parties in this matter; accordingly, 
IELA's brief is not filed on their behalf. Additionally, 
IELA's brief is not filed on behalf of member Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Company. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the trial court correctly hold that the word 
"sudden" in the "sudden and accidental" exception 
to the pollution exclusion at issue unambiguously 
contains a temporal element? 
II. Did the trial court correctly hold that the 
gradual, ongoing discharge of gasoline from a 
corroded underground line cannot be considered 
"sudden"? 
A. Standard of Review 
The interpretation of an integrated, unambiguous 
insurance contract is a matter of law, with the trial court's 
conclusions of law to be reviewed for correctness. See, 
e.g., Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 
749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. 
U.S. Life Title Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 933, 935 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
IELA hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the 
Statement of the Case set forth in Appellant's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
LaSal Oil Companyf Inc. ("LaSal") filed this declaratory 
judgment action against nine insurance companies which issued 
general and excess liability policies to LaSal. In this 
action, LaSal seeks a declaration that the various insurers 
2 
have a duty to defend and indemnify LaSal against claims 
arising from the leakage of gasoline from a corroded 
underground pipe over a period of approximately eighteen to 
twenty-four months at a service station owned by LaSal. 
The trial court ruling currently under review stems 
from LaSal's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against 
Omaha Indemnity ("Omaha") and two other defendants filed 
September 10, 1990 (R. 491-495), and from Omaha,s Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Among the issues raised in those pleadings 
was the interpretation of the language of the pollution 
exclusion contained in the Omaha policies. Under that 
exclusion, coverage does not apply 
to bodily injury or property damage arising out of 
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of 
smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalies, toxic 
chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or 
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or 
upon land, the atmosphere or other water course or 
body of water; but this exclusion does not apply if 
such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is 
sudden and accidental . . . . 
(R. 2416, 2067). 
The court, after reviewing the parties' briefs and 
hearing oral argument, held an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether the leakage from the underground gasoline 
line at the LaSal station was "sudden" under the terms of the 
policy. Both Omaha and LaSal presented expert testimony at 
that hearing. The two experts agreed that the leakage from 
LaSal7s gasoline line was caused by corrosion of the 
pipeline. (R. 3234-3235, 3238-3239, 3271-3272, 3277). They 
3 
disagreed, however, as to whether the discharge of gasoline 
from a corroded pipe was "sudden" under the policy language. 
(R. 3254, 3271-3272). 
In a January 21, 1993 memorandum decision, the trial 
court, following this Court's decision in Gridley Associates. 
Ltd. v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), held that the term "sudden," as used in the 
"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion 
in the Omaha policy, unambiguously contained a temporal 
element, and that a leak caused by corrosion could not be 
considered "sudden." The court therefore ordered that 
judgment in conformance with the evidence presented be 
entered in favor of Omaha. (R. 1886-1893). The trial court 
filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 11, 
1993. (R. 1894-1906). This appeal followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The insurance policies at issue expressly exclude 
coverage for pollution unless "the discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape" of contaminants is both "sudden" and 
"accidental." These critical words are clear and 
unambiguous, especially when read together and in context. 
"Accidental" means "unexpected and unintended." "Sudden" 
means "quick" or "abrupt." If the discharge is not both 
"sudden" and "accidental" — i.e., unexpected and unintended 
and abrupt — then the exception to the pollution exclusion 
4 
cannot come into play. As this Court recognized in Gridley 
Associates, Ltd. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.. 828 P.2d 524 (Utah 
App. 1992), the "sudden and accidental" exception cannot 
restore coverage for the gradual, long term leakage of 
gasoline from LaSal's corroded underground line. 
Well-settled rules of contract interpretation prohibit a 
court from considering extrinsic evidence to "construe" 
unambiguous contract terms. But even if such evidence were 
relevant and admissible, an even-handed review of the so-
called drafting and regulatory history of the pollution 
exclusion would support the application of the plain meaning 
of the word "sudden." 
Further, sound public policy dictates that the plain 
terms of the insurance contract should be enforced. The 
risk-allocation system that is the basis of liability 
insurance will function effectively only if unambiguous 
contract terms are enforced as written. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE WORD "SUDDEN" IN THE "SUDDEN AND ACCIDENTAL" 
EXCEPTION TO THE POLLUTION EXCLUSION CONTAINS A TEMPORAL 
ELEMENT UNAMBIGUOUSLY BARRING COVERAGE FOR THE GRADUAL 
"DISCHARGE, DISPERSAL, RELEASE OR ESCAPE" OF POLLUTANTS. 
The liability insurance policy in question contains a 
"pollution exclusion" which precludes coverage for any 
liability "arising out of the discharge, dispersal, release 
or escape of . . . fumes, . . . toxic chemicals, liquids or 
5 
gases, . . . or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants 
into or upon land, the atmosphere or other water course or 
body of water." The only exception to this exclusion of 
pollution-related coverage is for a "discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape" that is both "sudden and accidental." 
This Court, in Gridley Associates, Ltd. v. Transamerica 
Insurance Co., 828 P.2d 524 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), held that 
the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution 
exclusion is unambiguous. Id. at 527. In a case of first 
impression in Utah, the Gridley Court stated that "xsudden' 
within the xsudden and accidental' clause cannot be defined 
without reference to a temporal element, specifically 
immediacy, abruptness and quickness." Id. This Court found 
that a "clean break" in an underground gasoline line fell 
within the exception, contrasting it with a break "caused by 
corrosion or deterioration which would have resulted in a 
gradual drip or trickle of gasoline from the line." Id. 
Well-established principles of contract interpretation 
under Utah law require that the term "sudden" be construed 
temporally. An insurance policy "is merely a contract 
between the insured and the insurer. Its language should be 
construed pursuant to the same rules as are applied to other 
ordinary contracts . . . . "2 Thus, a contract of insurance, 
like any other contract, must be enforced according to its 
2
 Bergera v. Ideal Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 524 P.2d 599, 
600 (Utah 1974). 
6 
terms.3 The terms of the policy must be construed as a 
whole, and each of its terms should be given effect where 
possible.4 In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, 
the first source is the language of the contract itself.5 "A 
[contractual] term is not necessarily ambiguous merely 
because one party seeks to endow it with a meaning different 
from that relied upon by the drafter."6 Nor will this Court 
find a provision to be ambiguous "because a party may get a 
different meaning by placing a force[d] or strained 
construction on it in accordance with his interest."7 
3
 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. 
Commercial Union Assurance, 606 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 
1980)("Unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty in the 
language of an insurance policy, the policy should be 
enforced according to its terms."); Hartford Ace. & Indem. 
Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484, 
1486 (10th Cir.) (,nan unambiguous insurance contract, like 
any other contract, should be enforced as written'")(applying 
Utah law), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992) 
4
 Marriot v. Pacific Nat'l Life Assurance Co., 24 
Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 981, 983 (1970)(court is "obliged to 
assume that language included therein was put there for a 
purpose, and to give it effect when its meaning is clear and 
unambiguous"); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake 
City, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App.) (all parts of 
contract "should be given effect insofar as that is 
possible"), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
5
 Williams v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 
534, 536 (Utah 1979). 
6
 See, e.g., Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit Ass'n, 589 
P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979); Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 
799 P.2d 716, 729 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
7
 Auto Leasing Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Utah 
2d 336, 325 P.2d 264, 266 (1958). 
7 
Ultimately, any rule requiring insurance policies to be 
strictly construed against the insurer is to be applied only 
after application of the other rules of construction.8 Most 
fundamentally, "[a] court will not . . . make a better 
contract for the parties than they have made for 
themselves."9 
Consistent with these principles, the word "sudden/1 as 
coupled with the term "accidental" in the exception to the 
pollution exclusion, must be accorded a temporal meaning, 
denoting an event that occurs quickly, hastily, immediately 
and abruptly. To interpret the term "sudden," as LaSal asks, 
to mean "unexpected or unintended" would render it 
coextensive with "accidental," ignoring basic tenets of 
construction and rewriting the bargain between insurer and 
insured. The contract provision says "sudden and 
accidental," not "accidental and accidental." 
LaSal asks this Court to find that the "sudden and 
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion is 
8
 E.g., Fawcett v. Security Benefit Ass'n, 99 Utah 
193, 104 P.2d 214, 218 (1940)("Even though a particular 
provision of a contract of insurance be susceptible of more 
than one meaning, the construction of such provision more 
favorable to the assured will not be adopted if other 
provisions of the entire contract clearly resolve the 
ambiguity in favor of the contrary construction."); Williams, 
593 P.2d at 536 ("in determining the intent of a contact the 
language of the instrument itself should first be looked to, 
and unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is 
no justification for attempting to vary it by extrinsic or 
parol evidence"). 
9
 Rio Alcrom Corp. v. Jimco, Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 
(Utah 1980). 
8 
ambiguous, and therefore should be interpreted to provide 
coverage. In attempting to convince this Court to overturn 
its prior precedent in Gridlev, LaSal seeks to point the 
Court to dictionaries, extrinsic "evidence" purporting to 
reflect the "drafting history" of the policy language, and 
the existence of a minority of results-oriented judicial 
opinions adopting LaSal's position. In its attempt to create 
ambiguity where none exists, LaSal looks everywhere except to 
the plain language of the insurance contract it entered into 
with Omaha. As this Court and scores of others have found, 
fundamental principles of contract interpretation require 
that the term "sudden," read in context, contain a temporal 
element. 
To support its argument, LaSal strives to create 
ambiguity within the policy by citing in the abstract 
multiple definitions of the word "sudden." However, such an 
analysis snatches the word "sudden" from its context and 
views it in isolation, gleaning ambiguity solely from the 
pages of dictionaries, where multiple meanings appear for the 
vast majority of words which, as used in context, are clearly 
understood.10 What a word means in a particular usage 
10
 See, e.g., Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern 
Fidelity Ins. Co., No. 78,293, 1993 WL 241520 at *4 (Fla. 
July 1, 1993)("dictionaries are * imperfect yardsticks of 
ambiguity,M); Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 
702 F. Supp. 1317, 1324 (E.D. Mich. 1988)("[I]f merely 
applying a definition in the dictionary suffices to create 
ambiguity, no term would be unambiguous. The interpretation 
of contractual language is not mechanical."). 
9 
depends in large part on context. As Judge Learned Hand 
observed, 
[w]ords are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; 
they have only a communal existence; and not only 
does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, 
but all in their aggregate take their purport from 
the setting in which they are used[.] 
NLRB v. Federbush Co.. 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941). 
For example, in the sentence "the bride's train was 
made of lace," no one would argue that the bride was carrying 
a railroad car down the aisle on the basis of the fact that 
the first entry in the dictionary under "train" may be 
"railroad car." Like "train" in the example above, the word 
"sudden" must be read in its contractual context, where it is 
coupled with "accidental." In that context, to read "sudden" 
to mean only "unexpected or unintended" would deprive the 
term of any independent meaning. As the California Court of 
Appeal recently noted, read in context "the word [sudden] 
must, if it is to be anything more than a hiccup in front of 
the word accidental, convey a *temporal7 meaning of 
immediacy, quickness or abruptness." ACL Technologies. Inc. 
v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Co.. 17 Cal. App. 4th 1773, 
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 206, 214 (1993), review denied (Cal. Nov. 
17, 1993). 
Applying Utah law, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit, in rejecting an argument identical to 
LaSal's, cogently stated the point: 
[R]eading "sudden" without a temporal component 
renders "accidental" redundant. While both 
10 
conditions might include "unexpected11 or 
"unintended," "sudden" cannot mean "gradual," 
"routine" or "continuous." Since Utah law dictates 
each contract provision be given effect, . . . the 
conjunctive association of "sudden" with 
"accidental" is exactly the point on which our 
interpretation turns. Dictionaries may indicate 
each word has several overlapping meanings. We 
cannot use only the redundant definitions, however. 
Giving effect to every provision obliges us to 
construe "sudden" and "accidental" as separate, 
conditional requirements for coverage. This 
interpretive rule thus removes any ambiguity 
created by common usage. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United States Fidelity & 
Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484, 1489 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 113 
S. Ct. 411 (1992). 
LaSal also encourages this Court to find the term 
"sudden" ambiguous merely because of the existence of 
conflicting judicial precedent. However, a contract is not 
rendered ambiguous simply because some courts have 
interpreted its language contrary to its plain meaning. As 
one appellate court observed, "we would be abdicating our 
judicial role were we to decide such cases by the purely 
mechanical process of searching the nation's courts to 
ascertain if there are conflicting decisions." Lower Paxton 
Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 383 Pa. 
Super. 558, 557 A.2d 393, 400 n.4, allocatur denied, 93 M.D. 
Allocatur Dkt. 1989 (Pa. 1989). As the Michigan Supreme 
Court has noted, relying on differences in judicial opinions 
as proof of ambiguity "merely begs the question." Upjohn Co. 
v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 438 Mich. 197, 476 N.W.2d 392, 398 
n.8 (1991). 
11 
In fact, the majority of recent decisions, including 
decisions by six state supreme courts,11 seven federal 
circuit courts of appeal,12 and numerous lower appellate and 
11
 See, e.g., Dimmitt, 1993 WL 241520 at *4 (Fla. 
July 1, 1993)("to construe sudden also to mean unintended and 
unexpected would render the words sudden and accidental 
entirely redundant"); Polaroid Corp, v. Travelers Ins. Co.f 
414 Mass, 747, 610 N.E.2d 912, 915 (1993)(pollution exclusion 
bars coverage where "the discharge of pollutants into the 
environment happened gradually, over a lengthy period of 
time"); Hybud Equip, Corp, v. Sphere Drake Ins, Co,, 64 Ohio 
St, 2d 657, 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (1992), cert, denied, 113 
S. Ct. 1585 (1993) ("[t]he inclusion of the word 'sudden' 
readily indicates that the exception was not intended to 
apply to a release that occurred over an extended period of 
time"); Upjohn Co, v. New Hampshire Ins, Co,, 438 Mich. 197, 
476 N,W,2d 392, 403 (1991) ("when considered in its plain and 
easily understood sense, * sudden' is defined with a temporal 
element that joins together conceptually the immediate and 
the unexpected"); Lumbermens Mut, Casualty Co, v, Belleville 
Indus,, Inc., 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1990) 
("[i]f the word 'sudden' is to have any meaning or value in 
the exception to the pollution exclusion clause, only an 
abrupt discharge or release of pollutants falls within the 
exception"), cert, denied. 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992); Powers 
Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 74 N.Y.2d 910, 548 N.E.2d 
1301, 1302, 549 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1989)(exception to pollution 
exclusion is not operative unless occurrence is both "sudden 
and "accidental"); Technicon Elecs. Corp. v, American Home 
Ins, Co,. 74 N.Y.2d 66, 542 N.E.2d 1048, 1050, 544 N.Y.S,2d 
531 (1989)(same); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc, v. 
Peerless Ins, Co,. 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, 382 ("[t]he 
exception . . . describes the event — not only in terms of 
its being unexpected, but in terms of its happening 
instantaneously or precipitantly"), reh'g denied, 316 N.C. 
386, 346 S.E.2d 134 (1986). 
12
 Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., No. 91-16758, 1993 WL 
485275 (9th Cir. Nov. 26, 1993); Bituminous Casualty Co. v. 
Tonka Corp., 9 F.3d 51 (8th Cir. 1993); Bureau of Engraving, 
Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 1175 (8th Cir, 1993); United 
States Fidelity & Guar, Co, v, Morrison Grain Co,, 999 F.2d 
489 (10th Cir. 1993); Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem. 
Co., 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993)(Utah law); Aetna Casualty 
& Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 
1992); Hartford Accident & Indem., 962 F.2d 1484 (Utah law); 
Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754 (6th 
(continued...) 
12 
trial courts/3 have held that, to be sudden, a "discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape" of pollutants must be 
instantaneous or nearly instantaneous; it cannot occur 
gradually or continue over an extended period of time.14 As 
the California Court of Appeal found in ACL Technologies, a 
case similarly involving pollution resulting from the long-
term leakage of corroded underground storage tanks: 
[Wjhatever "sudden" means, it does not mean 
gradual. The ordinary person would never think 
that something which happens gradually also 
happened suddenly. The words are antonyms. . . . 
[G]radual is the opposite of sudden. . . . Sudden 
never means both "unexpected and gradual." 
12(.. .continued) 
Cir. 1992); Terminix Int'l Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 956 
F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1992); Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark 
Assoc. Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991); State of New York 
v. AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 (2d Cir. 1991); A. 
Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66 (1st 
Cir. 1991); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. Belleville 
Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1423 (1st Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 
112 S. Ct. 969 (1992); Ogden Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
924 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1991); FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & 
Sur. Co., 897 F.2d 214 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 911 
(1990); Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 905 
F.2d 954, 955 (6th Cir. 1990); United States Fidelity & Guar. 
Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988); 
Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 
727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984). 
13
 A list of decisions recognizing that the term 
"sudden" in the pollution exclusion has a temporal meaning is 
attached as Addendum A. 
14
 In Morton International, Inc. v. General Accident 
Insurance Co., 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993), motions for 
recons. pending, the New Jersey Supreme Court also recognized 
that the pollution exclusion as written unambiguously bars 
coverage for temporally sudden discharges of pollutants, but 
refused to apply the plain language of the exclusion based 
upon an estoppel theory. Id. at 847; see infra at pp. 15-16. 
13 
ACL Technologies, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 215-16 (citations and 
footnotes omitted). 
Finally, LaSal relies heavily on the analysis of a 
handful of courts that have found coverage for gradual 
pollution after inappropriate consideration of one-sided 
"drafting history" or "regulatory history" of the pollution 
exclusion.15 Those courts have relied primarily on articles 
written by counsel for policyholders, and their decisions are 
based on selected statements quoted from pro-policyholder 
articles or from other decisions erroneously considering such 
"evidence," which is untested by traditional rules of 
impeachment and cross-examination. 
This Court should reject any reliance on materials 
relating to the exclusion's purported history. First, it is 
a fundamental precept of Utah law that extrinsic evidence of 
the parties' intent will not be considered where a contract 
is unambiguous.16 Moreover, even were this Court to find 
that ambiguity exists such that reference to extrinsic 
evidence is permitted, only evidence of the contracting 
15
 See Morton Int'l. 629 A.2d at 848-49; Just v. Land 
Reclamation, Ltd., 155 Wis. 2d 737, 456 N.W.2d 570, 574-75 
(1990); Claussen v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 259 Ga. 333, 
380 S.E.2d 686, 689 (1989). 
16
 Williams v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 
534, 536 (Utah 1979); Anaconda Minerals Co., 990 F.2d at 
1179. 
14 
parties7 intent should be considered.17 LaSal does not, and 
cannot, contend that the materials relied upon in this 
handful of decisions demonstrate the mutual intent of LaSal 
and its insurers at the time they entered into the policies 
at issue. Indeed, LaSal does not suggest that it was even 
aware of these statements when the insurance contracts were 
executed. These statements provide no evidence probative of 
the mutual intent of the parties to the insurance contracts 
at issue and therefore should not be considered by the Court. 
The more reasoned decisions have refused to engage in 
appellate "fact-finding" based upon self-serving assertions 
of the purported "history" of the pollution exclusion. For 
example, in Polaroid Corporation v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 
414 Mass 749, 610 N.E.2d 912 (1993), the highest court of 
Massachusetts refused to consider extrinsic materials in 
construing the terms "sudden" and "accidental" and struck 
such materials from the record, stating that H/[b]ecause the 
word 'sudden7 in the pollution exclusion clause is not 
ambiguous, we have no need to consider the drafting history 
of that clause or any statements made by insurance company 
representatives concerning the intention of its drafters.7" 
17
 See G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)(in interpreting contract, court 
determines "what the parties intended by examining the entire 
contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, 
giving objective and reasonable construction to the contract 
as a whole") (emphasis added). 
15 
Id. at 916 n.7 (quoting Belleville Indus., 555 N.E.2d at 
573) .18 
A recent example of misplaced reliance on partisan 
articles presenting the alleged "history" of the pollution 
exclusion appears in Morton International. Inc. v. General 
Accident Insurance Co., 134 N.J. 1, 629 A.2d 831 (1993), 
motions for recons. pending. Although Morton International 
recognized that the plain language of the exclusion as 
written eliminates all coverage for pollution except that 
caused by discharges that are both sudden and accidental, Id. 
at 847. Id. It relied on the "regulatory history" of the 
exclusion as presented in articles by policyholder attorneys, 
held that insurers were "estopped" from asserting what the 
court had found to be the clear terms of their contracts. 
Id. at 848.19 
18
 Other state supreme courts are in accord. Upjohn 
Co., 476 N.W.2d at 396 n.6 ("when the policy is found to be 
clear and unambiguous, 'there is no need to resort to 
extrinsic evidence to ascertain the meaning of the 
exclusion'"); Belleville Indus.r 555 N.E.2d at 573 (same). 
Earlier this year, the Florida Supreme Court vacated an 
earlier opinion finding the word "sudden" to be ambiguous on 
the basis of such purported "drafting history." Dimmitt, No. 
78,293, 1993 WL 251520 (Fla. July 1, 1993). Upon motion for 
rehearing, the Dimmitt court found the "sudden and 
accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion to be 
unambiguous; therefore, the court found it "inappropriate and 
unnecessary" to consider the extrinsic evidence of "drafting 
history" put forth by the policyholder. Id. at *5. 
19
 The New Jersey courts analysis fails in at least 
three crucial regards. First, the court asserts that state 
regulators were somehow misled about the terms of the 
exclusion, even though the regulators were presented with the 
admittedly unambiguous language of the exclusion itself. 
(continued...) 
16 
Even if LaSal's contentions regarding the "drafting 
history11 or "regulatory history" of the pollution exclusion 
were relevant, a full and fair evaluation of the complete 
range of available materials documenting the drafting and 
regulatory background of the pollution exclusion supports the 
proposition that the exclusion means what its plain language 
says: there is no coverage for pollution occurrences unless 
the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of contamination 
is both temporally abrupt and accidental.20 
19(.. .continued) 
Second, at the time the exclusion was drafted, environmental 
regulatory regimes like CERCLA did not yet exist. No one — 
not insurers, not policyholders, not state regulators — 
could have anticipated the kinds of massive, latent 
liabilities that have arisen. Finally, the court made its 
decision based on an unbalanced, incomplete view of the 
pollution exclusion's drafting history. No trial was ever 
held on this issue such that the parties could address the 
various arguments adopted by the court. These flaws in the 
Morton opinion, along with others, form the basis for 
insurers7 motion for reconsideration currently before the New 
Jersey Supreme Court. 
20
 We note that the law review article on which LaSal 
relies was written by attorneys who regularly represent 
policyholders in insurance coverage litigation. See, e.g., 
Coaklev v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co., 136 N.H. 402, 618 
A.2d 777 (1992)(policyholders represented by Ms. Ballard, 
principal author of article cited by LaSal). For the 
insurers' side of the drafting history debate, see articles 
of insurer representatives Bernard J. Daenzer & Edward 
Zampino, Environmental Liability and the Pollution Exclusion; 
Why Some Courts Find Coverage, 46 Chartered Property & 
Casualty Underwriters Journal No. 2, 84 (June 1993)(Ex. 1) 
and Victor C. Harwood, III, Brian J. Coyle & Edward Zampino, 
The "Frivolity" of Policyholder Gradual Pollution Discharge 
Claims. 5 Mealey's Litig. Reps.: Ins. No. 40 (Aug. 27, 
1991)(Ex. 2); cf. Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause 
Through the Looking Glass. 74 Geo. L.J. 1237, 1241-53 (1986). 
See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Aetna Casualty and Surety 
Company. IELA proffers these materials conditionally and 
(continued...) 
17 
The pollution exclusion was drafted in 1970 by the 
Insurance Rating Board ("IRB"). IRB,s General Liability 
Governing Committee decided to adopt "a policy exclusion of 
pollution that would run to bodily injury and property damage 
• . . for all general liability insurance, the exclusion to 
except pollution caused injuries when the pollution results 
from the classical accident."21 A contemporaneous memorandum 
confirmed what was common knowledge among insurers and major 
insureds: that the pollution exclusion was to "exclude all . 
• . pollution or contamination of water and air except for 
the xboom' case, or ^classical accident,,n22 
20(.. .continued) 
invites the Court to consider them only if the Court elects 
to consider extrinsic materials relied upon by LaSal. 
21
 Minutes of IRB General Liability Governing 
Committee ("GLGC") meeting (March 17, 1970), quoted by 
Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 22 (emphasis in 
original). 
22
 Memorandum by Robert S. Hansen, Aetna Casualty's 
representative on the GLGC (March 20, 1970), quoted by 
Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 22. In order to 
accomplish this, the pollution exclusion was drafted to 
differ from the definition of "occurrence," which is part of 
the contract's insuring agreement, in at least two important 
ways. First, the pollution exclusion eliminates coverage for 
repeated or continuous exposure to conditions with regard to 
pollution-related liability. Second, unlike the "occurrence" 
definition, the pollution exclusion does not focus upon the 
nature of the damage or upon whether such damage was expected 
or intended, but rather upon the nature of the discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape. Accordingly, liability for the 
repeated or intentional release of pollutants was plainly 
intended to be excluded from coverage. 
18 
This classical accident (or "boom" event) has always 
been understood to be sudden or abrupt.23 An explanatory 
memorandum submitted by the IRB to state insurance 
commissioners in 1970 incorporated this accepted 
understanding of the word "accident": 
Coverage for pollution or contamination 
is not provided in most cases under 
present policies because the damages can 
be said to be expected or intended and 
thus are excluded by the definition of 
occurrence. The above exclusion 
clarifies the situation so as to avoid 
any question of intent. Coverage is 
continued for pollution or contamination 
caused injuries when the pollution or 
contamination results from an accident 
24 
• • • • 
This directly contradicts any claim that the pollution 
exclusion would not change coverage for pollution claims 
under the occurrence-based policies. The occurrence 
definition focuses on intent; for there to be an occurrence, 
the damage must be unexpected and unintended. In contrast, 
the IRB submission plainly states that the pollution 
exclusion "avoid[s] any question of intent." As the 
submission states, the pollution exclusion does this by 
eliminating coverage for all pollution-related liability 
unless it was caused by the classical "accident." Courts 
23
 See Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 22-
24 & n.6. 
24
 See Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 38 
& n.51 (emphasis in original). 
19 
have found that this is the proper interpretation of the IRB 
submission.25 
Policyholders and their representatives also recognized 
and understood this purpose when the exclusion was drafted. 
One broker wrote in the leading publication for corporate 
insurance buyers that the exclusion's "purpose" is to provide 
for some very short term phenomenon."26 An insurance 
consultant wrote at the time: 
the exception to the [pollution] 
exclusion states that the dispersal, 
release or escape must be "sudden and 
accidental." In other words, it must be 
both sudden and accidental rather than 
either sudden or accidental.27 
Mr. Melvin L. Summerhays was the General Liability Rates 
and Forms Analyst for the Utah Department of Insurance in 
1970. He has stated that, at the time of the filing of the 
pollution exclusion with the Department, his understanding 
was that "*[s]udden' was something * abrupt7 or x quick.' An 
25
 See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host 
Corp.. 120 F.R.D. 129, 133-34 (D. Kan. 1988) (finding that 
the submission "support[s] the courts previous 
interpretation that the pollution exclusion has an 
independent, objective meaning and is not simply a 
restatement of the subjective definition of occurrence"); see 
also Truck Ins. Exchange v. Pozzuoli, 17 Cal. App. 4th 856, 
21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 651 n.2 (1993) (finding that intent 
behind the exclusion was to "wholly eliminate coverage for 
pollution except in the case of a ^classical accident,' . . . 
defined as a * sudden, boom-type accident7 such as an 
explosion"), rev, denied. (Cal. Nov. 17, 1993). 
26
 G. R. E. Bromwich, Pollution and Insurance. 1971 
Risk Mgmt. 15, 19 (Ex. 3). 
27
 Warren G. Brockmeier, Pollution — The Risk and 
Insurance Problem. 12 For The Defense 77, 79 (1971) (Ex. 4). 
20 
*accident' was a sudden event that happened by chance." 
Affidavit of Melvin L. Summerhays fl 4 (September 2, 1993) 
(Ex. 5).28 Thus, "[c]learly, coverage for gradual pollution 
discharges would be excluded." Affidavit f 5. 
Numerous state regulatory documents also demonstrate 
that insurance commissioners understood the pollution 
exclusion to restrict coverage. After considering the 
exclusion, the Kansas Insurance Commissioner wrote, "[i]n 
view of the obvious reduction in coverage, to what extent 
will the premiums be reduced when this endorsement is 
attached?"29 Moreover, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, South 
Dakota, Hawaii, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of 
Columbia — because of the reduction in coverage — all 
required the consent of the insured before permitting the 
endorsement to be deemed part of outstanding policies.30 
Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, Texas, and Georgia 
permitted carriers to attach the pollution exclusion only to 
new or renewal policies.31 
28
 Because the cases relied upon by LaSal fail to 
describe fully the drafting and regulatory history of the 
pollution exclusion, IELA conditionally proffers this 
affidavit in response. If the Court accepts LaSal's improper 
invitation to go beyond the plain policy language to 
interpret the exclusion, IELA offers this affidavit to help 
the Court gain a complete view of that history. 
29
 Daenzer & Zampino, supra note 20, at 89. 
30
 Harwood, Coyle & Zampino, supra note 20, at 41. 
31
 Id. at 40. 
21 
Significantly, two states initially disapproved the 
exclusion because it eliminated coverage. The New Hampshire 
Insurance Commissioner, in a 1970 press statement, announced 
disapproval of the exclusion because it excluded coverage 
that otherwise might be available on an occurrence basis; and 
the Vermont Insurance Commissioner initially disapproved the 
exclusion as well.32 Obviously, if the exclusion were merely 
a "clarification" that did not restrict or limit coverage, 
these regulatory actions would have been unnecessary. It was 
only because the exclusion eliminated coverage that state 
insurance commissioners took these steps. 
Ultimately, however, the entire historical debate is 
irrelevant to the decision before this Court. Interpretation 
of the plain language of the insurance contract according to 
the principles established by Utah courts can lead to but one 
conclusion: that the contract of insurance purchased by 
LaSal did not contemplate insurance coverage for property 
contamination caused by gasoline gradually dispersed through 
the policyholders corroded piping. 
II. THE GRADUAL "DISCHARGE, DISPERSAL, RELEASE OR ESCAPE" OF 
GASOLINE FROM A CORRODED UNDERGROUND PIPE CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED "SUDDEN." 
LaSal argues in the alternative that, even if "sudden" 
is properly interpreted to contain a temporal element, the 
gradual leakage stemming from the corrosion of LaSal's 
32
 Id. at 43. 
22 
underground line was somehow temporally "sudden." LaSal 
attempts to achieve this sleight-of-hand by contending that 
neither the length of time during which the leakage occurs# 
nor the volume of pollutants released, nor the process by 
which the release occurs is pertinent to whether the event 
resulting in contamination was "sudden." According to LaSal, 
the only relevant inquiry is whether, at the instant when the 
final molecules of the pipe wall gave way, the so-called 
"fracture moment," the initial contact between gasoline and 
soil was temporally "sudden."33 
What LaSal's analysis ignores, however, is that this 
Court will not impose "a force[d] or strained construction" 
on a contractual term in order to create ambiguity. Auto 
Leasing Co. v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Utah 2d 336, 325 P.2d 
264, 266 (1958). Nor will this Court permit "a 
hypertechnical distortion of language not in accordance with 
the meaning intended by the insurance contract." Marriot v. 
Pacific Nat'l Life Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P.2d 
981, 983 (1970). LaSal's arguments torture the policy 
language and would wholly eradicate any independent meaning 
of the word "sudden." 
LaSal first argues that the length of time during which 
a discharge occurs is irrelevant to the discharge's temporal 
suddenness. Such a construction, however, ignores the 
language of the exclusion. The exception restores coverage 
33
 LaSal Brief at 43. 
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for pollution events only where "the discharge, dispersal, 
release or escape" — not the "fracture moment" — is both 
"sudden and accidental." LaSal's contention that the 
operative "discharge, dispersal, release or escape" is merely 
the initial instant of contact between contaminant and 
environment does violence to the plain language of the 
insurance contract. 
Every event has a beginning. The formation of the Grand 
Canyon began in one moment during which the accumulated 
effect of water, wind, sun and the elements caused the first 
particle of rock to separate from the earth. To consider 
such an event "sudden" because the precise point at which 
that first, inevitable separation occurred was "of abrupt or 
unexpected onset"34 makes a mockery of the concept. 
Likewise, LaSal's argument would neutralize the plain meaning 
of the contract. See Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. 
Belleville Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1423, 1428 (1st Cir. 
1991)("From a microanalytical viewpoint, almost any event can 
be labelled unexpected, since history probably never repeats 
itself precisely. But such an approach would eviscerate the 
exclusion for pollution.")35 
34
 LaSal Brief at 32. 
35
 LaSal quotes only selectively from other cases to 
support this contention. For example, in Belleville Indus., 
555 N.E.2d at 573 n.6, Massachusetts' highest court 
"decline[d] to speculate on the proper construction of the 
exception, if a release or discharge, initially both 
accidental and sudden, continues for an extended period. As 
(continued...) 
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Further, LaSal's argument that the duration of the 
"discharge, dispersal, release or escape" is irrelevant 
ignores the weight of the many decisions which have held 
that, because "sudden" has a temporal element, routine 
discharges of pollutants or contaminants over an extended 
period are barred from coverage by the pollution exclusion. 
35(. • .continued) 
the discharge or release continues, at some point, 
presumably, it would likely cease to be . . . sudden (even in 
the sense of unexpected).11 Similarly, the California Court 
of Appeal in Shell Oil v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 12 Cal. 
App. 4th 715, 15 Cal Rptr. 2d 815 (1993), qualified the 
dictum relied upon by LaSal: "If a sudden and accidental 
[event] continues for a long time, at some point it ceases to 
be sudden or accidental." 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842. 
Additionally, the New York intermediate appellate cases 
relied upon by LaSal are clearly in conflict with the 
pronouncements of that state7s highest court. In both Powers 
Chemco, 542 N.E.2d at 1302, and Technicon, 542 N.E.2d at 
1050, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that the 
"sudden" and "accidental" prongs of the exception to the 
exclusion are independent requirements which must both be 
satisfied in order for coverage to be restored. The cases 
relied upon by LaSal clearly ignore that requirement. 
36
 See, e.g., Belleville Indus., 938 F.2d at 1429-30 
("sudden and accidental" exception bars coverage attributable 
to gradual pollution; no coverage for pollution occurring 
over a period of years); AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d at 1428-
29 (release or discharge over a period of years not "sudden" 
despite insured's attempt to represent discharge as sudden or 
accidental ruptures of individual containers); Farm Bureau 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Laudick, 859 P.2d 410, 412-13 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1993) (long term leak from underground storage tank is not 
"sudden"), review denied (Kan. November 9, 1993); Upjohn Co., 
476 N.W.2d at 394-95 (no coverage where manufacturing by-
product was pumped into a leaking underground storage tank in 
nine batches over a month-long period); Technicon Elecs., 542 
N.E.2d at 129 (industrial waste discharged for six years not 
"sudden"); Waste Management. 340 S.E.2d at 382-83 (no 
coverage where contaminants were disposed of at a landfill 
over a number of years); ACL Technologies, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
at 215-16 (where pollution resulted from corroded underground 
(continued...) 
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The Gridlev court implicitly recognized that the term 
"sudden" cannot be fairly interpreted within the context of 
the exception to the exclusion without some reference to the 
duration and volume of the "discharge, dispersal, release or 
escape." In Gridley, the underground line leak at issue was 
a "clean break" caused by shifting of the area where the pipe 
was located. 828 P.2d at 525. This Court distinguished the 
situation before it from the situation where "the break was 
caused by corrosion or deterioration which would have 
resulted in a gradual drip or trickle from the line." Id. at 
36(. . .continued) 
storage tank, "sudden does not mean gradual"); Pozzuoli, 21 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (long-term gasoline leak from underground 
storage tank is not "sudden"); Borer-Warner Corp. v. Insurance 
Co. of N. Am., 174 A.D.2d 24, 577 N.Y.S.2d 953 (disposal of 
waste over periods ranging from two years to four decades not 
"sudden"), review denied, 80 N.Y.2d 751, 600 N.E.2d 632, 587 
N.Y.S.2d 950 (1992); Harlevsville Mut. Ins. Co. v. R.W. Harp 
& Sons, Inc., 305 S.C. 492, 409 S.E.2d 418, 420 (App. 
1991)(gasoline leak from negligently installed underground 
pipe union lasting between fourteen and thirty days is not 
"sudden"), cert, dismissed, 419 S.E.2d 222 (S.C. 1992); Mays 
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 103 Or. App. 578, 799 P.2d 653, 
655, 657 (1990) (exclusion bars coverage for release of 
wastes over ten year period as a regular part of business 
operations), rev, denied, 311 Or. 150, 806 P.2d 128 (1991); 
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or. App. 136, 711 P.2d 
212, 214 (1985) (pollution exclusion bars coverage for 
discharges released "regularly over a period of many years"), 
rev, denied, 301 Or. 76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986); Barmet of 
Indiana, Inc. v. Security Ins. Group, 425 N.E.2d 201, 202 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (no coverage where frequency of gas 
emissions ranged from occasional to once or twice a week); 
Lower Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 
557 A.2d at 403 (no "sudden" discharge where methane gas 
emanated from landfill "for some time"); Techallov Co. v. 
Reliance Ins. Co., 338 Pa. Super. 1, 487 A.2d 820, 827 (1984) 
(no coverage for "regular or sporadic [discharge] . . . over 
a period of 25 years"), rev, denied, 338 E.D. Allocatur Dkt. 
1985 (Pa. Oct. 31, 1985). 
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527 (emphasis added). That is precisely the situation 
currently before this Court. 
Other courts have agreed with the trial court and with 
this Court's dictum in Gridley that leakage stemming from 
corrosion of underground storage tanks cannot be temporally 
"sudden." See, e.g., ACL Technologies, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
219 ("Corrosion is, by definition, a gradual process.").37 
37
 LaSal's suggestion that the interpretation of the 
words "sudden and accidental" in old boiler and machinery 
policies to include gradual deterioration of equipment may be 
imported wholesale into the interpretation of the pollution 
exclusion clause is wholly without merit. The term "sudden," 
as employed in those polices, has a purpose wholly different 
from that of the term "sudden" in the pollution exclusion. 
Boiler and machinery policies protect insureds against 
liability arising out of damage to equipment. See 10A G. 
Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d § 42.385 at 496-98 (rev. ed. 
1982). Thus, "sudden" modifies the actual damage to the 
machine — its breakage or explosion. See, e.g., Julius 
Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 830 
(D. Colo. 1955) (policy provided coverage for sudden and 
accidental tearing, cracking, burning or bulging of insured's 
machinery). In the context of the pollution exclusion, 
however, "sudden" defines the temporal nature of the 
"discharge, dispersal, release or escape" of pollutants, not 
the resulting damage. The rationale provided for this 
interpretation of "sudden" in boiler and machinery policies, 
which specifically obligate the insurer to cover the sudden 
and accidental breaking of covered machinery, cannot be 
transferred to the pollution exclusion in general liability 
policies. 
In Anderson & Middleton Lumber Co. v. Lumbermen's Mutual 
Ins. Co., 53 Wash. 2d 404, 333 P.2d 938, 940 (1959), the 
court opined that "[i]t seems to us that the risk to the 
insurer would be the same, whether a break was instantaneous 
or began with a crack which developed over a period of time 
until the final cleavage occurred, as long as its progress 
was undetectable." This often-criticized, results-oriented 
analysis, see, e.g., Victor C. Harwood III, A Case of 
Misplaced Reliance; Anderson & Middletown Lumber Company 
Revisited, 7 Mealey's Litig.Reps.: Ins. No. 33 at 12 (July 
1, 1993)(Ex. 6), cannot rationally be incorporated into the 
pollution exclusion, where the parties plainly contracted to 
(continued...) 
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LaSal can contend that the ongoing and extended leakage 
of gasoline due to gradual corrosion in an underground line 
is "sudden" is to create a scenario where every "discharge, 
dispersal, release or escape" of a pollutant is "sudden" 
based on its initial contact with the environment. Such a 
misinterpretation of the unambiguous contractual language 
defies common sense and violates fundamental rules of 
contract interpretation. "Sudden" cannot be made to mean 
"gradual." The judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
III. IGNORING THE PLAIN MEANING OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS 
DISSERVES THE PUBLIC INTEREST BY DESTABILIZING THE 
INSURANCE SYSTEM AND HARMING ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS. 
Any failure to enforce the clear provisions of insurance 
contracts necessarily affects the integrity of the insurance 
37(.. .continued) 
exclude coverage for all pollution claims, except those where 
the "discharge, dispersal, release or escape" was "sudden and 
accidental." Whether or not the insured could detect, or 
even knew of the polluting event is irrelevant to application 
of the pollution exclusion. See, e.g., Aardvark Assocs., 942 
F.2d at 194 (pollution exclusion applies to "passive 
polluters," i.e., those who do not actually release 
pollutants); Powers Chemco, 548 N.E.2d at 1302 (exclusion 
precludes coverage even where former property owner 
discharged pollutants without policyholders knowledge or 
consent); Waste Management, 340 S.E.2d at 379 (pollution 
exclusion applicable despite fact that insured was waste 
transporter, not operator of waste disposal site); Dimmitt, 
No. 78,293, 1993 WL 241520 at *5 (pollution exclusion bars 
coverage despite fact that policyholder was generator of 
waste oil who sold it to polluting recycler); ACL 
Technologies, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (pollution exclusion bars 
coverage to policyholder who unknowingly purchased property 
with leaking underground storage tanks). 
28 
underwriting process in general. Insurance involves an 
agreement by the insurer to protect the insured against a 
specified risk for a fee. Insurance can cover risks, even 
very large ones, that can be actuarially predicted over a 
large number of insureds. This vital risk-spreading function 
is undercut, however, by excessive uncertainty as to the 
nature of the risk assumed. No insurer can (or would) agree 
to cover a carefully defined risk if courts felt free to 
impose liability as they saw fit, notwithstanding the plain 
language of the policy.38 
In short, settled assumptions concerning judicial 
enforcement of contracts underlie insurers' actuarial 
projections of their expected loss experience and the 
resulting calculation of premiums, particularly for large 
commercial risks. Distorting policy language as LaSal urges 
would transform the insurance contract from a pool of 
actuarially predictable risks into a gambling transaction 
with the odds stacked so that the insurer always pays. In 
the context of environmental claims, such a profound 
38
 As the United States General Accounting Office 
recently noted in testimony before a subcommittee of the 
United States House of Representatives, the projected cost of 
the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) alone is as much as 
five times the total surplus of the U.S. property/casualty 
insurance industry. See Insurance Liability for Cleanup 
Costs at Hazardous Waste Sites: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Policy Research and Insurance of the House Comm. on 
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50 
(1990) ("Potential Liability of Property/Casualty Insurers 
for Costs of Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Sites"). 
29 
alteration of the insurance risk would expose insurers to 
liabilities many times greater than the capacity of the 
industry as a whole. 
Moreover, if a court were to disregard the express and 
unambiguous provisions defining the risks that the insurer 
agreed to cover, the underwriter must pass on the cost of 
this uncertainty to all consumers of insurance. The failure 
to enforce the insurance contract as written therefore would 
affect the price and availability of insurance coverage for 
those who do not have the resources to self-insure, e.g., 
individuals and small businesses.39 As the California 
Supreme Court observed in Garvey v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co.. 48 Cal.3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 711, 257 Cal. 
Rptr. 292 (Cal. 1989), judicially created insurance coverage 
leaves "ordinary insureds to bear the expense of increased 
premiums necessitated by the erroneous expansion of their 
insurers' potential liabilities." 
39
 The Environmental Protection Agency itself has 
explained that the limited availability of insurance for 
Superfund contractors is based in part on the fact that 
"[c]ourts in key jurisdictions have imposed retroactive 
liabilities on insurers for pollution damages and cleanup 
costs that were never intended to be covered . . . . The 
reinsurance market for gradual pollution insurance has 
virtually disappeared because of adverse loss experience and 
concerns over legal trends in the U.S." EPA, "Superfund 
Response Action Contractor Indemnification," 54 Fed. Reg. 
46012, 46013 (October 31, 1989). See also J. Kehne, Note, 
Encouraging Safety Through Insurance-Based Incentives; 
Financial Responsibility for Hazardous Wastes, 96 Yale L.J. 
403, 423 (1986) (contraction of pollution coverage market 
attributed in part to insurers' "fears that further changes 
in legal rules will undermine the basis upon which policies 
are currently written"). 
30 
In the long run, public policy is best served by 
adhering to time-tested principles of insurance contract 
interpretation. These fundamental public policy 
considerations reinforce what Utah law requires: an insurance 
policy, like any other contract, must be construed according 
to its clear language and not distorted to provide free 
insurance where none was intended. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, amicus curiae IELA urges 
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ADDENDUM A 
Cases Holding That The Term "Sudden" 
In The Pollution Exclusion Has A Temporal Meaning1 
State Supreme Court Cases 
1. Hybud Equipment Corp, v. Sphere Drake Insurance Co,, 597 
N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992) ("the word * sudden' in the exception 
is not synonymous with the word xunexpected' in the typical 
definition of *occurrence'; instead, the word also has a 
temporal aspect") (emphasis in original), reh'g denied. 600 
N,K.2d 686 (Ohio 1992) , cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 1585 (1993). 
2. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. SCA Services. Inc., 412 Mass. 
330, 588 N.E.2d 1346 (1992) (pollution at landfill occurring 
gradually over several months of repeated activity was not 
the result of a "sudden and accidental" discharge). 
3. Upiohn Co. v. New Hampshire Insurance Co.. 438 Mich. 197, 476 
N.W.2d 392 (1991) ("'sudden' includes a temporal element as 
well as a sense of the unexpected") , reh'g denied, 439 Mich. 
1202 (1991). 
4. Protective National Insurance Co. v. City of Woodhaven. 438 
Mich. 154, 476 N.W.2d 374 (1991) ("'sudden' is defined with 
a 'temporal element that joins together conceptually the 
immediate and the unexpected"). 
5. Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. . 407 
Mass. 689, 555 N.E.2d 576, 579 (1990) (pollution exclusion 
provides coverage "only if the discharge or release was not 
only accidental but also 'sudden,' in the sense of an 
unexpected, abrupt discharge or release"). 
6. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Industries, 
Inc. . 407 Mass. 675, 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 (1990) ("For the 
word * sudden' to have any significant purpose, and not to be 
surplusage when used generally in conjunction with the word 
*accidental,' it must have a temporal aspect to its meaning, 
and not just the sense of something unexpected"). 
7. Waste Management of Carolinas. Inc. v. Peerless Insurance 
Co., 315 N.C. 688, 340 S.E.2d 374, 382-83 (1986) (pollution 
exclusion bars coverage for "xcontribution' over a number of 
years of contaminating materials to a landfill"). 
1
 In order not to burden the Court, we have not enclosed 
copies of the unreported opinions in this addendum. However, wo 
can provide immediate copies of any or all of the unreported 
opinions upon request. 
8. Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Insurance 
Corp., No. 78-293 (Fla. July 1, 1993) ("The ordinary and 
common usage of the term 'sudden7 includes a temporal aspect 
with a sense of immediacy or abruptness"; no coverage where 
pollution "took place over a period of years and most of it 
occurred gradually"). 
9. Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Insurance Co. , 610 N.E.2d 912 
(Mass. April 7, 1993) (pollution exclusion bars coverage 
where evidence showed that "the discharge of pollutants into 
the environment happened gradually, over a lengthy period of 
time"). 
State Intermediate Appellate Court Cases 
1. Dakhue Landfill. Inc. v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, No. 
CO-93-905 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23,1993) ("Releases of 
pollutants that extend over two decades cannot be considered 
'sudden' under any reasonable interpretation of the word"). 
2. County of Fulton v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.. 
No. 67681, 1993 WL 271807 (N.Y. App. Div. , 3d Dep't July 22, 
1993) ("The [underlying] complaints do not allege an abrupt 
or quick discharge, but rather the inference is that the 
discharge occurred over long periods of time. Such discharge 
does not qualify as being sudden")• 
3. Greenville County v. Insurance Reserve Fund, 427 S.E.2d 913 
(S.C. Ct. App. 1993) ("sudden" as used in pollution exclusion 
"is unambiguous and must be defined in its temporal sense" to 
describe "a release which was abrupt or precipitant"; no 
coverage for alleged "regular dumping" of hazardous wastes). 
4. Plasticolors. Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance Co., 1992 WL 
532785 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1992) (pollution exclusion 
bars coverage except where release was abrupt; no coverage 
where policyholder failed to show sudden and accidental 
release)• 
5. Sanborn Plastics Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Co.. 616 N.E.2d 988 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 4, 1993) (pollution 
exclusion barred coverage for continuous discharge of waste 
over four-year period). 
6. Sylvester Brothers Development Co. v. Great Central Insurance 
Co. . 503 N.W. 2d 793, (Minn. Ct. App. July 12, 1993) (because 
"*sudden' in the pollution exclusion exception carries the 
tempora connotation of *abruptness'" long-term and ongoing 
release of contaminants for over two decades "cannot 
reasonably be considered ^sudden'"), review denied (Minn. 
Sept. 30, 1993) 
- 2 -
Board of Regents v. Royal Insurance Co. . 503 ^.w. 2d 486 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (alleged gradual and continuous 
deterioration of asbestos-containing building materials over 
the course of more than twenty years "cannot reasonably be 
construed to be ^sudden'"), appeal pending. Nos. Cl-93-24, 
C8-93-36r C5-93-186 (Minn.)-
Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Insurance Co. . 12 Cal. 
App.4th 715, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 815 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist. 
1993) (a temporal connotation is inherent in ordinary meaning 
of "sudden"; for pollution exclusion to permit coverage, 
discharge must be abrupt as well as unexpected), appeal 
denied (Cal. May 13,1993). 
Sylvester Brothers Development Co. v. Great Central Insurance 
Co.. 480 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ('"sudden' in the 
context of the policies carries the temporal connotation of 
*abruptness' . . . * sudden' means the incident at issue 
occurs relatively quickly rather than gradually over a long 
period of time"), review denied, 480 N.W.2d 368 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North Americaf 577 
N.Y.S. 2d 953 (App. Div. 1992) ("liability arising out of the 
long-term, intentional disposal of plaintiff's industrial 
waste was not covered under the xsudden and accidental' 
expection to the pollution exclusion": "for a release or 
discharge to be %sudden' within the meaning of the pollution 
exclusion, it must occur abruptly or quickly or over a short 
period of time"), appeal denied, 80 N.Y,2d 753, 587 N.Y.S.2d 
905, 600 N.E.2d 632 (1992). 
Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co. v. R.W. Harp & Sons. Inc., 
409 S.E. 2d 418 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (gasoline leak of up to 
sixty days' duration was not sudden), cert, dismissed, 419 
S.E.2d 222 (S.C 1992). 
Mays v. Transamerica Insurance Co.. 103 Or. App. 578, 799 
P. 2d 653 (1990) (pollution exclusion bars coverage for 
releases of wastes over a ten-year period). 
Weber v. IMT Insurance Co.. No. 9-437, slip op. at 7 (Iowa 
Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1990) (" * sudden' in its common usage, means 
*happening without previous notice or with very brief 
notice'"; no coverage where pollutants were discharged on 
ongoing basis over ten-year period), aff'd on other grounds. 
462 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1990), 
Chemetco. Inc. v. Citizens Insurance Co. of America, No. 
109913, slip op. at 3 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1990) 
(pollution occurring over "a long period of time" was not 
sudden). 
Lover Paxton Township v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co.. 383 Pa. Super. 558, 557 A.2d 393, 398 (1989) ("sudden" 
means "abrupt and lasting only a short time"), review denied. 
93 M.D. Allocatur Dkt. 1989 (Pa. Sept. 22, 1989). 
Technicon Electronics Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 
141 A.D.2d 124, 533 N.Y.S.2d 91, 99 (1988) ("[a] ^sudden and 
accidental' event is one which is unexpected, unintended and 
occurs over a short period of time"), aff'd on other grounds, 
74 N.Y.2d 66, 544 N.Y.S.2d 531, 542 N.E.2d 1048 (1989). 
Barmet of Indiana. Inc. v. Security Insurance Group, 425 
N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (discharge of emissions 
due to regular and frequent malfunctioning of pollution 
control equipment is not sudden and accidental). 
Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co.. 338 Pa. Super. 1, 
487 A. 2d 820, 827 (1984) (no coverage for "a regular or 
sporadic discharge over a period of 25 years"), review 
denied, 338 E.D. Allocatur Dkt. 1985 (Pa. Oct. 31, 1985). 
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Sunnes. 77 Or. App. 136, 711 
P. 2d 212, 214 (1985) (pollution exclusion bars coverage for 
discharges "regularly over a period of many years"), review 
denied. 301 Or. 76, 717 P.2d 631 (1986). 
Q#Brien Energy Systems. Inc. v. American Employers' Insurance 
Co. , No. 2660 PHL 92 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1993) (pollution 
exclusion unambiguously bars coverage for "gradual migration" 
of polluting gases). 
Truck Insurance Exchange v. Pozzuoli. 17 Cal. App. 4th 856, 
21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. Aug. 3, 1993) 
(pollution exclusion barred coverage for leak from 
underground storage tank of at least 60 days' duration). 
ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Co., 
17 Cal. App. 4th 1773 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist. 1993) 
("gradual is the opposite of sudden"; no coverage for 
longterm leakage from corroded storage tanks on property 
purchased by insured). 
Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Laudick, No. 68990 (Kan. 
Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1993) (pollution exclusion bars coverage 
for longterm leakage from underground tank, since "sudden" 
has a temporal meaning, "combining both the elements of 
without notice or warning and quick or brief in time"). 
Krawczewski v. Western Casualty and Surety Co.. No. C3-93-672 
(Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 1993) (pollution occurring over a 
period of one to thirteen years "cannot reasonably be 
cons idered 'sudden'"). 
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State Trial Court Cases 
1« City of Portsmouth v. New Hampshire Insurance Guaranty 
Association, No. 88-E-759 (N.H. Super. Ct., Rockingham County 
Sept. 22, 1993) (pollution exclusion unambiguously bars 
coverage for gradual contamination of a landfill over a 
thirteen-year period: "[w]hen read in conjunction with the 
term 'accidental,' a reasonable [insured] could only 
understand 'sudden1'1 to mean abrupt") 
2. Atlas Tack Corp. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. . Nos. 91-
566, 91-5667, 91-5669 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suffolk County Sept. 
15, 1993) (no coverage where "the contamination resulted from 
regular business activity over an extended period of 
time") . 
3• Service Control Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., No. 
644496 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Diego County Apr. 12, 1993) 
(pollution exclusion bars coverage for leakage from corroded 
underground tanks: "corrosion, by its very definition, [is] 
not abruptr but gradual"). 
4. Hecla Mining Co. v. Continental Insurance Co, . No. CV-91-
87608 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Kootenai County Mar. 19, 1993) 
("sudden" in phrase "sudden and accidental" in pollution 
exclusion is unambiguous and has a temporal connotation). 
5. Cooley, li IC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. 90-00060 
(Mass. Super. Ct., Bristol County Feb. 17, 1993) (pollution 
exclusion barred coverage where insured failed to show 
release was abrupt as well as inadvertent). 
6. MSM Industries, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., No. 
90-6968 (Mass. Super. Ct., Middlesex County Jan. 19, 1993) 
(coverage barred by pollution exclusion where insured failed 
to show that alleged polluting discharge was abrupt as well 
as unexpected). 
7. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. c-
610358 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County May 17, 1993) (to 
avoid effect of pollution exclusion, insured must show that 
polluting event was a M/sudden# event/1 as opposed to " 
gradual event"). 
8. Republic Insurance Co. v. Sunshine Mining Co., Nos. 95229 and 
95239 (Idaho Dist. Ct., Ada County Apr. 27, 1993) (pollution 
exclusion bars coverage for contamination arising from 
insured's longstanding waste disposal practices)^ 
9. ACC Chemical Co. v. Alexander & Alexander, liic. , No. CL-14219 
(Iowa Dist. Ct., Clinton County Mar. 16, 1993) ("sudden" 
includes a temporal element and means "happening, coming, 
made or done quickly, or abruptly without warning"). 
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Arthur Bleaknev v. California Union Insurance Co,. No, 90-00-
4-18 (Mass. Super. Ct., Norfolk County April 15, 1993) 
(pollution exclusion barred coverage for pollution resulting 
from policyholders routine business operations and waste 
disposal practices). 
General Chemical Corp. v. First State Insurance Co. . No. 90-
3833 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County Sept. 18, 1992) (a 
continuous course of disposal of pollutants over a 26-year 
period due to practices in the regular course of operating 
the facility "is not sudden and accidental"). 
Landauer, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., No. 91-5802 
(Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County Apr. 24, 1992) (routine 
dumping of hazardous substances at landfill over several 
years is not "sudden"), appeal pending. No. 92-P-1175 (Mass. 
Ct. App.). 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. City of Menominee, 
No. 87-4939CE (Mich. Cir. Ct., Menominee County Feb. 13, 
1992) (no coverage for routine dumping of hazardous materials 
at landfill over many years). 
Rochester Smelting & Refining Co., Inc. v. Merchants Mutual 
Insurance Co., No. 91/02683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Monroe County 
Sept. 9, 1991) (where wastes were deliberately dumped in a 
landfill over a seven-year period, "it would be difficult to 
conclude that such discharges were either sudden or 
accidental"), aff'd. No. 1495 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 30, 1992). 
Aeroiet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Insurance Co., 
No. 262425 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Mateo County Aug. 20, 1991) 
("the plain, ordinary and popular meaning of sudden is 
abrupt, quick, swift, not gradual"), appeal pending, Nos. 
A057580, A057812, A059976 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist.). 
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Mccormick & Baxter 
Creosoting Co. . No. A6711-07096 (Or. Cir. Ct., Multnomah 
County Dec. 21, 1990) ("while the term %sudden' in certain 
contexts may mean * unforeseen,' when used in conjunction with 
*accidental,' it necessarily assumes its temporal definition 
of short in time"; no coverage for 25 to 30 spills of 
chemicals over 40-year period), appeal pending. No. A71072 
(Or. Ct. App.). 
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17. New Hampshire Insurance Co. v. H. Brown Co. . No. 87-56315-CK 
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Kent County Sept. 27, 1989) ("only fair 
reading" of the pollution exclusion is that the policy does 
not cover damage which arises from normal, continuous 
business operations), aff'd. No. 121961 (Mich, ct. App. July 
29, 1991), cert, denied, 483 N.W.2d 901 (Mich 1992). 
18. City of Maple Lake v. American States Insurance, Co., Nc. 
C4921804 (Minn. Dist. Ct. , Wright County Jan. 29, 1993) 
(polluting discharge of effluent from policyholder's 
wastewater treatment plant "was neither sudden nor 
accidental"). 
19. United Technologies Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.. 
No. 87-7172 (Mass. Super. Ct., Suffolk County Aug. 3, 1993) 
("The term 'sudden' has a temporal aspect; only an abrupt 
discharge or release of pollutants falls within the 
exception"; exclusion bars coverage for pollution resulting 
from releases occurring in the course of continuing 
manufacturing and disposal operations). 
20. Union Oil Co. v. International Insurance to.. No. 351219 
(Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo County Aug. 16, 1993) (no 
coverage for discharge from underground storage tank; judge 
instructed jury that "(a) process that occurs slowly and 
incrementally over a relatively long time Is not sudden"). 
Federal Appellate Court Cases 
1. Smith v. Hiahes Aircraft Co. , No. 91-16758 (9th Cir. Nov, 
1993) (no coverage for claims arising from practice of 
discharging pollutant into unlined ponds: "the 'sudden and 
accidental' exception to the pollution exclusion necessarily 
incorporate a notion of temporal brevity") 
2. Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp.. No. 92-3187 (8th 
Cir. Nov. 12, 1993) (to qualify for "sudden and accidental" 
exception, insured must show that release of contaminant was 
abrupt; "ongoing and routine" onsite disposal of wastes was 
not "sudden" as a matter of law). 
3. Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co.. No. 92-
2910 (8th Cir. Oct. 1, 1993) (no coverage for pollution 
where barrels of contaminants had been leaking 
at the site for almost fpn years). 
4. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Morrison Grain Ob., 
Inc.. No. 90-3123 (10th Cir. July 19, 1993) ("The discharge 
here was not 'sudden and accidental,' but a gradual dispersal 
LI release toxic chemicals which ought to have been 
anticipated i * avoided"). 
Anaconda Minerals Co, v. Stoller Chemical Co, . 990 F.2d 1175 
(10th Cir. 1993) ("sudden" in the pollution exclusion must be 
given its conventional temporal definition, which is "abrupt 
or instantaneous"; no coverage for pollution that took place 
gradually as result of routine release of flue dust). 
Ray Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co,, 974 
F,2d 754 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1992) (routine dumping and 
crushing of drums containing insured's wastes at landfill was 
not "sudden and accidental" within exception to pollution 
exclusion). 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, v. General Dynamics Corp,, 968 
F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992) ('"sudden' must mean abrupt," 
barring coverage for discharges "occurring over an extended 
period of time"). 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. United States Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992) ("continuous 
or routine discharges of pollutants are not covered"). 
Terminix International Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 956 F.2d 
270 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming and adopting trial court's 
holding that pollution exclusion bars coverage where 
contaminants were released over a long period of time). 
Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Insurance Co, , 905 
F.2d 954, 955 (6th Cir. 1990) ("the phrase 'sudden and 
accidental' has a temporal component and does not describe 
continuous or ongoing polluting events"). 
FL Aerospace v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 897 F.2d 214, 
219 (6th Cir. 1990) ("word * sudden' has a plain, everyday 
temporal component . . . a sudden and accidental event is one 
that happens quickly, without warning, and fortuitously or 
unintentionally"), cert, denied. 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990). 
Oaden Corp. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.. 924 F.2d 39, 42 (2d 
Cir. 1991) ("For a release or discharge to be sudden, it must 
'occur[] over a short period of time'"). 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Star Fire Coals, 
Inc.. 856 F.2d 31, 34 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[w]e do not believe 
that it is possible to define * sudden' without reference to 
a temporal element that joins together conceptually the 
immediate and the unexpected"). 
Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance 
Co. , 727 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1984) (no coverage for 
contamination as a result of "regular business activity"). 
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15
 • A, Johnson & Co. v. Aetna Casualty k Surety Co. . 933 F.2d 66, 
72 (1st Cir. 1991) (predicting that Maine will "join the 
jurisdictions which accord %sudden7 its unambiguous, plain 
and commonly accepted meaning of temporally abrupt"). 
State of New York v. AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d 1420 (2d 
Cir. 1991) ("The underlying complaint here, alleging that an 
industrial operation disposed of its manufacturing waste by 
certain improper methods for close to thirty years, cannot be 
understood to allege a 'sudden7 release"). 
17• Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Industries, 
Inc. . 938 F.2d 1423 (1st Cir. 1991) (pollution exclusion bars 
coverage for discharge of pollutants as ordinary part of 
longterm business operations, notwithstanding that scattered 
instances of release may have been unforeseen or occurred 
suddenly), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 969 (1992). 
18. Northern Insurance Co. v. Aardvark Associates, Inc.. 942 F.2d 
189 (3d Cir. 1991) ("exception for xsudden and accidental7 
discharges applies only to discharges that are abrupt and 
last a short time": no coverage for pollution "occurring 
over a period of years"). 
Federal District Court Cases 
1. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. General Dynamics Corp.. no. 
88-2220C(8) (E.D. Mo. Oct. 1, 1993) (contamination that 
"reflects the culmination of years of illegal or at least 
improper waste disposal, [resulting in] a slow and persistent 
dissemination of chemical pollutants into the soil, "cannot 
resonably be termed a "sudden" discharge). 
2. Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Flanders Eletric Motor Service, 
Inc.. No. EV 91-186-C (S.D. Ind. Aug. 20, 1993) (pollution 
exclusion barred coverage for "long-term effects of leakage 
from improper handling and storage practices"; "the word 
7sudden7 would not have any meaning in the exception if it is 
not interpreted to mean quick, abrupt, or happening without-
previous notice or very little notice") 
3. Hussey Plastics Co. v. Continental Casualty Co. , No. 90-
13104-WD (D. Mass. June 18, 1993) (pollution exclusion bars 
coverage where insured "over the course of years 
deliberately caused its plastic waste materials tu be 
deposited at the landfill"). 
4. Freedom Gravel Products, Inc. v. Michigan Mutual Insurance 
Co.. No. CIV-91-237C (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1993) (pollution 
exclusion barred coverage for contamination alleged to occur 
over a three-month period, a "non-sudden" event). 
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Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.. No. 
91-2346 (D. Kan. Feb. 17, 1993) ("sudden" is not ambiguous 
and includes meaning of "quick or brief in time"; no coverage 
for groundwater contamination that occurs gradually or over 
an extended period of time). 
Gould, Inc. v. CNA, No. 3-CV91-0569 (M.D. Pa. 1992) 
(pollution exclusion unambiguously bars coverage for bodily 
injury claim arising from gradual pollution; "sudden" 
includes a "temporal element, that being %abrupt' and lasting 
a short time"). 
Upjohn Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. . No. K88-124CA4 
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 1993) ("sudden" includes a temporal 
element as well as the unexpected; no coverage where 
pollution resulted from poor business practices at plant or 
from intentional dumping of wastes at landfill). 
Meridian Oil Production. Inc. v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co. . No. G-91-167 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 1993) 
(discharge of pollutants "in the normal course of [insured's] 
drilling operations over a period of thirteen months . . . 
does not fulfill the temporal requirements for * sudden'"), 
appeal pending. No. 93-7463 (5th Cir.) 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. R.P. Hoffman Mobil Inc.. 
No. 90-1187 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 1992) ("a release of gasoline 
over the period of several months to almost two years cannot 
be said to be abrupt or sudden"; no coverage for pollution 
resulting from leakage from underground storage tank) , appeal 
pending. No. 92-7549 (3d Cir.). 
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Kansas Citv Fire and Marine 
Insurance Co.. 805 F. Supp 905, 909 (W.D. Okla. 1992) ("As 
the discharges at issue occurred over a number of years in 
accordance with [the policyholder's] intended disposal plan, 
they cannot as a matter of law be deemed to be * sudden and 
accidental.'. . . Routine discharges over a period of years 
cannot be viewed as * sudden.' Likewise, in no event can such 
purposeful conduct be %accidental'") , appeal pending. No. 92-
6391 (10th Cir.). 
City of Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co., No. 88-
CV-574 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1992) (pollution exclusion bars 
coverage for "a lengthy and continuous course of conduct. . 
, whereby wastes were intentionally deposited at the 
site11). 
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West American Insurance Co, v. City of Southaate. No, 91-17 
(E.D. Ky. Jan. 22, 1992) (pollution exclusion bars coverage 
where insured had its wastes disposed of at landfill over 
ten-year period). 
In re Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination 
Insurance Coverage Litigation. MDL No. 764 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 
1992) ("^sudden' clearly has a temporal meaning," barring 
coverage where discharges into environment took place over a 
period of years), aff'd. No. 92-1638 (3d Cir. May 28r 1993)* 
Christopher v. Hartford Insurance Group, No. 89-CV-72492-DT 
(E.D. Mich. July 1, 1992) (ongoing pollution at drum-
reconditioning site, including leaks, spills, and discharges 
from accidental machinery malfunctions, was not "sudden and 
accidental"). 
State of New York v. Raeco Products, Inc., Nos. 89-1263L, 91-
6015L (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1992) ("long-term, continuous release 
of pollutants over the course of sixty years cannot be 
interpreted as an allegation of a *sudden' discharge"). 
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Royal Group, Inc., 779 F. supp, 
736 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discharge not "sudden" because waste was 
deposited repeatedly over an extended period of time)
 f aff'd, 
(2d Cir. May 14, 1992). 
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Continental Insurance Co., No. 90-
1251-A, slip op. at 2 n.l, 1991 WL 323804 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 5, 
1991) (insured's "arguments that the word * sudden' has no 
temporal component would require the Court to ignore that the 
clause in question refers to * sudden and accidental' 
discharges") (emphasis in original). 
Aeroquip Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., No. CV 90-
4260 RG(Gx) (CD. Cal. Oct. 16, 1991) ("the release must be 
brief, abrupt and of short duration to fall within [the 
* sudden and accidental'] exception to the pollution 
exclusion"), appeal pending, IT 91-56356 (9th Cir.) 
Ludlow's Sand & Gravel Co. v. General Accident Insurance Co., 
No. 87-CV-1239 (N.D.N.Y. May 13, 1991) (discharges taking 
place over twenty-year period cannot be considered "sudden") . 
Detrex Chemical Indus., Inc. v. Employers Insurance of 
Wausau, 681 F. Supp. 438, 457 (N.D. Ohio 1987) ("sudden and 
accidental" does not include events over a period of time). 
Peerless Insurance Co. v. Strother, No. 87-91-CIV-3-B0, slip 
op. at 10 (E.D.N.C. June 21, 1990) ("a pattern of repetitive 
activity" is not "sudden and accidental") 
Inland Waters Pollution Control, Inc. v. National Union Fire 
Insurance Co., No. 89-CV-70584-DT (E.D. Mich. May 17, 1990) 
(pollution exclusion unambiguous). 
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Becker Electronics Manufacturing Corp. v. Granite State 
Insurance Co., No. 86-CV-1294, slip op. at 6 (N.D.N.Y. June 
9, 1989) (1989 WL 63671) ("[n]or can this court conclude that 
allegations of continuous disposal of waste solvents for a 
period of approximately twenty years . . . constitutes a 
* sudden and accidental' exception to the pollution 
exclusion"). 
C.L. Hauthaway & Sons Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance 
Co. , 712 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D. Mass. 1989) ("sudden" connotes 
"a temporal aspect of immediacy, abruptness, swiftness, 
quickness, instantaneousness, and brevity"). 
Federal Insurance Co. v. Susquehanna Broadcasting Co. , 727 
F. Supp. 169, 177 (M.D. Pa. 1989) ("pollution exclusion 
broadly, but nevertheless plainly, excludes coverage for 
gradual pollution"), atfJd, 928 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1991). 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Murray Ohio 
Manufacturing Co.. 693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988), aff'd 
without opinion. 875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir. 1989) (release of 
pollutant over seven year period "cannot, under any 
reasonable interpretation, be deemed a %sudden' discharge or 
release"). 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Korman Corp., 693 
F. Supp. 253, 260 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (pollution exclusion 
applies where alleged leaching of contaminants was not sudden 
but rather "occurred continually over a long period of 
time"). 
Fireman's Fund Insurance Cos. v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 702 
F. Supp. 1317, 1325-26 (E.D. Mich. 1988) ('"sudden7 in the 
pollution exclusion includes the temporal component of 
briefness, and means *brief, momentary, or lasting only a 
short time/w). 
EAD Metallurgical, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 701 
F. Supp. 399 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (no coverage for releases 
occurring from 1977 to 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 905 
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1990). 
Centennial Insurance Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 
677 F. Supp. 342, 347, 348 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("pollution 
exclusion clause . . . . [is] unambiguous and . . . the 
language should be given its plain and ordinary meaning"; 
waste released on numerous occasions over thirteen-month 
period cannot be characterized as "sudden"). 
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Neville Chemical 
Co., 650 F. Supp. 929, 933 (W.D. Pa. 1987) ("annual careless 
spillage onto the ground surface cannot be sudden"). 
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Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated hn Insurance Co.
 r 682 F. Supp, 
927, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1987) (regular depositing of radioactive 
wastes "is precisely the type of activity which the pollution 
exclusion was drafted to preclude"), aff'd mem,. 865 F.2d 
1267 (6th dr.), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 68 (1989) 
American Motorists Insurance Co. v.
 G e n e r a i nost Corp., 667 
F. Supp. 1423, 1428 (D. Kan. 1987) ("[n]o use of the word 
* sudden' or %suddenly' could be consistent with an event 
which happened gradually or over an extended time") , aff'd on 
other grounds. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 4428, vacated in part on 
reh'q. 946 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir 1<^1). 
Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. , 656 
F. Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (continuous dumping of 
toxic chemicals is not "sudden"). 
Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Co. v. CNA Insurance Co. , 669 
F. Supp. 798, 801 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (pollution exclusion bars 
coverage for pollution discharged "at least sporadically and 
may be continuously"), appeal dismissed mem.. 838 F.2d 4^ 0 
(6th Cir. 1988). 
American States Insurance Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 587 
F. Supp. 1549, 1553 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (no coverage for 
continuous dumping). 
National Standard Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance Co.. 
No. CA-3-81-1015-D, slip op. at 17 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 1983) 
(chemical discharges "over n period of years" are not 
sudden)• 
01in Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America. 762 F. Supp. 
548 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1991) (pollution exclusion bars 
coverage for claims resulting from discharge of DDT-bearing 
effluent where discharge was neither "sudden," since it 
occurred over a sixteen-year period, nor "accidental," since 
insured was aware of DDT in effluent). 
United States v. Amro Realty Corp., No. 87-CV-1418 (N.D. N.Y. 
Nov. 10, 1992) (no coverage where allegations that 
contamination occurred over period of several decades 
precluded finding that contamination was "sudden"), aff'd. 
No. 93-6046 (2d Cir. June 18, 1993). 
Downtown Airpark. Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co.. No. CIV-
91-673-L (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 1993) (pollution exclusion 
unambiguously bars coverage for pollution occurring over a 
number of years as a result of routine waste disposal 
practices). 
Upiohn Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.. No. K88-124CA4 
(W.D. Mich. June 3, 1993) (pollution exclusion bars coverage 
where insured's wastes were deliberately dumped at landfill 
over period of years). 
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Macklanburq-Duncan v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., No. CIV-
92-1650-A (W.D. Okla. March 29, 1993) (no coverage for claims 
arising from repeated and deliberate disposal of wastes at a 
landfill). 
United States v. Hardage. No. CIV-86-1401-W (W.D. Okla. April 
20, 1993) ("sudden and accidental" exception to pollution 
exclusion applies only to discharges that are "both abrupt 
and unexpected or unintended by the insured"). 
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Duro Bag Manufacturing. Co., 
No. 89-161 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 5, 1993) ("sudden and accidental" 
exception to pollution exclusion does not apply to the 
hauling of waste to a dumpsite regularly over a period of 
years). 
St. Paul and Marine Insurance Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp.. 
No. 91-0518P (D.R.I. Dec. 8, 1992) (discharge of insured's 
wastes into landfill was neither "sudden" nor "accidental"; 
"(t)he majority of the recent judicial interpretations of the 
sudden and accidental exception to the pollution exclusion 
clause held that the word * sudden' unambiguously has a 
temporal component and means abrupt"), adopted June 3, 1993, 
appeal pending. No. 93-1721 (1st Cir.). 
Harrow Products. Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.. No. 
l:89-CV-967 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 1993) (no coverage where 
spills "appear to have occurred in the regular course of 
business and cannot reasonably be characterized as abrupt or 
sudden events"). 
IMCERA Group. Inc. v. American Home Assurance Co. . $o. BC 
011005, slip op. at 13 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County 
Sept. 8, 1993) (pollution exclusion barred coverage: "This 
was an instance of long chemical use, and of gradual 
variegated chemical and metallic pollution of the soil and 
consequent pollution of the water flowing through the soil 
and into the groundwater. This was pollution which occurred 
over a extended period of time"). 
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T a b l 
Environmental Liability and the 
Pollution Exclusion: 
Why Some Courts Find Coverage 
by Bernard J. Daenzer, CPCU, and 
Edward Zampino, J.D. 
ABSTRACT- Since 1970 pollution txcluswm have been endorsed to 
or included m American comprehensive general liability (CCL) poli-
cies Insureds frequently seek coverage for gradual pollution discharge 
claim* as coming withm the 'sudden and accidental' exception to cer-
tain exclusions They allege not only that exclusion language is am-
biguous on its face but that the "history* of that policy language 
snows that insurers' conduct has threatened the integrity of the judical 
nxess In this article, the authors discuss the litigation strategies ad* 
pressing these allegations and evidence that they believe refutes such 
contentions 
Editor's Note: This article was submitted m response to the article by 
Charles Becker published m the December 1992 CPCU Journal While 
this article does not address the accuracy of the survey of case utto made 
in the earlier article, it does provide a different perspective on the issue 
It contains insight into both the issues and the process that surrounds 
>he resolution of these issues, 
n he onslaught of environmental insurance coverage litigation that began in the 1980s shows no sign of letting up in the 1990s. Insureds and insurers continue to litigate quite ferociously over who will ultimately pay the price of a nationwide cleanup of 
contamination resulting primarily from decades of in-
sureds' normal operational polluting acts. The intensity of 
this battle is understandable. There are. literally billions of 
dollars at stake. 
What is not understandable to many people in the in-
surance field art some of the tactics used in this Litigation. 
Bernard J. Daerue* CPCU, served as president of The Society of 
CPCU m 1959 He t$ a past president of the Society's Connecticut 
Chapter and a trustee of the CPCU-Harry J Loman Foundation He is 
also a past chairman of the Board of Trustees of the College of Insurance 
Edward Zampino, J.D,. is a partner m the Neio Jersey law firm. 
Harwood Uoyd He represents insurers tn environmental coverage 
litigation. 
These tactics are founded upon accusations that in 1970 
the entire community of insurance companies perpetrated 
a fraud upon the public and all state insurance commis-
sioners when the standard bureau pollution exclusion was 
drafted, filed for regulatory approval, and marketed The 
purpose of this amde is to demonstrate whv some courts 
are finding coverage for environmental liabilities under 
the comprehensive general liability (CCL) policy s pollu-
tion exclusion based upon such groundless accusations. 
Th« Evolution of 
Pollution Exclusion Litigation 
The pollution exclusion was drafted as an endorsement in 1970 and later incorporated into the standard 1973 
CCL policy. It reads as follows: 
It \s agreed that this insurance does not appiv to 
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the 
discharge, dispersal release or escape of smoke, va-
pors, soot fumes, aads, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liq-
uids or gases, waste materials, or other umtants, 
contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the at-
mosphere or any watercourse or body ot water, but 
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dis-
persal reiease or escape is sudden and accidental. 
In environmental coverage cases, policyholders assert 
that "sudden" must be interpreted as "unexpected." It is 
also urged that there is coverage under the exclusion for 
any unexpected pollution damage, even though the "sud-
den and accidental" language in the exclusion s exception 
modifies the "discharge" of pollutants. On the other hand, 
insurance earners contend that "sudden" cannot be 
stripped of its temporally abrupt element, and that the 
exclusion's plain "discharge" focus cannot be ignored 
Some early court decisions interpreting the "sudden 
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion 
found coverage for long-term and gradual pollution 
discharges. As tune passed, the ra-
tionale or those pro-policy holder 
decisions was rejected-m some of 
the junsdicaons where those cases 
had been deaded As more courts 
were dismissing insureds' claims 
based upon the plain Language of 
the exclusion, manv policyholders 
and their lawyers began creating 
and expanding upon arguments 
based upon the exclusion s purport-
ed "historv" 
Specifically it was argued that an 
analysis of the exclusion's drafting 
history demonstrated drafting in-
tent to create an exclusion that ex-
cluded nothing Some suggested 
that the exclusion was deliberately 
drafted to be ambiguous : It was 
also argued that the regulatory his-
tory of the exclusion's filing for ap-
proval with stare insurance com-
missioners showed that insurance 
.. .Insureds and insurers 
continue to litigate 
quite ferociously over 
who will ultimately pay 
the price of 
a nationwide cleanup 
of contamination 
resulting primarily from 
decades of insureds' 
normal operational 
polluting acts... 
bureaus such as the Insurance Rat-
ing Board (IRB) and the Mutual In-
surance Rating Bureau (MiRB) 
made dishonest representations to 
insurance regulatory bodies * It 
was argued at every turn that a 
public history of speeches, articles, 
and comments made by individu-
als in the insurance business 
demonstrated that the exclusion 
was not meant or understood to 
restrict existing coverage in 1970, 
and that the earners present liti-
gation posture is seriously disin-
genuous 
The Integrity Argument 
In light of their purported evi-dence of insurance dishonesty, 
many policyholders, pnmanly 
through the assistance of policy-
holder amia curiae associations 
represented bv the same law-
yers that represent individ-
ual insureds, have insisted 
that courts must find cover-
age for insureds. They have 
alleged that denial of cover-
age for insureds' gradual 
pollution discharge claims 
would destroy the "integri-
ty of the judicial system."4 
Insurance earners are cast as 
chameleons, who told the 
world one thing about the 
meaning of the exclusion at 
its "point of sale" in 1970 
and who now tell quite a 
different and unscrupulous 
story at the "point of ciaum "3 
Not all of the verbiage 
used is so inflammatory. 
'owever, the inflammatory 
message transmitted to 
courts nationwide has been ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
uniformly consistent—the ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * 
insurers scammed both the 
public and insurance regu-
latory bodies in 1970. They told everyone that the exclusion 
merely restated then-existing occurrence coverage for un-
expected harms, and they now must be made to provide 
coverage for gradual pollution discharge claims. While in-
surers contend that all of these accusations are patently 
false, a number of courts have taken them at face value. 
The Insurer Dilemma 
Even in the face of these accusations, for many years in-surance carriers did little to challenge or rebut the pol-
icyholders' extrinsic "history* contentions. Rather, they 
properly held firm to the proposition that courts should 
not have to resort to extrinsic evidence when interpreting 
policy language They argued that this was especially true 
of extrinsic evidence of a far-flung "history" that played 
no pan whatsoever in the insurance dealings between a 
particular policyholder and a particular insurer. 
On top of these objections, carriers correctly argued to 
courts that the extrinsic history materials policyholders 
were relying on were not even part of the record in a 
iven case. Generally there was no discovery taken or 
ftfovided by policyholders concerning such materials or 
the individuals who generated thent Most frequently pol-
icyholder amia curiae groups appeared in cases on a na-
tionwide basis when thev 
reached a jurisdiction > ,r-
termediate appellate or 
highest court Thu* tor tn* 
hrst time durine the appe-
late process, these Amia 
raised arguments bas«d 
upon extrinsic materials 
whose existence was un-
known to insurance earn-
ers or their attorneys in a 
given case 
Some earners made, with 
mixed success, affirmative 
motions to strike such evi-
dence When insurers op-
posed the insureds' 
extrinsic evidence tactics, 
insureds and their amici ar-
gued to courts that such re-
sistance proved that 
carriers were trying to 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ "keep hidden" revealing 
^ ^ ^ • ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ W evidence that supported 
the policyholders' con-
tentions and accusations.* 
However, as time went on, carriers found they could 
not count upon the courts to enforce tradinonal'legal rules 
that dearly delineated precise restrictions on the use of 
parol evidence to demonstrate the intent of the particular 
parties entering into a contract of insurance. These courts 
often looked at the insured presentation of such evidence 
and did not uniformly grant carrier motions to strike it 
More distressing, some courts relied upon this extnnsic 
evidence in awarding coverage to policyholders.7 Indeed, 
ui light of the policyholders' accusations and one-sided 
presentation of extrinsic history evidence, some courts 
have labeled insurers "dishonest" and described the earn-
er coverage position as "irrational."* 
An Invisible Body of Evidence 
Courts that purport to make observations on the "history of the exclusion have not seen th* complete evidence 
of that history. In some instances, a handful of documents 
were attached to the briefs of insureds and their amicx curi-
ae. M06t often, these briefs simply made reference to pub-
lished "commentaries" about the import of the exclusion 
written by lawyers who represent policyholders in envi-
ronmental coverage disputes. These arguably bused arti-
cles, which appeared m such diverse places as insurance 
trade journals, law reviews, 
and insurance hagaoon rrade 
pubkcanons, presented cer-
ram excerpts of exmnsic 
evidence documents. As 
demonstrated below, this 
"evidence" was presented 
out of context 
The court bnefs that refer-
enced these articles of poli-
cyholder counsel (and the 
snippets of evidence* con-
tained therein) also routine-
ly rehed upon self-serving 
"'conclusions" set forth m 
such articles. Courts were 
typically told that "com-
mentators agree" that the 
exclusion excluded nothing. 
However, courts were rarely 
dvised of the partisanship 
J these commentators.* 
Thus, without reviewing 
any or the smallest selection • • • • • • • • • • • • 
of, actual evidence, some 
courts made erroneous as-
sumptions about the import of extrinsic "history" evidence 
based upon policyholder counsel commentaries.*0 As soon 
as one court accepted these accusations and arguments, 
policyholders cited its opinion as precedent to other 
courts Without making an independent review of the in-
sureds' exmnsic evidence, the observations previously 
made by one court were simply accepted by others.11 
Thus, a small cycle was created wherein unfounded con-
clusions about the history of the exclusion set forth in pol-
icyholder lawyers' articles were adopted by some courts, 
and were in turn rehashed bv still other courts. 
Belated Insurer Response 
The above scenario occurred often enough that a few earners began to obtain and take a very hard look at 
the universe of documents comprising the history of the 
pollution exclusion. Hundreds of thousands of docu-
ments were reviewed They included the drafting history 
records of the Naftonal Bureau of Casualty Underwriters 
(NBCU), KB, MIRB, and the Insurance Services Office 
ISO). They included the records of state Insurance de-
partments across the country. Additionally, because many 
insureds were also asserting in courts that they had a rea-
sonable expectation of coverage for the consequences of 




has been that 
the insurers scammed 




gradual pollution discharges 
urder the exc *sior\ a 
virtual storeroom ot docu-
ments was compiled it 
included evidence from 
(1) leading international n-
surance brokers w ho acred 
as agents for policyholders 
(2) insurance bro*e' trade 
associations, (3) prominent 
policyholder industry and 
insurance trade associa-
tions, (4) the federal gov-
eminent, and (5) a host of 
major insurance trade pub-
lications 
This enormous collec-
tion of historical materials 
f>roved quite enlightening 
t demonstrated that every 
segment of the insurance 
world understood exactly 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ how, in accord with its 
^ ^ • • • • • • • • • i pUin language, the pollu-
tion exclusion restricted 
coverage How, then, have 
courts been persuaded to think otherwise* The answer is 
more than a little disturbing. 
Anatomy of a Stratagem: Selective Excerpting 
It is commonplace that bnefs anng documents or testi-mony m support of positions do not recite the entirety 
of that evidence. Rather, pertinent excerpts are a ted This 
is especially so when that evidence is part of the record in 
a case. However, use of excerpts to cast a document or a 
set of documents m a ousrepresentative light is quite an-
other matter. 
The complete history of &* pollution exclusion demon-
strates that in 1970 it was drafted and understood as com-
prising both a clarification and a restnction of coverage It 
clarified that *ix\ most cases" there was no coverage for 
harm resulting from normal operational polluting everts 
under the occurrence definition- It further restricted cover-
age only to temporally abrupt (sudden) and fortuitous 
(accidental) pollution discharges. By focusing on the dis-
charge of pollution, the exclusion also avoided debate as to 
what damage insureds expected or intended to result rrom 
their polluting conduct.12 
Unfortunately, over the years, many policyholders and 
their omici cunae have selecnvely excerpted and txagger-
•v^nrrencat '^ a&iLirv i?d *r* ^^unon Eacusion Wnv Sum ^ourva : 
•s* 
Kl references in extrinsic 
icenais addressing the 
nftcation aspect of the ex-
ision. References ro the ex-
tsion's resmcnve aspect in 
»e very extrinsic ma ten-
i were completely ignored. 
was then inaccurately ar-
led to courts that the ex-
nsic evidence showed that 
e exclusion only clanhcd 
isnng coverage. 
Of course, courts were es-
xiaily susceptible to being 
isled by such arguments 
hen they did not review 
le actual evidence, and 
ley misplaced trust in and 
jliance on the inaccurate 
nclusions" sat forth in 
policyholder commen-
ines that selectively ex* 
erpted these materials to 
egin with. 
Some specific examples 
allow. 
Drafting History."* One of the purposes of the pollution 
exclusion was to stop coverage for normal business poilu-
lon practices. In 1970 it was commonly perceived that 
•ounne operational pollution conduct caused "expected" 
2ollunon damage. Coverage for such claims was already 
precluded by the 'nether expected nor intended" limita* 
non of the 1966 CGL policy's occurrence definition.13 This 
Limitation was subsumed within the exclusion's further nr* 
stncuon of coverage for pollution damage to that caused 
by a sudden and accidental pollution discharge Urns, m 
one r&pect the pollution exclusion did clarify the coverage 
situation. 
The exclusion provided an extra fail-safe mechanism, 
different and separate from that of the occurrence defini-
tion, to produce a similar result the preclusion of cover-
age for most industrial pollution- However, while the 
results of the different occurrence definition and pollution 
exclusion mechanisms were similar, they were not identi-
cal. Those claims for unexpected damage slipping through 
he "occurrence" net would be caught by the exclusion— 
artless the damage was caused by a discharge that was 
both sudden and accidental. 
The March 17,1970, minutes of IRB's Central Liability 
Governing Committee (CLGO show that it deeded to re-
..They repeatedly refrained 
from mentioning 
how these very minutes 
expressly described . 
drafting efforts to narrow 
pollution coverage to the 
temporally oriented 
"classical accident" 
and provide for a 
buyback of coverage... 
turn pollution coverage 
from a broader c a i * ^ ^ e 
basis back to the more nar» 
row classical accident basis. 
It commissioned rhe cre-
ation of: 
a polic\ exclusion 
of pollution rhat 
would run :o bod-
dv injury and 
property damage 
should be adopted 
for ail general lia-
bility insurance 
the exclusion to re-
crpt vollutian caused 
inturua when the 
pollution mult* 
from the classical 
accident It was 
agreed that cover-
age should be 
made available on 
an individual buy-
phasis added)14 
As stated in these minutes. 
it was recognized that insureds could repurchase the cov-
erage taken away by the exclusion via a buyback. 
For years, many insureds and their ermci routinely cited 
only to another excerpt of these minutes (a few para-
graphs above the excerpt cited here), which stated that the 
exclusion also clarified the coverage situation. They re-
peatedly refrained from mentioning in their court briefs 
and articles how these very March 17,1970, minutes (and 
many other contemporaneous drafting documents) ex-
presely described drafting efforts to narrow pollunon cov-
erage to the temporally oriented "classical acridenf and 
provide for a buyback of coverage taken away by the ex-
clusion.15 Through such selective excerpting some courts 
have been persuaded to accept inaccurate drafting history 
arguments. 
Drafting History "Presumption" Argument Large num-
bers of policyholders and their enrua have also asserted 
that there should be a "presumption" that in 1970 the 
drafters of the exclusion had in mind a nontemporal 
meaning for "sudden" purportedly adopted by one or 
two courts that had already interpreted "sudden and acci* 
dental" in the context of the boiler and machinery insur-
ance policy.1* However, those drafters have testified that, 
not only did they intend a temporal restriction by using 
"sudden" in the pollution 
exclusion, they were also 
unaware of any decision 
that purportedly interpret-
ed "sudden and accidental" 
without its temporal ele-
ment m the context of a boil-
er and machinery policy. 
Long ago, the community 
of policyholder litigators 
had aiso obtained all of the 
actual contemporaneous draft-
ing history documents (such 
as the March 17, 1970, min-
utes, referred to earlier) that 
corroborated the drafters' 
sworn testimony and thor-
oughly rebutted any "pre-
sumption" of contrary draft-
ing. Why. then, do policy-
holders and their amxci 
onttnue to make a clearly 
unfounded drafting history 
"presumption" argument? ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ « 
The answer is quite simple, 
some courts are occasional-
ly taking the bait on this argument and awarding millions 
of dollars in coverage when insurers do not precisely 
rebut it. 
Nationwide Regulatory History Documents. For years, 
many insureds have urged that the community of state in-
surance commissioners presiding over the regulatory filing 
of the exclusion in 1970 understood it as onhf clarifying cov-
erage. For instance, through selective excerpting, it has been 
argued that the Kansas insurance commissioner only un-
derstood that the exclusion precluded coverage for inten-
tional conduct. Based on this excerpt, it has in turn been 
argued that then-Commissioner Sullivan understood the 
exclusion as a "mere" clarification of existing coverage. 
On the contrary, the complete Kansas filing documents 
demonstrate that Insurance Commissioner Sullivan un-
derstood that the exclusion also restricted coverage. He 
wrote the IRB recognizing the "obvious" coverage reduc-
tion inherent ui the exclusion's language: 
In view of the obtneus reduction in cm*r*$e, to what 
extent will the premiums be reduced when this en-
dorsement is attached' Wt/f a buybadc be aoailnbie. 
and how will it be rated? (emphasis added)17 
The RB's response confirmed that the coverage taken 
awav by the exclusion 
would be subec: to a buv-
back on an individual risk 
basis. The IRB also revised 
the proposed effective date 
so that the restrictive en-
dorsement would applv 
only to "new and renewal" 
policies. This responded to 
Sullivan's terming the en-
dorsement "discnminatorV' 
and to his questioning its' 
attachment to outstanding 
polices.11 
As in Kansas, insurance 
departments in West Vir-
ginia. Kentucky. Mississip-
pi. New York, texas, and 
Georgia would not approve 
the resmenve endorsement's 
unilateral attachment to 
outstanding polices. 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Through selective ex-
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ cerpting tactics, some 
courts have been persuad-
ed to accept the argument 
that the exclusion was understood by the insurance com-
missioner of Georgia as merely restating then-existing 
"occurrence" coverage.1* In reality, the complete Georgia 
regulatory filing documents reflect that its insurance com-
missioner prohibited attachment of the restrictive exclu-
sion to existing policies as he felt"... the effect of the 
addition of this exclusion could be so great."20 (Former In-
surance Commissioner Samuel Weese, CPCU, of West Vir-
ginia has confirmed that this conditioned approval of the 
exclusion indicated that it was perceived as a restriction of 
coverage. The Weese affidavit is discussed later in this ar-
ticle) 
The Louisiana Insurance Commission also balked at ap-
proving an exclusion with this coverage "restriction." An 
Aetna employee 
.. disnused this matter further with HP Walker, Ex-
ecutive Secretary of the Louisiana Insurance Com-
mission. He said that the disapproval of eh« IRE'S 
filing for this ratnetum of coverage was a poliocai 
situation, (emphasis added)21 
While recognizing the restriction of coverage, Louisiana 
did, howevet permit application to outstanding policies 
in which the insured signed a letter acknowledging the 
"restriction of coverage" Similarly Michigan. South 
Dakota, Hawaii, Virginia, 
Iowa, and the District of Co-
lumbia also approved the 
pollution exclusion hiing 
upon the condition that the 
written consent of the insured 
be obtained before attaching 
the restrictive endorsement 
to an outstanding policy. 
Regulatory records from 
Texas demonstrate that the 
"draftingshiftorV' irttent of 
restricting coverage to the 
sudden 'tJoom" or 'classical" 
accident was highlighted for 
Texas insurance regulators. 
Texas regulatory records also 
reflect awareness that cover-
age taken away by the exclu-
sion could be repurchased 
via a buy back.22 
Thus, all of this nation-
wide evidence (and similar. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
lengthy evidence from other ^ ^ ^ ^ • • ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ B 
states) demonstrates that 
the presentanon of the ''reg-
ulatory history" of the exclusion made by many insureds 
has been distorted. It is suggested that courts that ren-
dered decisions awarding coverage based upon such ar-
guments have been led astray 
West Virginia Regulatory History, Perhaps no source of ev-
idence has been more distorted than the 1970 West Virginia 
pollution exclusion filing 
scenario. For years, large numbers of insureds and their 
amia have been attempting, sometimes successfully, to 
persuade courts to accept their version of what thtn-Com-
rrussioner Samuel Weese, CPCU, was told and understood 
about the import of the pollution exclusion.0 
It is true that Weese signed an administrative order in 
1970 referring to the exclusion as a "mere clarification." 
This seemed odd since the evidence from the historical 
West Virginia regulatory files indicated that the insurance 
department was advised and understood how this exclu-
sion did change existing coverage.24 
This situation is readily explained. Unbeknown to most 
insurers, a prominent policyholder insurance expert testi-
fied in 1987 about a conversation he had had with Weese. 
In that conversation, Weese advised that he had had little 
involvement in the 1970 proceedings, which were essen-
tially handled by one of his assistants.* This testimony 
cast doubt upon insured 
contentions about the- sig-
nificance of the verbiage in 
Weese'* 1970 order. 
In a July 7, 1992, affidavit. 
Weese corroborated what 
he told the insureds' expert 
five years earlier He far-
ther explained that his 1970 
administrative order re-
ferred to the exclusion as a 
"mere clarification" only 
because of an "assumption" 
he had made, and not be-
cause of anything that any 
insurance bureau or earner 
representative had said or 
submitted during the regu-
latory process. 
11 did not aenve-
ly participate at 
the hearing or in 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ the prehearing or 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ™ post-hearrng riling 
process. Although 
present at the 
hearing, as Insurance Commissioner, I appropriately 
delegated the filing process to others. I was not in-
volved in the discussions of the legal complexities 
underlying the coverages provided by the polices 
as amended by the addition of the proposed pollu-
tion exclusion. I recall entering the hearing with the 
belief that coverage was generally excluded for nor-
mal operational polluting events'and premium* 
charged did not reflect such coverage under the 1966 
CCL policy. I also recall leaving the hearing with an 
assumption that with the addition of the pollution 
exclusion there continued to be no general coverage 
for normal operational polluting events. Therefore, 
without additional miysxs, I assumed that the txdusm 
did not alter axxrtge. as none was intended initially. 
(emphasis added) 
Indeed if anyone had asked Weese in 1970, he would 
have told them that "sudden" described a temporal event 
identifiable in rime and place- He also understood that. 
unlike the exclusion's discharge language, the occurrence 
definition focused upon resultant harm. 
4. In 1970,1 understood that a "sudden" event was 
one which was identifiable in time and place I also 
knew that an "accident" was an insurance term which 
contained a "sudden" element In addition, I under-
stood that the language of the occurrence definition 
focjsad upon un-
expected or un it-
tended damage * 
The affidavit also notes 
that the conditioned ap-
proval of the exclusion in 
VVest Virginia (as in the nu-
merous states discussed ear-
lier), indicates chat those 
actively involved in the 
approval process properly 
perceived the exclusion a's 
a restriction of coverage 
Weese further disapproved 
of certain policyholders' use 
of a 1988 declaration of his to 
"misrepresent" his recollec-
tion of and involvement m 
those 1970 events 
The representanve of the 
West Virginia Insurance 
department who actually 
handled the conditional ap- ^ ^ — « — 
proval of the exclusion on • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Weese's behalf, Deputy Com-
missioner Donald W Brown, 
has also admitted that the insurers' position is correct He 
testified that the exclusion was understood as both clarifying 
and restricting then-existing coverage He has also admit-
ted that "sudden" meant "quickly," and that it would not 
even be reasonable, as policyholders assert, to equate the 
scope coverage of the pollution exclusion with that of the 
occurrence definition ff 
h is astounding that so many millions of dollars of 
coverage have been awarded by courts based on what 
Weese and the West Virginia Insurance Department pur-
portedlv did or understood in 1970. This is especially so 
when the 1987 testimony of a most prominent insured ex-
pert should have informed many policyholders that the 
arguments being made in courts about Weese were com-
pletelv unfounded 
Premium Reduction Argument Many policyholders and 
their amici have also routinely asserted in courts that 
since there was no reduction in premium when the exclu-
sion was introduced in 1970, this snows that there was no 
intent by the insurance industry to reduce existing gradual 
pollution coverage.28 While some courts may have been 
persuaded by that argument it is flatly incorrect The 1966 
CCL policy, which expanded coverage to include certain 
gradual exposures, did not involve a premium increase 
-. .polio/holders have 
routinely asserted that 
since there was 
no reduction in premium 
when the exclusion 
was introduced in 1970, 
there was no intent 
to reduce existing 
gradual pollution coverage 
... this is flatly incorrect... 
for occurrence coverage 
in the nnst place Therefore 
thee was no reason *o 'de-
bate anv premium w*e* 
the exclusion eumirated ad 
gradual poilunon v.o e^raje 
tn 1970 » LnfomnateU in-
surers that were not aware 
that this evidence * as 
buned among hundreds of 
thousands of insurance DU-
reau and regulatorv docu-
ments were unable to 
prevent courts from being 
persuaded by this argument 
Public History of 
Pollution Exclusion 
Many insureds and their amia also argue 
that the exclusion was pub-
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ iidy spoken or and market-
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • • • M ed in a fashion supportive 
of their "mere clarification' 
thesis. A good example of 
that allegation's lack of ment is the uniform evidence of 
public statements made by the community of insurance 
brokers who negotiated and procured coverage on behalf 
of their policyholder clients. 
Consider the documentation generated by the respected 
international broker.Johnson fcHiggins Qkti) Materials 
used by JfcH in pollution coverage presentations to poli-
cyholders highlighted that the exclusion both clarified and 
restricted existing coverage 
Insurance Industry Both Clarifies (And Reduces) Cov-
erage—The Sudden and Accidental Exception* 
Thus, brokers, like the exclusion's drafters and state insur-
ance regulators, were keenly aware of both of the dual as-
pects of the exclusion. 
A member of J&H's Pollution Committee criticized 
those courts that would go so far as to misinterpret the ex-
clusion simply to find coverage. J&H recognized that 
some courts did this by ignoring the discharge focus con-
templated by the drafters and expressed in the exclusion's 
plain Language: 
our forecast that the courts would argue in favor 
of coverage under the General Liability policy even 
to d\e extent of mtsinttrprtttng the exclusion has been 
borne out [Tlhe couns in their desire to Koid that 
the insured ;s cov-
ered bv rhe policy 
have not realized 
that it is the dis-
charge of the pollu-
tants which must 
be sudden and ac-
cidental and not 
the damage or in-
jury caused by the 
dxscMrge of the pol-
lutants, (emohasis 
added)" 
Many other brokers dis-
seminated similar informa-
tion about the lack of 
gradual pollution discharge 
coverage under the exclu-
sion, including the largest 
brokers in the w o r l d -
Marsh & McLennan. Alex-
ander & Alexander, and 
rrank B. Hail. In fact, on be-
half of all of its nationwide ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
membership, the National ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ M 
Association of Insurance 
Brokers (NAlB) acknowl-
edged that gradual pollution was not covered under the 
ISO CCL policy In a 1978 survey, N'AIB members called 
for ISO's deletion of its restrictive sudden and accidental 
exclusion. They wanted the exclusion replaced with 
broader language that did not contain a "sudden" dis-
charge limitation.32 
The broker evidence' is so powerful that some insureds 
and policyholder commentators now also accuse die bro-
ker community of dishonesty Brokers are specifically ac-
cused of creating a false impulsion that the pollution 
exclusion created a gap in coverage and of misleading 
insureds into spending vast amounts of money for envi-
ronmental impairment liability (EH) policies solely to 
generate commissions for themselves.13 These accusations 
should disturb all insurance men and women, especially 
those brokers who took the GPCU charge to uphold a 
'standard of honor and integrity" and put the interests of 
their clients before their own. 
Reasonable Coverage Expectations 
Numerous insureds and their amid have routinely come into court asserting that a finding of coverage 
for gradual pollution discharges comports with then "rea-
sonable expectations" of coverage. This is ironic because 
...brokers, like the 
exclusion's drafters and 
state insurance regulators, 
were keenly aware that 
the exclusion both clarified and 
restricted existing coverage... 
In a 1978 survey, NAIB members 
called for ISO's deletion of its 
restrictive sudden and accidental 
exclusion... 
one of the leading policy-
holder amicu* caw ruers m 
the nation, the Chemxai 
Manuxacrursrs Association 
(CMA), made conrran. ad-
missions in formal submis-
sions to the United States 
Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) over a decade 
ago on behalf of its wide 
membership In a nonhn-
gious setting addressing 
financial responsibility re-
quirements under federal 
statutes, CMA freely admit-
ted that the CGL policy, 
while providing coverage 
for sudden polluting events, 
did not provide coverage 
for gradual polluting 
events.* 
Perhaps even more dis-
__ concerting, the head of 
• • • B B H B B H B H B B I CMA's specialized Insur-
ance Committee, Thomas 
A Caldwell CPCU, pub-
lished an article criticizing those policyholders who made 
"frivolous" claims for gradual pollution coverage in the 
bee of the exclusion. He criticized "creative" and cold-
blooded" policyholder lawyers for Sling such frivolous 
claims because all policyholder risk managers and insur-
ance personnel always understood the coverage restrictions 
inherent in the plain language of the exclusion.39 
At the time he wrote his scathing commentary, this 
CMA Insurance Committee chairman was also the director 
of corporate Insurance of one of the largest chemical com* 
parties in the world. Unfortunately, that chemical compa-
ny subsequently filed one of those "frivolous" gradual 
pollution claims in a New Jersey court seeking coverage 
under the pollution exdust * 
The policyholder nsk manager association, the Risk and 
Insurawe Management Society (RIMS), similarly acknowl-
edged the lack of gradual pollution coverage in formal 
submission to the EPA in a nonlitigious setting over a 
decade ago. Furthermore, in an announcement of ISO's 
then-new pollution insurance policy, RIMS pointed out in 
its newsletter; SIMSCOPE, that this policy provided "both 
sudden and gradual" coverage. It admitted that "gradual 
incidents currently are not covered under standard gener-
al liability contracts." In fact, RIMS once drafted its own 
proposed pollution exclusion language. RIMS's exclusion 
conspicuously omitted the 
restrictive "sudden" limi-
tation exactly because its 
temporal restriction was un-
derstood " 
Thus, like brokers, major 
industry and insurance trade 
associations representing the 
policyholder community in-
dependently recognized the 
coverage restricnons inher-
ent in the plain language of 
the pollution exclusion. This 
recognition was document-
ed years before segments of 
that community asserted con-
tradictive coverage claims in 
courts. 
A Matter of Priorities 
rhere are a host of other examples where draft-
mg, regulatory, and public • ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • • • • • • 1 
history documents have 
been ignored or selectively 
excerpted and presented out of context to courts. The sam-
pling provided in the instant presentation, however, 
should suffice to make the fair-minded reader take notice. 
In the final analysis, the core question is whether insureds 
and insurers alike should continue to tolerate patently 
false accusatory tactics which, while sometunes successful 
in court, truly undermine the integrity of the judicial 
process and the insurance business. 
Notably the availability of pollution coverage has dried 
up, primarily as a result of court misinterpretations of the 
1970 exclusion. This is something the heed of CMA's In-
surance Committee, a GPCU, 
recognued and lamented in his public criticism of the 
frivolous" gradual pollution claims being filed by many 
policyholders. 
The attitude of management is, left spend some 
money on lawyers and see if rhe courts will rule in 
our favor. At best some battles were won but I am 
afraid we lost the war.* 
It is also suggested here that the answer to the question 
of whether such claims, accusations, and tactics should be 
.derated must take the form of a resounding no. 
In late 1992, a handful of insurers began attempts to 
change the manner in which the extrinsic history issue is 
perceived bv litigants and. 
hopefully, our courts They 
have done this bv present-
ing courts with a cwofotd 
argument. The first argu-
ment reiterates the earners" 
traditional stance—that 
there is no reason for courts 
to go beyond the pohcy (to 
its "history") to interpret its 
language. The language * 
unambiguous and the ''his* 
tory" evidence is ob e^cnon-
able, since it is neither part 
of the record nor illustra-
tive of the specific dealings 
between an insured and its 
insurer However, the sec-
ond argument is that, if 
courts are going to consider 
extrinsic evidence present-
ed by policyholders, they 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ need to look at all such ew 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • • • B dence in fair and full con-
text. A number of party 
and amicus curiae briefs pre-
senting the insurer side of the extrinsic evidence issue 
have recently been filed with the courts. Time will tell 
what impact they have on pending coverage litigation.* 
However, it is clear that these insurer presentations are 
having an impact on certain policyholder amm curme 
and commentators. For instance, not long ago a policy-
holder amicus curia* filed a brief with the New Jersey 
Supreme Court which made extrinsic evidence argu-
ments about the "drafting history" of the pollution ex-
clusion. Thereafter, an insurer amicus filed its own bnef 
that demonstrated that the drafting history of the exclu-
sion supported only the insurers' coverage positions. 
In a rather abrupt retreat the policyholder amicus then 
urged the New Jersey Supreme Court to ignore the amicus 
(Urrier's drafting history evidence. The policyholder ami-
cus stated that such "internal" evidence had no bearing on 
an insured's "reasonable expectations" of coverage or on 
how a court should interpret the exclusion's Language: 
..."drafting history" refers to internal insurance in-
dustry documents, such is those in Amicus Cunae 
Aetna Casualty k Surety Company's (hereinafter 
"Amicus Aetna") motion to expand the record. The 
vast majority of the drafting history documents 
were never shown to the New Jersey Department of 
insurance or the policyholder public Except for 
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ments which were 
actually seen by 
the New Jersey De-
partment or Insur-
ance or the policy-
holder public, the 
drafting history 
documents neither 
formed the basis of 
the Insurance Com* 
missioner s ap-
proval of the "poU * 
luter's exclusion" 
or the policyholder*' 
objectively reasonable 
expectations Thus, 
the drafting history 
documents relied on 
by Defendants-Re-
spondents and Ami-
cus Aetna are ir-
relevant in deter-
mining the meaning 
of the 'polluters ex-
clusion." (emphasis 
added)* 
It is almost beyond irony 
that the authors of the above 
court submission denounc-
ing drafting history as "ir-
relevant" before the New 
Jersev Supreme Court are 
the same authors who. in 
numerous other policyhold-
er amicus briefs, have insist-
ed that courts must look at 
drafting history evidence. It 
\5 these same authors who 
have urged courts to find 
coverage so as to protect the 
"integrity" of the judicial 
svstem. ft is also these same ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ 
authors who publish com* ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ™ 
mentanes (which are rou-
tinely cited to courts) lam-
basting insurance companies under titles decrying their 
"dishonesty." It appears that certain insured proponents 
of "history'' evidence want courts to look at it only ii it can 
be presented unilaterally and inaccurately.41 
the final irony is that the amicus curiae entity frequently 
utilized by these authors and others when making such 
allegations and accusations is represented to courts as 
.. .It is respectfully 
submitted here that, if the 
"integrity" of the judicial process 
is at risk, as those representing 
insureds have repeatedly alleged, 
it has certainly not been put 
thereby insurers... 
being "nonpartisan " On 
the contrary this p^Ucv-
holder amicu< hier which 
also congratulates irseir m 
court pap*r5 for its 'vigi-
lance" in protecting the 
integrity of the judical svs-
tem, is lavashiv funded bv 
the policyholder communi-
ty, including policyholders 
litigating these very cover-
age issues.42 
A number of other poli-
cyholders are now vehe-
mently objecting to earners' 
recent presencanons of the 
very categories of extrinsic 
evidence they and thetr 
amia have incessantly 
pressed upon the courts for 
so long. They understand 
that an undistorted "histo-
ry7' of the exclusion actually 
corroborates the restrictions 
set forth in its plain lan-
guage—and seek to block 
courts' consideration of 
that evidence in fair and 
full context.*5 
It is respectfully submit-
ted here that, if the "integri-
ty" of the judicial process is 
at risk, as those representing 
insureds have repeatedly 
alleged, it has certainly not 
been put there by insurers. 
Conclusion 
In an ideal world, a dis-^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ cussion of this nature 
^^^^^^^^^^^^^
m
 would not be necessary 
Litigants would be content 
to let courts interpret the 
language set forth in black and white in a policy. If a 
court wished to resolve a perceived ambiguity, it would 
consider only direct evidence bearing on the intent and 
reasonable expectations of the particular parties to a con-
tract of insurance. Notably, i* was those representing pol-
icyholders who first put forth history" arguments m 
attempts to create an aura of ambiguity before courts 
even determined whether policy language was so unclear 
as co prevent insureds from understanding the bounds of 
their coverage. Seemingly made overconfident by theu 
success in persuading some courts to accept their ver* 
sion of the history of the exclusion, some also saw fit to 
heighten unfounded ad homintm accusations. 
Regrettably a good deal of damage has already been 
done. A body of case law founded upon acceptance of 
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THE "FRIVOLITY" OF POLICYHOLDER 
GRADUAL POLLUTION DISCHARGE CLAIMS 
(Everything carriers should want to know about pollution exclusion generic discov-
ery, and shouldn't be afraid to ask) 
By 
Victor C Harwood, m 
Brian J. Coyle 
Edward Zampino 
[Editor's Note: The authors' law firm, Harwood Lloyd, is located in Hackensack, 
New Jersey. It defends environmental insurance lawsuits on behalf of insurance companies. 
Victor C. Harwood, III and Brian J. Coyle are partners of the firm and head its environ* 
mental department Edward Zampino is a senior associate of the firm. The personal 
"editorial" observations of the authors do not necessarily represent the viewpoint of any 
carrier the firm represents. Responses to this commentary are welcome.] 
COMMENTARY 
Picture for a moment a 
major figure in the insurance 
community stepping up to a 
spotlit podium. He admonishes 
CGL policyholders regarding 
their pursuit of coverage for 
gradual environmental con-
tamination claims made against CGL policies containing a pollution exclusion with an 
exception affording coverage only for "sudden and accidental" pollution discharges. This 
speaker also strongly admonishes the courts in no uncertain terms for resolving some of those 
claims in favor of the policyholder. 
For instance, imagine this speaker accusing the policyholders of submitting: 
"frivolous claims to their insurers and the courts in the hope of 
finding coverage". 
Listen to the speaker further assert that: 
"it was clearly noi the intent of either party to the insurance 
contract to cover many of these events which were not truly 
sudden and accidental in nature". 
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The speaker relentlessly insists that policyholder risk managers clearly understood that 
gradual pollution discharges were not covered by virtue of the pollution exclusion, but that 
nothing deterred their "cold blooded" and "creative" lawyers who try to: 
"exploit a lack of specificity in policy wording and convince a 
judge that any doubt regarding intent should be ruled in favor 
of the policyholder". 
The speaker indignantly concludes: 
'This does not make the final outcome right". 
Who is this vehement denouncer of perceived injustice? Is he the disgruntled presi-
dent of a major insurance carrier? Perhaps a frustrated attorney for a carrier? You might 
be surprised to learn that our speaker is actually the Director of Corporate Insurance for one 
of the largest chemical company policyholders in the world.1 
Don't be surprised anymore. This policyholder risk manager is only one of innumer-
able members of the insurance universe including policyholder risk managers, insurance 
brokers, policyholder and broker trade associations, trade publication authors, state insurance 
commissioners, and policy drafters who have known from the very inception of the pollution 
exclusion in and around 1970 that gradual pollution discharges were not, and were never 
meant to be, covered under a CGL policy with a pollution exclusion. They were also well 
aware that only an Environmental Impairment Liability (MEIL") policy could plug the gradual 
pollution discharge "gap" created by the pollution exclusion. 
Unfortunately policyholders have been able to convince some courts to the contrary 
by proffering misleading arguments based upon a handful of extrinsic documents propped up 
by semantical confusion, many of which have appeared in the pages of this publication. Poli-
cyholders and brokers are no doubt thrilled to find these "gifts" of coverage from certain 
members of the judiciary, but they are not always surprised by the generosity of the courts. 
For instance, after one of the earlier favorable "policyholder" decisions in the country was 
rendered by a New Jersey trial court judge2, a member of the pollution committee of broker, 
Johnson & Higgins, observed they had already predicted that courts would do anything to 
find coverage, even if it meant misinterpreting the plain language of the policy exclusion. 
. . . our forecast that the courts would argue in favor of cover-
age under the General Liability policy even to the extent of 
misinterpreting the exclusion has been borne out.3 
Johnson & Higgins also immediately recognized a major flaw in the comprehension 
and reasoning exhibited in such decisions, which improperly focused on pollution damage 
rather than the pollution discharge. 
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. . . the courts in their desire to hold that the insured is covered 
by the policy have not realized that it is the discharge of the 
pollutants that must be sudden and accidental and not the dam-
age or injury caused by the discharge of the pollutants, (empha-
sis added)4 
Policyholders have flooded the insurance literature forum with fantastical ramblings 
on 'The World According To The West Virginia Commissioner Filings". They make unten-
able contentions that the drafting history of the pollution exclusion somehow supports their 
case. They utter pleas of ignorance regarding their lack of understanding of the restrictive 
nature of the pollution exclusion. Unfortunately, some carriers have shied away from generic 
discovery efforts, burying their heads in the sand while simultaneously being sandbagged into 
believing the policyholder myth that generic discovery is against them. 
A great deal of credit is due to aggressive carriers who have permitted their counsel 
to meet the generic discovery challenge generated by policyholders' contentions as to the 
content of generic discovery materials. Thus, we have been able to pursue generic discovery 
projects involving several hundreds of thousands of pages of documents, memoranda, min-
utes, letters, speeches, articles, books, and other writings generated by the broker community, 
Insurance Service Organization (ISO), trade publications, policyholder industry and insurance 
associations, state insurance commissions, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and 
the like. While consistently confident that the plain language of the pollution exclusion is 
not remotely ambiguous, these carriers have recognized that the courts have been mistakenly 
and unduly influenced by the policyholders' presentation of the import of certain extrinsic 
evidence. 
To paraphrase a famous quote which requires no footnote, "we hold this truth to be 
self-evident": the pollution exclusion language is clear and unambiguous in excluding 
coverage for gradual pollution discharges. However, if your state considers extrinsic 
evidence and finds gradual pollution coverage in favor of the policyholders, it is because the 
courts have not been properly informed. Unless you can guarantee that extrinsic evidence 
will not be admitted in court, you had better be ready to confront it. We hope that the 
evidence presented in this article will encourage others not only to negate extrinsic evidence 
arguments raised by policyholders but to aggressively go after decisive wins, if necessary, on 
the very extrinsic evidence battlefield where policyholders, until now, have always felt very 
much at home. 
1. DRAFTING HISTORY: THE POLICYHOLDERS' UNRELIABLE ALLY 
Policyholders have routinely pressed courts to consider their unfounded arguments 
regarding the drafting history of the pollution exclusion. While some courts have accepted 
these histrionics where nothing in defense has been offered, the fact of the matter is that the 
drafting history is one of the policyholders' worst enemies. 
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A logical and chronological starting point as to the intended meaning and purpose of 
the pollution exclusion is the documentation generated by the men who drafted the exclusion. 
It is generally acknowledged that one of the drafters of the wording of the pollution exclusion 
was Francis X. Bruton, a member of Aetna's casualty department, who was Aetna's repre-
sentative on the drafting committee of the IRB (Insurance Rating Board). The IRB was a 
precursor of ISO, an organization charged with developing and filing standard policy forms 
for state approval on behalf of member insurance carriers. The deposition of Mr. Bruton *vas 
taken simultaneously in a large number of environmental declaratory judgment actions.3 
Marked as an exhibit at that deposition was a sworn affidavit of Mr. Bruton attaching key 
supporting documents regarding his recounting of drafting intent to restrict pollution dis-
charge coverage to the sudden/quick "classical accident". 
These important documents establish that the IRB's General Liability Governing 
Committee ("GLGC") met on March 17, 1970 to discuss a proposed endorsement to exclude 
pollution coverage for general liability policies with an exception for pollution resulting from 
a "classical accident". As the minutes of the meeting reflect, the Committee decided: 
that a policy exclusion of pollution that would run to bodily 
injury and property damage should be adopted for all general 
liability insurance, the exclusion to except pollution caused 
injuries when the pollution results from the classical 
accident... (emphasis added) 
That the GLGC decided to go ahead with a pollution exclusion with a temporal "classical ac-
cident" exception is reflected in a March 20, 1970 memorandum prepared by Robert S. 
Hansen, an Assistant Vice-President of Aetna Casualty, who was Aetna's representative on 
the GLGC. Mr. Hansen reiterated that the exclusion decided upon by the GLGC would: 
exclude all other pollution or contamination of water and air 
except for the "boom case", or "classic accident". 
Subsequently, drafts of proposed pollution exclusion wordings were exchanged. The 
final draft made it clear that it was the "discharge" of pollutants that had to be "sudden and 
accidental" rather than the injury or damage caused by the pollution discharge. In fact, a 
suggestion to include in the pollution exclusion language similar to that found in the "occur-
rence" definition ("neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured") was 
expressly dismissed by Mr. Bruton in a letter of June 5, 1970 to a member of the IRB staff 
for the reason that such "occurrence" wording would have the potential to drag back into the 
pollution exclusion a debate as to the insured's state of mind. This was unacceptable, as the 
intent of the pollution exclusion was to avoid any question of an insured's intent and direct 
focus only upon the physical nature of the pollution discharge. 
The words "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint 
of the insured" when appearing in the "occurrence" definition 
of the policy actually appears in a completely different context 
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and carries a different meaning than it would if added as a tag 
to the (pollution) exclusion. The words "sudden and acciden-
tal" are used to modify the words "discharge, dispersal, release, 
or escape" and as such refer to a physical event which itself is 
sudden and accidental. In the context of the "occurrence" 
definition the phrase in question modifies the words "bodily 
injury or property damage" and describe a state of mind of the 
insured as respects that occurrence of such bodily injury or 
property damage. The exclusion, as pointed out above, does 
not itself attempt to address to the state of mind of the insured 
but rather is pitched to a particular physical event, (emphasis 
added) 
Thus, the drafters of the pollution exclusion, when wording the exception to it, expressly 
chose language ("sudden and accidental") requiring a true sudden/temporal "classical acci-
dent". The drafters made clear that the focus of this "sudden and accidental" exception was 
on the physical event of a pollution discharge. It was also made clear that application of the 
pollution exclusion would not involve any consideration of the insured's state of mind as to 
whether an insured "expected or intended" property damage or bodily injury resulting from 
a pollution event. 
There is no point in belaboring this discussion with illustrations' from the myriad 
documents which encompass the background of consistent understandings shared by the 
insurance universe of policy drafters, brokers, trade journalists, professors of insurance, etc. 
on this temporal issue. It was a long established insurance concept that "classical accident" 
or "boom" accident, or just plain "accident", were all described by the plain, ordinary, 
common word "sudden", and all incorporated quickness.6 
Policyholders will ask: 
l)Q: If the drafters intended a temporal meaning why did they use "sudden and 
accidental" when courts were already interpreting such language in boiler and machinery 
policies as merely fortuitous? 
A: That myth has already been exposed. With only one possible exception boiler 
and machinery cases pre-1970 attributed a temporal meaning to sudden.7 
2)Q: Why did the drafters use an ambiguous word like sudden to express the tem-
poral when dictionaries define sudden as "unexpected"? 
Aj, Respected dictionaries, such as Merriam-Websters, do riot define the current or-
dinary meaning of "sudden" as "unexpected." The first listed sense cited by policyholders 
is the historical one, as explained in the "front matter" or usage instructions of the dictionary. 
All Merriam-Webster's dictionaries have always ordered the senses of a word historically. 
As explained, for example, in Webster's Seventh New Collcgate Dictionary (1972): 
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ORDER OF DEFINITIONS 
In general the order of definitions follows the practice of the 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL, where the earliest ascertain-
able meaning is placed first and later meanings are arranged in 
the order shown to be most probable by dated citations and 
semantic developments. This arrangement applies alike to all 
meanings whether standard, technical, or scientific. The his-
torical order is of especial value to those interested in the 
development of meanings and offers no difficulty to the user 
who is merely looking for a particular meaning (Preface, 
Page 5a). 
Therefore, when the purpose of using a Merriam-Webster's dictionary is to find the 
plain, ordinary, and common (current) meaning of "sudden", one should look at subsequently 
listed senses, such as: 
5. Hastily prepared,... very quickly made . . . Webster's New 
International Dictionary. Second Edition Unabridged (1935) and 
(1952). 
2a: characterized by or manifesting hastiness . . . Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary. Unabridged (1961). 
2: marked by or manifesting hastiness . . . 
3: made or brought about in a short time . . . Webster's Seventh 
New Collegiate Dictionary (1972). 
Only policyholders' incorrect use of dictionaries support their claims. When used as intended 
by their publishers all major dictionaries advise that "sudden" means "quick".8 
3.Q: If "classical accident", or "accident", describes the temporal, why didn't the 
drafters just use those words in the language of the pollution exclusion? 
A: Considering the way the courts were misconstruing "caused by accident" as cov-
ering many fortuitous events [reference Schmalz article, Endnote 6(b)], it would have been 
foolhardy to think courts would not treat that same language in the same way they did pre-
1966. The selection of "sudden" was a safe choice of policy language (or so they thought) 
of a plain ordinary word to express the simple thought of quickness, especially since "sud-
den" was understood that way by insurance men and ordinary people alike. By emphasiz-
ing the temporal with "sudden", they permitted "accidental" to express fortuity, thereby 
completing the classical accident concept. 
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Let us emphasize the dramatic impact of a full and accurate presentation of drafting 
history. When confronted with overwhelming generic evidence on this point, one of the 
leading policyholder insurance experts in the country, Richard E. Stewart (ex-Insurance 
Commissioner from the State of New York in 1970), made a headspinning turnaround. 
Stewart completely backed off his opinion that the drafting history documents reflect "that 
the 'sudden and accidental' language of that exclusion does not have a temporal component".9 
In the very case where Mr. Stewart proffered this opinion, he later testified at his deposition 
that: 
. . . the drafting documents . . . speak of sudden in its temporal 
sense, and as accomplishing a serious cutback in coverage. 
Granted. I am not questioning the accuracy of anything in Mr. 
Bruton's Affidavit as to what was going on.10 
That one of the policyholders' most impressive and articulate insuranc experts had to pull up 
stakes and ditch policyholder "drafting history" arguments should leave little to the imagi-
nation regarding the positive and powerful use carriers can make of theis category of extrinsic 
evidence. 
2. THE (BASHFUL) BROKERS 
Any carrier counsel who has experienced a deposition session with an account execu-
tive or other representative of a commercial broker has probably emerged from that session 
with the phrases "I do not recall", "that is not what I meant when I wrote that", or "what is 
a pollution exclusion" ringing in his or her ears. Apparently, many brokers do not wish to 
have it said that their testimony worked quite negatively against a client or former client. 
Fortunately, a wide and wonderful universe of generic broker documents exists for carriers 
to utilize. Without exception, these documents demonstrate that every commercial insurance 
broker in the country understood that the pollution exclusion restricted existing pollution 
coverage and created a gradual ugap" in coverage. Of course, the recognition of the gradual 
pollution "gap" by the entire insurance industry and policyholder brokers in particular, 
precludes any suggestion that the pollution exclusion merely restated the language of the 
"occurrence" definition and did not restrict existing coverage. Here are some samples from 
the universe broker documents: 
(a) Alexander and Alexander 
Alexander & Alexander ("A&A") was well aware since the introduction of the pol-
lution exclusion in 1970 that coverage for "gradual" pollution discharges was expressly 
excluded from the CGL policy and that the pollution exclusion created a "serious coverage 
gap." Consider the following discussion contained in A&A's National Environmental Action 
Team pamphlet. 
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Does Your Insurance Protect You? For accidental and sudden 
pollution, industry has long been covered under Comprehensive 
General Liability policies. But in the early 1970's gradual 
pollution was excluded from the CGL. This exclusion repre-
sents a serious coverage gap for most companies . . . (emphasis 
added) 
A&A also had a complete understanding that the gradual pollution gap, not covered 
under a CGL with a pollution exclusion, could only be insured by way of purchase of an EIL 
policy. This long known principle is reflected in an excerpt from A&A's 1979 Annual 
Report. 
A&A is developing programs which, using through engineering 
surveys and loss prevention techniques, provide coverage for 
gradual inadvertent environmental impairment. These programs 
fill the gap currently created by widespread restrictions that 
limit coverage to sudden and accidental events. 
In fact, Alexander & Alexander acquired an EIL producer, Shand Morahan, as a 
subsidiary. There can certainly be no doubt that Alexander & Alexander understood the 
pollution exclusion and the gradual pollution gap it created in a manner perfectly in tune with 
the express intent of its drafters. 
(b) Frank B. Hall 
Frank B. Hall is another well known broker whose understanding of the nature and 
purpose of the pollution exclusion should be examined. In one of its highly informative 
publications entitled "Newsletter", Frank B. Hall routinely discussed the nature of the EIL 
policy and how it afforded the gradual pollution coverage taken away by the CGL's pollution 
exclusion.11 The basic message succinctly carried by Frank B. Hall to its policyholder clients 
was the need to fill the temporal coverage gap for "long term" or gradual pollution: 
Most companies are not insured against long term and gradual 
pollution, but several underwriters now offer EIL insurance, 
which provides coverage for claims arising out of gradual 
pollution occurrences, (emphasis added)12 
But Frank B. Hall had an even stronger message to disseminate to policyholder clients 
which was published in an insurance trade publication. In that article, a senior staff scientist 
of HaU's subsidiary Risk Science International ("RSI")* highlighted the "brief temporal" 
element of "sudden" and blasted as "rash" court decisions rendered in favor of policyholders. 
It also stated: 
It is clear that despite some readings to the contrary by some 
courts and commentators the pollution exclusion in the CGL 
© COPYRIGHT 1991 MEAL£Y PUBUCATONS. INC., WAYNE, PA 
26 
MEALEY'S LITIGATION REPORTS 
INSURANCE 
Vol. 5, #40 August 27, 1991 
policy was meant to and does deny coverage for claims arising 
out of pollution events that are not of a brief temporal duration, 
(emphasis added)13 
The Frank B. Hall/RSI message ends with a plea for the courts to refrain from simply 
looking for a "deep pocket". 
It has become a standard part of insurance law that ambiguity 
in an insurance contract should be resolved in favor of the 
policyholder. It is incumbent upon the courts, however, to 
provide reasonable interpretations of language based on con-
tract and not to exploit the inherent ambiguity of the English 
language. Otherwise, the definitions section of an insurance 
contract will become unwieldy. Because an insurance company 
may have the deepest pocket in some pollution cases does not 
mean it should be unreasonably forced to empty it. (emphasis 
added) 
This is not an insurer speaking! These are the words of a broker whose clients are 
policyholders! There can be no doubt that Frank B. Hall understood the true meaning of the 
pollution exclusion as expressed by the plain wording chosen by the drafters, and spread this 
understanding as gospel to its policyholder clients and the insurance community at large. 
(c) Marsh & McLennan 
All evidence similarly demonstrates that Marsh & McLennan ("M&M") was as well 
aware as its brethren that gradual pollution discharges were not afforded coverage under the 
CGL by virtue of the pollution exclusion. For instance, M&M's Technical Service Unit, also 
known as Clayton Environmental Consultants, Inc., expressly advised in its environmental 
"newsletter" that a CGL provided coverage only for "sudden" pollution events, and that only 
an EIL policy would afford coverage for "gradual" pollution.14 In its informational literature, 
M&M's Waste Management Services unit demonstrated a similar understanding when advis-
ing the public that only an EIL policy afforded the "gradual" pollution coverage that CGL 
underwriters never previously provided.15 
The head of M&M's Hazardous Waste Management Program likewise broadcast to 
the policyholder public in insurance trade publications that only "sudden and accidental" 
coverage was provided in the CGL and that an EIL policy was required to afford "gradual" 
pollution insurance, correctly noting that the EIL "gradual" market needed time to develop.16 
Even at the apparent height of environmental insurance litigation in 1990, and despite some 
court misinterpretations to the contrary, M&M was still acknowledging that the CGL pro-
vided only "sudden" pollution coverage, and that it took time, with Marsh & McLennan*s 
help, to develop a "gradual" pollution market after the pollution exclusion was introduced in 
1970.17 
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(d) Johnson & Higgins 
On May 11, 1970, shortly after the Insurance Company of North America (INA), a 
non-IRB member company, announced the introduction of its pollution exclusion ("sudden 
happening . . . neither expected nor intended'*), Johnson & Higgins ("J&H") held a meeting 
of its Casualty Department where the exclusion was discussed. It was noted in the minutes 
that the ERB was preparing a similar endorsement. J&H prepared a form letter for distribu-
tion to its clients expressly advising them that INA's exclusion may have the effect of 
reducing the scope of coverage. 
In a February 5, 1976 letter, J&H's in-house counsel to its Casualty Department 
expressed concern over the impact of a pollution exclusion with a usudden and accidental" 
exception on the coverage of a J&H client. He pointed out that underwriters were motivated 
to exclude pollution coverage because of litigation directed at "concerns whose everyday 
plant operations created harmful exposures'9. He also complained that this exclusionary 
restriction was unfair and recommended negotiations with underwriters for a "more equi-
table" pollution exclusion. What wording did J&H suggest in lieu of the "sudden and 
accidental" language? Not surprisingly, J&H recommended negotiating for a pollution 
exclusion that barred only "unintentional" pollution discharges. It is obvious that very early 
on J&H recognized that the "sudden and accidental" concept was more restrictive than an 
exclusion that merely restated the fortuity requirement set forth in the CGL's "occurrence" 
concept. 
The reader is requested to revisit a previously mentioned J&H memorandum com-
menting on courts' lack of comprehension of the obvious wording of the pollution exclu-
sion.18 In this same memorandum J&H also warned against reliance upon such misguided 
decisions, fearing such misplaced reliance would prove detrimental in the event a court 
interpreted the exclusion in accord with its underwriting intent and plain wording.19 The 
memorandum concluded by recommending that J&H clients be advised to purchase EIL 
coverage when warranted. 
In addition to the positions of J&H set forth in the above-cited memorandum, J&H 
personnel had no hesitation in voicing public acknowledgement of what courts were improp-
erly doing when handing down decisions in favor of policyholders. For instance, in a leading 
trade publication, a J&H Assistant Vice-President was quoted as saying that such court 
opinions favoring policyholders had the effect of "completely emasculating" the CGL's 
pollution exclusion.20 This J&H executive was making absolutely clear that these courts were 
(painfully) abusing the wording and purpose of the pollution exclusion, rendering it impotent. 
These statements of broker employees were not the wild personal opinions of a few 
individuals. Rather, the understanding that gradual pollution claims were simply not covered 
by a CGL policy with a pollution exclusion constituted the formal position of the brokers in 
their insurance manuals and pollution seminars. In such materials one routinely finds histori-
cal discussion of the pollution exclusion. The J&H pollution insurance manual, for instance, 
echoes the drafting history story previously discussed, advising that the pollution exclusion 
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came "full cycle" and returned coverage for pollution from a broader 1966 "occurrence" basis 
to the more narrow "interpretation of accident".21 Brokers' materials also show an excellent 
understanding of the coverage gap created by the pollution exclusion which could only be 
filled by a "gradual" pollution policy such as the EIL policy offered by the London market 
in the mid-1970's. Typical broker seminars similarly educated and informed policyholder 
clients and potential clients that the CGL only covered sudden pollution discharges and that 
EIL coverage was required to fill the gradual pollution ugap" created by the pollution exclu-
sion.22 
(e) The National Association of Insurance Brokers (NAJB) 
As will be discussed in regard to EPA topics, infra, the NAIB, on behalf of all of its 
broker members acknowledged that gradual pollution was not covered under the CGL and 
that an EIL was the appropriate coverage option. 
3. POLICYHOLDER AMNESIA 
As just demonstrated, there can be no question that insurance brokers perfectly 
understood and broadcast to their policyholder clients and the policyholder public that grad-
ual pollution discharges were not afforded coverage under the "sudden and accidental" 
exception to the pollution exclusion. As will be further demonstrated, the community of 
policyholders itself broadcast the identical understanding. American Cyanamid's Director of 
Corporate Insurance was not the only risk manager to acknowledge that a CGL policy with 
a pollution exclusion did not cover gradual pollution discharges.23 That only truly sudden/ 
temporal discharges were afforded coverage under the pollution exclusion was a normal 
operating premise upon which business was done throughout the insurance community. Thus, 
when policyholder risk managers were routinely "quoted" in trade publications, as will be 
discussed, infra, their quoted discussions begin with a starting premise that a CGL with a 
pollution exclusion barred coverage for gradual pollution discharges. 
For instance, one article describes how risk managers for Republic Steel Corporation 
and Hanna Mining Company, never presuming that any such "gradual" coverage was ever 
afforded in their CGL policies, got together and drafted their own version of an EIL gradual 
pollution policy.24 In another trade publication article entitled "Most Firms Plan To Insure 
Gradual Pollution Risks", the quotes given by numerous policyholder risk managers reflected 
the normal operating premise that federal EPA insurance requirements for coverage of 
"gradual" pollution incidents could not be met by mere proof of CGL insurance.25 Rather, the 
risk managers simply debated whether they would purchase quite expensive EIL policies or 
comply with EPA gradual pollution financial responsibility requirements by way of self-
insurance. The quoted risk managers represented policyholders such as United Technologies 
Corporation, Hexcel Corporation, Koppers Company (and its subsidiary), as well as numer-
ous unidentified petroleum, chemical, and manufacturing companies. 
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Some comments chosen from the article sum up the strategy expressed by these risk 
managers for choosing either EIL policy coverage ("its expensive as hell") or going the self-
insurance route ("its much less expensive"). The bottom line was, "It's all a matter of eco-
nomics/'26 Of course, it was never once suggested that the cost (EIL) or risk (self-insurance) 
dilemma posed by the federal requirement to purchase "gradual" pollution coverage could be 
easily avoided because it was understood that CGL policies existing in these risk managers' 
portfolios already afforded such protection. If that were the case no risk manager, obviously 
perturbed by the high cost of EIL protection, would keep quiet about such a proposition. On 
the contrary, such an astute risk manager would have probably deserved a promotion. The 
reality of the situation was, however, that no risk manager ever suggested a CGL solution for 
the EPA's gradual pollution insurance requirements because it was simply impossible, illogi-
cal, and contrary to any policyholder understanding or objectively reasonable expectation of 
coverage. 
Similarly, risk managers for some of the largest and most well known chemical 
companies in the country began their discussion of pollution insurance with the familiar 
premise that the CGL did not cover gradual pollution incidents. Once again, the only debate 
was whether to purchase EIL policy protection or go the self-insurance route.27 
From the risk manager of DuPont — "We want to self-insure as much as possible". 
From the risk manager of DOW Chemical — "We haven't bought the (EIL) coverage 
yet, and were looking at self-insurance". 
And, from the risk manager of American Cyanamid — "We hope the final regulations 
will permit some semblance of self-insurance". 
It should not surprise anyone by this time that it was never suggested by these major 
chemical industry risk managers that their CGL policies already provided the gradual pollu-
tion insurance they were required to obtain by the government. Everyone knew the CGL did 
not ever provide such coverage. 
4. POLICYHOLDERS' INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS: GROUP AMNESIA 
The proclamations of the trade associations and industry groups to which policyhold-
ers and their risk managers belonged are also instructive on the understandings of its 
membership. Consider, for example, the Risk and Insurance Management Society, Inc., also 
known as "RIMS". According to a RIMS paper submitted to the EPA in 1980, RIMS 
represented 3,500 policyholder corporations and 6,500 policyholder risk managers.23 RIMS' 
understanding of the gradual pollution gap created by the pollution exclusion mirrored those 
of the drafters of the pollution exclusion. For example, on April 21, 1982, RIMS and the 
broker, Alexander and Alexander, jointly participated in a pollution presentation in Washing-
ton, D.C. entitled "RIMS Seminar - Update of Environmental Impairment Insurance". The 
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materials utilized at the RIMS pollution seminar make crystal clear that RIMS understood 
that the pollution exclusion accomplished exactly what its drafters wanted it to do. 
A topic heading found in the seminar materials, "UNDERWRITERS' INTENT FOR 
EXCLUDING NON-SUDDEN AND GRADUAL COVERAGE FROM CGL", tells us: 
Pollution incidents of this type are normally of long duration 
which causes difficulty in determining, in an occurrence policy, 
exactly when the occurrence took place, (emphasis added)29 
This and numerous other statements in the seminar materials remove any conceivable doubt 
that the RIMS risk managers perfectly understood that gradual "pollution incidents" (i.e. 
discharges) "are normally of long duration" (i.e. temporal). Thus, when the RIMS seminar 
material further stressed that "sudden and accidental" claims "have traditionally been covered 
by Comprehensive General Liability Policies (CGL)" there cannot be an iota of doubt that 
everyone understood that "sudden", like "gradual", was an expression of temporality. The 
RIMS pollution seminar material accordingly instructed its risk manager audience of the 
correct conclusion that: 
Non-Sudden and Gradual Pollution Claims — Not Covered by 
CGL policies. 
Of course, RIMS was also correct when it instructed risk managers that the industry response 
to the pollution exclusion's taking away of gradual coverage resulted in the creation of the 
EIL policy, that product being intended to fill the gradual pollution "gap" created by the 
pollution exclusion in the CGL policy. 
INDUSTRY RESPONSE 
Creation of a new product (policy) called Environmental Im-
pairment Liability Insurance (EILI), EILI provides insurance 
for non-sudden and gradual pollution. It fills in the gaps not 
provided bv vour coverage CGL contract, (emphasis added) 
Is it not curious that a risk manager association, run by and on behalf of risk man-
agers, never even hinted, thought or suggested that a great deal of money could be saved by 
advising RIMS members or the EPA that CGL policies already issued to the policyholder 
community provided the EPA mandated "gradual" pollution coverage? ;j it not curious that 
it was never hinted, thought, or suggested that it was simply not necessary to purchase 
expensive EIL coverage or assume catastrophic risks by way of self-insurance because the 
CGL already provided "gradual" coverage? No such suggestion was ever made by RIMS to 
its risk management audience or to the EPA since it was common knowledge and had been 
a normal operating premise for over a dozen years that, since its inception in 1970, the 
pollution exclusion covered only truly sudden/temporal pollution incidents. 
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In addition to being members of RIMS and participating in the operating premises that 
were common knowledge in the community of risk managers, brokers and underwriters, poli-
cyholders routinely belonged to industry associations. Consider the industry trade associa-
tion, CMA (Chemical Manufacturers Association). According to documents submitted by the 
CMA to the EPA in 1980, the CMA was made up of 190 member companies in the United 
States "representing more than 90 percent of the domestic production capacity for basic 
industrial chemicals".30 What did 90 percent of the chemical industry understand about the 
pollution exclusion? In public documents comprising the submission of formal comments by 
the CMA on behalf of its membership, CMA addressed the use of liability insurance as a 
mechanism for complying with federal financial responsibility requirements. CMA expressed 
therein an explicit recognition that a CGL policy with a pollution exclusion could not be 
proffered as a mechanism for complying with federal requirements for "gradual" pollution 
coverage. It is further reflected that the CMA understood that only an EIL policy provided 
"gradual" pollution coverage and, EPA regulations aside, all types of gradual environmental 
exposures needed to be protected against with an EIL policy.31 As will be examined in a 
separate discussion of EPA topics, infra, other policyholder industry associations had similar 
understandings. 
5. WHAT EVERY READER OF INSURANCE TRADE PUBLICATIONS KNEW 
Insurance trade publications were read and contributed to by policyholders and bro-
kers alike and present an accurate picture of the premise under which the insurance industry 
had been operating for many years — that a CGL with a pollution exclusion did not cover 
gradual pollution discharges. For example, contemporaneously with the filing of the IRB 
pollution exclusion with state insurance commissioners in 1970, the insurance trade publica-
tion, the John Liner Letter, addressed the impact of the new exclusion, immediately recog-
nizing that the "sudden and accidental" exception of the exclusion pertained to the pollution 
discharge. The John Liner Letter also immediately recognized that the exclusion as described 
in the IRB announcement "obviously" constituted a reduction in coverage from that coverage 
previously afforded under the CGL.32 
In April 1971, Risk Management magazine carried an article pointing out the "limited 
extent of coverage'' carriers were now affording for pollution liability claims. It also ob-
served: 
What seems to be the intent is to- provide for some very short 
term phenomenon . . . (emphasis added)13 
In 1973, the Weekly Underwriter published a three part article regarding the then new 
CGL policy form, which incorporated into the policy the pollution exclusion which hereto-
fore had to be added to a policy by separate endorsement. That article, authored by Bernard 
J. Daenzer, President of the national brokerage firm, Wohlreich & Anderson Agencies, similarly 
highlighted that the exception to the pollution exclusion focused on the pollution "discharge". 
The author also expressly noted the temporal nature of "sudden", distinguishing this "sudden" 
requirement from the additional "accidental" requirement of the wording. 
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. . . if the discharge is not sudden and accidental, there is no 
coverage in the basic policy. It must be both sudden and 
accidental, not either sudden or accidental.34 
In another Weekly Underwriter article, Daenzer, like so many others, recognized the gradual 
pollution "gap" created by the pollution exclusion's reduction in coverage. 
'The non-marine market has been very sluggish in plugging the 
gap for gradual pollution — land, air, water — not now in the 
standard CGL or for the sudden and accidental exposure where 
it has been excluded."35 
In November, 1979, one author pointedly explained the long standing knowledge of 
the insurance industry that this gap was a gradual gap, giving the example of "slow leak-
age".36 Thus, the author recommended the use of EIL to fill the "gradual pollution" gap. 
Going beyond acknowledging the mere premise that the pollution exclusion barred 
gradual pollution coverage, trade publication authors were just as aware as risk managers and 
brokers37 that courts rendering environmental insurance decisions in favor of policyholders 
were doing so without basis and in contradiction of the express and clear understanding of 
the entire insurance community. In discussing the weakening of the pollution insurance 
market available to help business meet EPA mandated requirements, one trade publication 
author succinctly noted that a cause of this problem was coverage awards made by courts 
without any basis in the insurance contract. 
'The bottom dropped out of both types of coverage when courts 
began awarding coverage when none was written . . .". (em-
phasis added)36 
Regarding the pollution exclusion and its "sudden and accidental" exception, the obvious "in-
stantaneous" temporal nature of "sudden" was highlighted by the author. 
In this form, pollution or contamination is covered if it is sudden 
or instantaneous, not gradual, (emphasis added)39 
A director of environmental risk management services for the Corroon & Black brokerage 
also recognized in another trade publication the unfair treatment afforded to policy wording 
by certain courts. 
Originally, comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies 
sought to exclude all claims arising from pollution that were not 
sudden and accidental. Recent court decisions, however, have 
awarded damages to insureds even though the pollution event 
was clearly not sudden or accidental. These cases significantly 
broadened the coverage provided under the CGL policy. 
(emphasis added)40 
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Along this identical line, in May 1984, another trade article noted that such court decisions 
ran afoul of the plain wording of the policy and the industry's common knowledge of the 
exclusion's "unequivocal" bar of gradual pollution coverage. 
While that language appears to be unequivocal, the courts have 
now in a scries of cases determined that gradual pollution is 
covered in many instances because (of) a variety 
of . . . interpretations, (emphasis added)41 
While only a small sampling of the large number of trade publications expressing 
these propositions has been mentioned herein, it amply demonstrates that the articles being 
published by insurance trade publications were completely in accord with the intent of the 
drafters of the pollution exclusion to bar coverage of gradual pollution. Their message was 
also in accord with the common knowledge of all brokers and policyholders procuring and 
purchasing CGL policies containing the pollution exclusion — i.e. that only truly sudden (and 
not gradual) pollution discharges were afforded coverage. 
6. THE EPA REGULATIONS: POLICYHOLDERS CHAMPION CARRIERS* 
POSITIONS 
Certain documents generated by the insurance industry in response to the federal EPA 
financial responsibility requirements have been previously discussed. The instant discussion 
will focus on early formal analyses made by the EPA reflecting how the EPA understood a 
"sudden" pollution event and how that was distinct from a "non-sudden" or "gradual" pol-
lution event. This discussion will then target a sampling of the formal comments submitted 
by the insurance community in response to the EPA request for public comments regarding 
pollution insurance issues. As will be seen, carriers could not have had better advocates than 
the policyholder voices themselves for the proposition that the pollution exclusion barred 
coverage for gradual pollution discharges. 
In April of 1980, the EPA generated one of a number of "Background Documents" 
regarding the financial requirements mandated by the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA) in 1976/a The EPA recognized that the CGL provided coverage for "sudden 
events", but that "non-sudden" or "gradual" events were not afforded under the CGL.43 
What, then, did the EPA mean by a "sudden" event and how was "sudden" distinguished 
from "non- sudden99 coverage? Firstly, and as will be seen continuously throughout EPA 
records, "non-sudden" was used interchangeably with "gradual". Secondly, the EPA's dis-
tinction between "sudden" and "gradual" was one of pure temporality - a "sudden" pollution 
event was one of short duration and a "gradual" pollution event was long term in nature. 
Appendix B of the EPA Background Document comprises an intensive case study of pollu-
tion events, separating them into these two categories - "sudden" and "gradual". 
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ANALYSIS OF INCIDENTS ON HAZARDOUS WASTE 
TREATMENT. STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL SITES 
Incidents on sites where hazardous waste was knowingly re-
ceived or managed were extremely varied. Incidents were both 
sudden and gradual; they occurred both on manufacturing sites 
and on independent commercial waste management sites; they 
occurred on abandoned and on operating sites. Based on a 
review of the damage reports, the incidents have been grouped 
into the following categories to facilitate their analysis: 
Sudden: 
1. Overflow of lagoons due to rain 
2. Collapse of dikes supporting lagoons 
3. Explosion/fire or toxic fumes 
4. Spills or material discharge to the ground 
Gradual: 
1. Dumping on ground or burial of untreated wastes 
2. Leaks from unlined ponds 
3. Continual overflowing of lagoons 
4. Leaking drums/tanks without back-up containment for wastes 
5. Leaks during production or treatment of wastes44 
Tables and charts in the EPA's Background Document utilize these identical temporal cate-
gories.45 
Thus, the EPA quite logically included in the category of "sudden'* events things that 
happened quickly — such as an explosion, a spill, or a collapse. This analysis in the 1980's 
is quite in accord, by the way, with the long standing insurance concept of the "boom" 
accident or the "classical accident" and the drafting intent to use "sudden" as expressing that 
concept within the pollution exclusion in 1970. The EPA also quite logically grouped under 
the "gradual" category events of long term duration such as leaking drums, continual over-
flows and burial/dumping of untreated wastes. 
It is refreshing to sit back and see how ordinary people knew exactly what was meant 
by simple words like "sudden" and "gradual". It is also enlightening in this litigious era to 
see that the world always quietly understood that discharges from buried leaking drums and 
the like were not "sudden" pollution events. Of course, all of these plain and simple under-
standings existed without the benefit of the efforts of policyholders to "re-educate" the world 
that the concept of "sudden" was one beyond the normal comprehension of mankind. The 
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EPA, like the rest of the world, simply operated on the common sense premise that "sudden" 
events were sudden and "gradual" events were gradual. There was absolutely no mystery 
involved. 
As evidenced in its "Background Document", the EPA sought input from the insur-
ance community regarding its proposed financial responsibility requirements. More specifi-
cally, in its "Request For Public Comments", the EPA asked some very pointed questions 
regarding the cost of gradual coverage, the timing of gradual coverage requirements, the 
capacity of the gradual pollution marketplace, etc. The responses submitted by the insurance 
community routinely tracked the order of the EPA questions. What, then, was the response 
of the insurance industry to the solicitation of the EPA regarding how to address availability 
and cost of insurance for gradual pollution events such as dumping of waste, burial of 
drummed waste, slow leakage of waste, etc.? The responses consistently reflected an under-
standing that the GCL's pollution exclusion coverage was limited to the EPA's "sudden" 
category of pollution incidents and that GCL coverage had to be supplemented with EIL 
coverage so as to protect against the exposures described in the EPA's "gradual" category of 
pollution incidents. 
This article has already addressed the formal comment response of the chemical trade 
association, the CMA,46 and that of RIMS, the risk manager association.47 Moreover, the 
formal comment responses of individual major insurance brokers were totally in accord, as 
would be expected based upon the prior discussion in this article of broker understandings. 
However, consider the submissions to the EPA from the National Association of Insurance 
Brokers ("NAIB").4* The NAIB informed the EPA that "NAIB member brokers negotiate 
the major share of the business-related insurance in this country." On behalf of all its 
member brokers (not just "major" brokers), the NAIB informed the EPA that gradual pol-
lution was never covered by the CGL but that the NAIB had hopes for development of EIL 
coverage options. 
Policyholders, through their industry organizations, also submitted formal comments 
to the EPA implicitly recognizing that the CGL did not cover "non-sudden" or gradual 
pollution discharges. A sampling of the list of policyholder industry associations who made 
such submissions includes the American Petroleum Institute, the American Iron & Steel 
Institute, and the National Solid Waste Management Association/9 Thus, the innumerable 
policyholders comprising the petroleum industry, the iron and steel industry and the solid 
waste management industry also shared in the common knowledge of the entire insurance 
community that gradual pollution was not afforded coverage by the pollution exclusion's 
"sudden and accidental" exception. It should also be noted that many individual policyhold-
ers submitted similar comments to the EPA or expressly joined in the comments submitted 
by its industry association. 
The EPA was not alone among federal agencies in having a clear grasp of the way 
the pollution exclusion operated to exclude gradual pollution. Indeed, in 1970, ISO specifi-
cally advised the Rural Electrification Administration (REA): 
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First, although the intent of the endorsement is essentially clari-
fication, there is no doubt that the endorsement tightens the 
coverage by requiring that the occurrence be "sudden" in addi-
tion to being neither expected nor intended. However, this is 
an underwriting exclusion which may be deleted for individual 
risks under the (a) rating procedure.50 
In any event, the bottom line concerning the EPA financial responsibility require-
ments issue is that no one ever thought, hinted or suggested that the EPA's gradual pollution 
coverage requirement could be satisfied by mere proof of CGL coverage. On the contrary, 
both the EPA which solicited public comment on gradual pollution coverage and the respond-
ing insurance community of policyholders/policyholder associations and brokers/broker asso-
ciations clearly understood that the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclu-
sion did not afford coverage for gradual pollution events such as dumping of waste, burial 
of drummed waste, slow leakage of waste and the like. 
7. STATE COMMISSIONER FILINGS: THE "UNABRIDGED" STORY 
Policyholders typically proffer the meritless argument that the IRB/insurance under-
writers, when filing the pollution exclusion endorsement with state insurance commissioners 
in 1970, did not inform or represent to said commissioners that the pollution exclusion 
constituted a reduction in coverage. Rather, policyholders contend that the pollution exclu-
sion was filed solely as a "clarification" and as a mere restatement of the "occurrence" 
definition's language ("bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from 
the standpoint of the insured"). 
Indeed it was the opinion of underwriters that (under the 1966 policy prior to the 
exclusion) coverage for pollution was not provided in most cases because it could be said to 
be expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. The IRB told that to the 
commissioners in the first sentence of the Explanation.51 It would stand to reason that 
pollution damages generated in the regular course of business by a regular manufacturing 
process would be something known to or reasonably to be expected by the insured in most 
cases. 
However, the occurrence definition was not working well. Disputes arose as to 
whether the pollution damage was expected or intended, and the carriers were losing some 
of those disputes in court. An additional test was needed to simplify the matter that regular 
business pollution was not covered — and to get the insured's intent or expectation of 
damage issue out of the courts. In that respect the additional test was certainly a clarification 
of underwriting intent not to cover pollution damage. That is a far cry from saying, however, 
that the additional test would operate just like the old test, as merely restating the occurrence 
definition's coverage conditions. 
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This additional test would also clarify that policyholder intention or expectation of 
damages was no longer relevant in this second line of defense to pollution claims. If 
policyholders passed the occurrence test they would next have to pass the "sudden and 
accidental'' test. In that sense, the exclusion could be regarded as a restriction on coverage. 
However, most of the gradual pollution problem produced by regular business practices 
should be weeded out by the occurrence definition. But if any should slip through it would 
certainly be snared by the "sudden and accidental" test. Thus, the result under both tests 
would ordinarily be pretty much the same: the industrial pollution problem would not be 
covered, one way or the other. 
Policyholders, however, routinely distort this issue and cite a few documents from the 
1970 West Virginia insurance commissioner's file - to the exclusion of an entire universe of 
documents related to state insurance commissions across the country which reveal these 
policyholder assertions for what they are. 
Preliminarily, in discussing the understanding of state insurance commissioners, it is 
anticipated that policyholders will argue that use of the word "accident" in the IRB uExpla-
nation" which accompanied the pollution exclusion endorsement filings conveyed nothing to 
the state insurance commissioners about the restriction in coverage inherent in the plain 
exclusionary language. Accordingly, it is necessary to briefly discuss the historical usage of 
"accident" by insurance men and how it conveyed the classical "boom" concept contemplated 
by the drafters of the pollution exclusion. The IRB "Explanation" accompanying the pollu-
tion exclusion endorsement as filed with state commissioners read in part as follows: 
Explanation 
Coverage is continued for pollution or contamination caused 
injuries when the pollution or contamination results from an 
accident . . . (emphasis added)52 
It is well known that prior to 1966 general liability insurance policies usually provided 
coverage on a "caused b accident" basis. As demonstrated in the discussion of drafting 
history above, the insurance community's use of "accident" had always been one of the 
"boom" accident or the "classical" accident which encompassed the temporal element of 
instantaneousness. "Accident" was commonly used in the insurance industry as a term of art 
pertaining to an event "identifiable in time and place". Astonishingly, policyholders have 
taken the meritless position that since various courts had broadly interpreted the word 
"accident" in the context of an insurance policy dispute, the insurance comnuu *y completely 
threw away its long standing day to day common usage of the word "accident" to express 
a sudden "boom" event. Policyholders, mixing insurance apples and oranges, contend that 
anytime anyone in the insurance industry referred to "accident" in a conversation, piece of 
correspondence, or state filing memorandum, it had to be assumed that such reference 
necessarily incorporated the proposition that "accident" no longer conveyed the temporal 
meaning "accident" had since the dawn of (insurance) time. 
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Quite frankly, this is preposterous. The insurance community never stopped using 
"accident" to describe a classical accident.53 If that were the case, the then new 1966 CGL 
form could have simply retained the "caused by accident" terminology. Quite to the contrary, 
the insurance industry expressly sought to articulate the narrow meaning of "accident" by 
switching coverage in the revised 1966 CGL over to an "occurrence" basis. The new 
"occurrence" definition thus retained both the sudden "accident" concept and added the 
continuous "exposure to conditions" coverage as well.54 
There should be no disagreement that the advent of the revised 1966 CGL policy form 
was a major event in the history of insurance. A careful examination should be made, then, 
of what the insurance carriers (through their bureau) were telling state insurance commission-
ers in the 1966 "Explanatory Memorandum of Changes" when that policy was filed for 
approval. What the state insurance commissioners were being told in 1966 was this — that 
while the new "occurrence" coverage included broadened coverage for "exposure to condi-
tions" occurring over time, such coverage was in addition to coverage for sudden events 
identifiable in time, i.e. "accident" coverage. 
An "occurrence", as defined, includes not only a sudden event 
identifiable in time which is characterized as an "accident", but 
also exposures to conditions which may continue for days, 
weeks, months or even years.55 
The bureau also expressly advised state insurance commissioners in that filing that the 
new broader "occurrence" definition eliminated the connotation of suddenness inherent in the 
old "caused by accident" policy.56 Therefore, when only a few years later in 1970 the state* 
insurance commissioners were expressly told in the "Explanation" accompanying the pollu-
tion exclusion endorsement that pollution coverage would continue for a pollution "accident", 
those commissioners were well aware that an "accident" was a "sudden" event "identifiable 
in time". If that concept needed any reinforcement, it was provided in ISO's 1971 filing of 
an explanation relating to changes which eventually became the 1973 CGL policy.57 
It is, therefore, disingenuous of any policyholder to assert that insurance people (such 
as the ERB) speaking to other insurance people (such as the state insurance commissioners) 
in 1970 did not understand the usage of "accident" as referring to the sudden event identi-
fiable in time. This is precisely what the state insurance commissioners were told in the 1966 
filing Explanation: exactly what they understood by the filing Explanation received with the 
pollution exclusion in 1970 and specifically what they were reminded of in the 1971 Expla-
nation filing of the 1973 policy. It should not be forgotten, however, that an "Explanation" 
was not necessary to tell any commissioner that the exclusion constituted a restriction of 
coverage to sudden pollution events. The clear wording of the endorsement did that. 
Use of the word "accident" to capture the temporal/sudden/identifiable in time con-
cept (in contra-distinction to use of the word "occurrence" to describe exposure-type/gradual 
events) is well documented in the prc-1970 literature and documents, as discussed in the 
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drafting history section of this article.58 Moreover, this distinction between "accident" and 
"occurrence", as a point of reference for insurance persons, persisted in the literature after 
1970, and continued to constitute an acceptable framework for communication.59 
Furthermore, to put beyond any doubt the message given to and understood by state 
insurance commissioners in 1970 in the United States and Puerto Rico, an examination of 
material related to various state insurance commissions is instructive.60 These materials 
overwhelmingly establish that, contrary to policyholders' contentions, there was a complete 
understanding by insurance commissioners that the pollution exclusion could take away a 
measure of existing pollution coverage. 
Consider for example the Kansas' materials. On June 11, 1970, the Kansas Insurance 
Commissioner wrote to the IRB acknowledging that the filed pollution exclusion constituted 
an "obvious reduction in coverage". 
In view of the obvious reduction in coverage, to what extent 
will the premiums be reduced when this endorsement is attached? 
Will a buy back be available, and how will it be rated? 
(emphasis added) 
As indicated above, the commissioner also inquired whether there would be a "buy back" of 
coverage available. A "buy back", obviously, would not be necessary or logical without an 
attendant understanding that the coverage to be repurchased had been taken away by the 
exclusion. 
The Commissioner also inquired, since the endorsement was "discriminatory", why 
the endorsement should be attached to outstanding policies. The commissioner felt that such 
a restrictive endorsement should not be unilaterally superimposed upon an existing policy. In 
response to the Kansas Commissioner's letter, the IRB revised the proposed effective date so 
that the endorsement would apply only to "new and renewal" policies. The IRB also con-
firmed on June 18, 1970 that the restricted coverage would be subject to a "buy back" [on 
an individual risk basis with an (a) rate determined in accordance with the hazard of the risk]. 
Other states, like Kansas, conditioned approval of the filing upon carriers attaching 
the endorsement only to new and renewal policies. These states included Kentucky, Missis-
sippi, New York, Texas, and Georgia. If there was no similar perceived effect on coverage, 
why limit the exclusion's application to new or renewed policies? A May 29, 1970 letter 
from the Georgia Insurance Commission to the IRB provides the answer, the insurance 
commission noting that "the effect of the addition would be so great". 
Surely, there cannot be any doubt that the State of Kansas' Insurance Commission 
fully understood the "obvious reduction in coverage" expressed in the plain wording of the 
pollution exclusion. Moreover, Kansas' Commissioner suffered from no confusion whatso-
ever purportedly generated by the "Explanation" attached to the pollution exclusion endorse-
ment advising him that pollution coverage would continue for a pollution "accident". Based 
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upon the Kansas materials alone, Courts should dismiss out of hand the broad extrapolations 
policyholders seek to make from the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner files. However, 
as will be demonstrated, there is an abundance of additional evidence establishing awareness 
by other members of the insurance commissioner community that the pollution exclusion did 
not merely restate the "neither expected nor intended" language of the "occurrence" definition 
but resulted in an obvious coverage reduction. 
The insurance commissioner materials for the State of Louisiana reflect that the IRB 
filing of the pollution exclusion was initially disapproved. Discussions held between Aetna 
Casualty and the Louisiana Insurance Commission in June of 1970 reflect that the disapproval 
was based upon political pressure generated by the "restriction" in coverage the exclusion 
obviously carried. 
He said that the disapproval of the IRB's filing for this restric-
tion of coverage was a political situation.61 
The Louisiana Insurance Commission did, however, permit attachment of the pollution 
exclusion to individual risks as long as the insured acknowledged in writing it understood that 
the pollution exclusion constituted a "restriction of coverage".62 
Iowa, Michigan, South Dakota, Hawaii, Virginia, and the District of Columbia also 
approved the pollution exclusion filing upon the condition that the consent of the insured be 
obtained before attaching the endorsement to an outstanding policy. If there was no similar 
perceived effect on coverage, why would consent of the insured be required? 
The filing documents from the State of Texas not only recognized the exclusion's 
reduction in coverage but emphasized the established insurance usage of "accident" to con-
note the sudden/boom "classical accident".63 Oviously, the Texas Board of Insurance also did 
not suffer from the presently espoused policyholder delusion that the pollution exclusion 
merely restated the "neither expected nor intended" (damage) language of the "occurrence" 
definition. Rather, the documents reflect an understanding of the intent of the drafters' to 
return pollution coverage to an (classical) "accident" basis. 
In the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the pollution exclusion filing was initially dis-
approved- On November 30, 1970 in follow-up correspondence from the IRB to the Puerto 
Rico Commissioner of Insurance, the need for the exclusion was elaborated - the commis-
sioner being informed that underwriters did not want to debate whether an insured "expected 
or intended" the pollution "act", especially a "continuous"* pollution sitL«:ion. 
Reiving solely upon the policy definition of occurrence which 
requires that the act causing damage must not be expected nor 
intended bv the insured, might well cause dispute as to whether 
in fact the act was unexpected or unintended particularly in a 
fact situation involving a continuous course of action. This 
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kind of situation is often very costly to both insureds and 
companies since many of them are brought into court to be 
resolved, (emphasis added) 
This concept is totally consistent with the aim of the drafters to avoid debate over whether 
an insured "expected or intended" damage by shifting focus to the physical (sudden) dis-
charge of pollution.64 The filing was subsequently approved in Puerto Rico. 
As noted, the State of New York approved the pollution exclusion filing but would 
not allow the endorsement to be placed on outstanding policies. If there was any doubt, 
however, that New York did recognize the exclusion's restriction against gradual pollution 
coverage, one need only read the law approved in 1971 that made it illegal to issue gradual 
pollution insurance coverage.65 Immediately recognizing the gradual pollution gap which the 
law left unprotected, a utility company tried to persuade the governor not to sign the bill into 
law.66 However, the law was passed. 
Therefore when the EIL market for gradual pollution developed in the mid-1970's, 
those EIL policies could not be sold in the State of New York. It remained illegal to sell 
gradual pollution insurance in the State of New York, with certain legislative exceptions, 
until the repeal of this law in 1982, Thus, the New York Department of Insurance instructed 
ISO in 1981 that its claims-made pollution liability policy (i.e. EIL) could not be issued to 
an insured unless that insured fell within certain enumerated exceptions to the 1971 statute.67 
Of course, the New York Insurance Commission had no problems with existing CGL pollu-
tion coverage as it was evident that the "sudden and accidental" exception to pollution 
exclusion did not provide (illegal) gradual discharge coverage.68 
Regarding the North Carolina State Insurance Department, correspondence between 
the department and ISO reflects that policyholders in the exterminating industry opposed 
approval of the pollution exclusion because it "would take away coverage from them.'9 It was 
noted, however, that one underwriter routinely modified the policy for a considerable number 
of exterminating risks by restoring the coverage taken away by the exclusion for a charge (via 
a buy-back).69 
The Illinois Department of Insurance file contains documents filed by the London 
Market evidencing a consistent understanding on the part of that State's Director of Insur-
ance. London's Cause (Industries, Seepage, Pollution and Contamination Clause No. 3), like 
the IRB's pollution exclusion, contained a "s .den" happening limitation. Regarding the 
coverage taken away by the exclusion, the Lonaon Market pointed out to the Illinois Insur-
ance Commission that coverage taken away by Clause No. 3 was subject to a "buy-back" (as 
was also the case with the IRB exclusion).70 The Kentucky Department of Insurance was 
similarly advised by London representatives of the "buy-back" available for the gradual 
coverage taken away by London's Seepage Cause No. 3.71 
Two states that did not approve the pollution exclusion filed by the IRB in 1970 were 
New Hampshire and Vermont. However, documents reflect awareness in those states of the 
restrictive nature of the exclusion. Moreover, subsequent insurance events which generated 
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explanations from the insurance commissioners of New Hampshire and Vermont convinc-
ingly confirm the understanding of these commissions that the pollution exclusion constituted 
a reduction of existing coverage. 
The commissioner in New Hampshire issued a press release on September 28, 1970 
announcing disapproval because the exclusion excluded liability on an occurrence basis, pro-
viding only sudden and accidental coverage. Subsequently in September of 1981 ISO filed 
with the New Hampshire Insurance Department its then new claims made pollution liability 
policy (an EIL). New Hampshire's reason for denying its approval in 1981 is quite instruc-
tive. Essentially the Insurance Department told ISO that since it had disapproved the 1970 
CGL pollution exclusion, gradual coverage was automatically afforded to CGL policyholders. 
Thus, there was no need in 1981 for a pollution liability policy covering gradual pollution.72 
The identical scenario is evidenced in Vermont which also disapproved the 1970 filing 
of the pollution exclusion. As was the case in New Hampshire, the IRB sent follow-up cor-
respondence to the Vermont Commissioner of Insurance advising that the exclusion was 
subject to a buy-back, an obvious confirmation that the exclusion indeed reduced coverage. 
Vermont then disapproved ISO's pollution liability policy in 1982 on the basis that gradual 
pollution coverage was never taken away because the pollution exclusion was not approved 
in 1970.73 
The foregoing establishes beyond any doubt that the "big picture"1 of what the com-
munity of state insurance commissioners understood about the effect of the pollution exclu-
sion is a vivid picture of clear recognition of the exclusion's restriction of existing coverage. 
Their collective understanding stands in stark and overwhelming contrast to the assertions of 
policyholders that the pollution exclusion was understood by the state insurance commission-
ers as merely restating the language of the "occurrence'* definition. 
Finally, regarding the insurance personnel of the State of West Virginia, the entirety 
of the evidence indicates that West Virginia truly understood that the pollution exclusion did 
not cover gradual pollution. Some of the documents in the 1970 West Virginia file demon-
strate shared understanding by those who attended the July 16,1970 hearing that the pollution 
exclusion was a restriction on coverage. These materials have already been reported on.74 
The record also discloses comments by another oil and gas industry spokesman who objected 
to the pollution exclusion. He understood that salt water produced with gas and oil was the 
largest cause of pollution in West Virginia. Recognizing that gradual salt water pollution 
would be excluded, he stated the "word sudden (is) inappropriate."73 
Moreover, consider the West Virginia Hazardous Regulations, Section 47-35-13 
("Financial Requirements").76 and incorporating by reference the EPA financial responsibility 
requirements, the State of West Virginia acknowledged that it also participated in the long-
standing and common knowledge of every segment of the insurance world that the pollution 
exclusion restricted coverage. This legislative acknowledgment is clearly contrary to policy-
holder assertions that West Virginia took the position that the pollution exclusion served no 
restrictive function whatsoever. 
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Further confirming West Virginia's understanding that the pollution exclusion took 
away gradual pollution coverage provided in the CGL is the fact that West Virginia approved 
ISO's filing of its pollution liability policy. The reader will recall that states which had 
disapproved the 1970 pollution exclusion filing (such as New Hampshire and Vermont) also 
subsequently disapproved ISO's pollution liability policy filing, taking the logical position 
that a gradual pollution policy was not necessary as gradual pollution coverage was already 
provided in the CGL (the pollution exclusion's restrictions not being approved in 1970). 
Therefore, by approving the ISO pollution liability policy, West Virginia conversely ac-
knowledged its long-standing recognition that there was no existing mechanism in 1983 to 
protect gradual pollution exposures, the pollution exclusion having taken awav gradual coverage 
in West Virginia back in 1970. 
In any event, any confusion generated by the West Virginia scenario as to what 
insurance commissioners across the country were told and understood about the restrictive 
nature of the pollution exclusion is laid to rest by the overwhelming nationwide evidence 
documented and presented to the reader herein. Quite frankly, the broad extrapolations 
policyholders divine from the West Virginia file are simply incorrect. Even a brief look at 
the "big picture" of the insurance commission understandings in the United States and Puerto 
Rico make it evident that insurance commissioners participated in the common knowledge of 
brokers, policyholders, underwriters, trade organizations and insurance trade commentators 
that the pollution exclusion did not, and was never meant to, afford coverage for gradual 
pollution discharges. 
POSTSCRIPT: THE NEED TO DEVELOP AND UTILIZE GENERIC DISCOVERY 
Surely, certain of the court decisions favorable to policyholders have been based upon 
the lack of adequate presentation of generic proofs by defendants or upon acceptance of the 
handful of incomplete proofs proffered by policyholders. Perhaps certain of these decisions 
were rendered primarily to target the proverbial "deep pocket". Whatever the reasons, it is 
submitted that it is absolutely necessary to present the courts with the "big picture" of the 
common knowledge of the insurance community, the lack of any objectively reasonable 
expectation of gradual pollution coverage by the policyholders, and the intent of the drafters 
of the pollution exclusion. It is also necessary to present the true and complete "big picture" 
of the state insurance commissioner filings, one small part of which being so artfully and 
repeatedly emphasized out of proportion and context by policyholders. Finally, this article 
suggests that it is necessary to advise our courts that policyholders and their brokers are 
keenly aware that courts are finding coverage for policyholders (where it was never written) 
by misinterpreting the plain language of the pollution exclusion. 
With so many millions of dollars at stake, one could almost understand the motivation 
of policyholders to file such lawsuits. However, it is impossible to condone the endless filing 
of litigation where it is known in advance that such litigation is "frivolous", based upon hopes 
of continued "misinterpretation" of policy language or based on providing courts with a 
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targeted "deep pocket". The instant discussion of the pollution exclusion began with a series 
of informative and instructive quotes from American Cyanamid's Director of Corporate 
Insurance. That risk manager acknowledged the common knowledge of the insurance 
community that there was never any intent of any party to the CGL insurance contract to 
cover gradual pollution claims under the pollution exclusion. He further criticized courts for 
"grossly mistreating" insurance underwriters and chastised policyholders for bringing "frivo-
lous" lawsuits. It is thus distressing to report that American Cyanamid has recently filed an 
environmental insurance lawsuit in New Jersey against virtually all of its liability insurance 
carriers.77 The pollution exclusion is among the issues being contested. A commentary by 
an attorney was reported publicly when the suit was filed: 
The Courts know the insurance industry is huge and wealthy 
and can always pay off by raising premiums.78 
The filing of such suits and the making of such comments seems to ignore the fact that 
insurance companies are not immune from financial disaster and, more importantly, the fact 
that insureds never paid a penny in premiums for coverage of gradual pollution discharges 
excluded by the pollution exclusion. 
Several thousand documents have been assembled which reflect the insurance com-
munity's common knowledge of the coverage restriction expressed in the pollution exclusion. 
Many of these documents are protected from public disclosure by confidentiality protective 
orders. It is submitted, however, that even a partial sampling of the unprotected documents 
is more than sufficient to demonstrate that policyholders could never at any time have 
entertained any objectively reasonable expectation of coverage for gradual pollution dis-
charges. Certainly, policyholder brokers were so attuned to this reality they commented on 
the courts which failed to comprehend what every insurance man knew about the plain 
meaning of the pollution exclusion language. Clearly, powerful industry groups, like the 
CMA, the American Petroleum Institute, National Solid Waste Management Association, and 
the American Iron & Steel Institute were intensely attuned to the temporal meaning of the 
pollution exclusion as well as to why and when gradual pollution coverage was taken away 
from the CGL. Moreover, the powerful risk manager insurance association, RIMS, represent-
ing many thousands of policyholder corporations and their risk managers, acknowledged what 
every risk manager knew - that "sudden" and "gradual" were temporal pollution concepts and 
that the CGL did not cover gradual pollution events. All of these sources further recognized 
that a "gap" was created in CGL coverage because the pollution exclusion took something 
awav from previously afforded coverage. They recognized that the "gap" created by the 
exclusion was one of gradual pollution discharge coverage. They recognized that this "gap" 
was serious. Finally, they all recognized that only an EIL policy could fill this coverage 
gaP • 
Even if any particular policyholder's risk managers did not have the benefit of an 
international insurance broker, or the centralized voices of an industry association, or a risk 
manager insurance association, they would still have been appropriately informed of the 
restriction by the wealth of information being disseminated by the broker community to 
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potential clients and to the insurance world at large in pamphlets and pollution seminars. 
They would also have been educated by the information being disseminated by publishers of 
insurance trade publications in quite explicit articles. Such a policyholder, to claim ignorance 
of what was going on, would also have had to turn a deaf ear to the similar operating 
premises and acknowledgements in articles and quotes by his policyholder risk manager 
brethren in trade magazines and newspapers. 
It is quite emphatically suggested that the time has come to put a stop to the policy-
holder pollution exclusion games being played in the courts. The pollution exclusion bars 
coverage for all but truly sudden and accidental discharges and everybody knew (and knows) 
it. Presentation of the foregoing generic materials should preclude any court from accepting 
the proposition that policyholders lived hermits' existences in caves of isolation or in plastic 
bubbles shutting out the insurance world at large. Aggressive and intelligent use of generic 
evidence should also prompt courts to wonder where policyholders ever got the notion that 
thek claims are anything other than "frivolous". 
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2. July 15, 1982 correspondence from New York Superintendent of Insur-
ance, Albert B. Lewis to Counsel to the Governor ("the Insurance Department 
notes that there has been an increased interest in recent years in obtaining insur-
ance to cover gradual pollution"). 
3. July 19,1982 Manufacturers Association of Central Ndw York correspon-
dence to Governor Carey (legislation allows purchase of coverage for "gradual or 
continuous discharge of pollutants")* 
4. July 12, 1982 correspondence of Insurance Brokers of New York (IBA/ 
NY) to Counsel to the Governor ("insurers in New York are unable to provide 
coverage for gradual pollution liability"). 
5. July 16,1982 correspondence of The Business Council of New York State 
to Counsel to the Governor (legislation allows coverage for "gradual or continuous 
discharge of pollutants"). 
New York unquestionably understood, then, that the pollution exclusion consti-
tuted a restriction of existing gradual pollution coverage. 
69. May 12, 1972 correspondence. 
70. February 27, 1970 correspondence. 
71. March 13, 1970, correspondence. 
72. September 17, 1981, correspondence of New Hampshire Insurance Department. 
73. November 11, 1970 correspondence from ISO and February 4, 1983, correspon-
dence from Vermont Insurance Commission. 
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August 27, 1991 Vol. 5, #40 
74. "Lawyers Say Insureds Are Attempting to Reinvent History" by Timothy C. 
Russell, Thomas S. Schaufelbcrger and Alan C. Nessman, Mealev's Insurance Litigation 
Reports, Vol, #2, Issue #10, March 23, 1988. 
75. Hearing notes, West Virginia's 1970 Insurance Commissioner's record. Com-
ment is by Larry L. Skeen, Executive Secretary, Independent Oil & Gas of West Virginia. 
76. West Virginia Hazardous Regulations, Title 47, Department of Natural Resources 
(effective April 24, 1982). 
77. See July 26, 1991, Bergen Record front page article. 
78. Id. 
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Tab 3 
Pollution and Insurance 
by G. R. E. BromwKh 
Responsibility for Poilution and other aspects of pro-
duction, which r.iay adversely affect the public at 
large, is potentially the most devastating single hazard 
risk faced by management today. Risk managers 
should play a vital role m minimising this problem. 
Mr. Bromwtch, who is Manager of the Research 
Department at Reed Shaw Osier Limited in Toronto, 
discusses the nature of the pollution problem, the 
general non-availability of insurance as a panacea and 
the role of the risk manager. 
T he pollution liability insurance situation if both 
1
 simpit and complex. Limitations on coverage 
can ,be understood quickly; unfortunately, if not 
amended or eliminated they often leave the risk man-
ager with a senous uninsured exposure. The beck* 
ground is more complicated, but must be understood 
if one is to make the best out of a bed business. Most 
of the examples given here refer to Canada and 
Canadian law but they are applicable in the United 
States because the questions involved are funda-
mental. 
Insurers Concerned 
do not think there is any doubt that the msur-
ince market, both direct and reinsurers, is perturbed 
about the possibility of large pollution liability 
claims. Their immediate reaction has been to intro-
duce endorsements which attempt to define the 
limited extent of coverage they wish to give for most 
risks and to exclude virtually all liability for pollution 
in the case of risks associated with the petroleum 
industry. 1 believe Lloyd's was first to introduce what 
it called Seepage, Pollution and Contamination 
clauses which went beyond previous similarly named 
clauses. This was in tht early past of last year and 
IN A was not far behind with its dause termed. 
Environmental Pollution .Exclusion. Other versions 
put out by insurers have such titles as Environmental 
Exclusion. 
in<uren rarely reocTUhmod lately to any situation 
.itui the origins of the peeoent concern over pollution 
go back for some yuan. 
For example, * y fisherman will confirm that for 
years people writing about fishing have been bemoan-
ing the extent to whkh rivets and lakes have become 
polluted. Attempts have been made to counteract this 
but conservation, as far as 1 am aware, never made a 
great deal of headway. 
Torrey Canyon Aroused Interest 
was not until the Unker Torrey Canyon went 
t» -and off the south coast of England and the oil 
tpiU fouled the coasts of England and Prance that 
general interest in pollution was aroused. Tht British 
Navy attempted unsuccessfully to salvage the wTtc*; 
the R.A.F. tried to set the oil on fire by bombing it, 
also without success. Subsequently, a inter ship wU 
"arrested" in Singapore harbor and tvtntually tht 
British and French governments recovtrtd about $7 8 
million from the charterers. Union Oil Company of 
California, who apparently owned tht vtssel through 
a subsidiary. 
Then came the enormous spill from a drilling ng 
operated by Union Oil in the Pacific Oean near Santa 
Barbara, California. Representatives of the parties 
damaged, which included fishing and boating indus-
tries, beach front property owners and the beach-
using public, have filed suit for SI.3 bdlion (not 
million) damages against the four companies invoked 
(although Union Oil was operating the rig. it wis in 
partnership with Mobil Oil, Gulf Oil and Texaco). 
There have been other smaller spills in Canada and 
elsewhere. One of these "smaller" spills involves suits 
for $100 million against Chevron Oil Company for 
damage done to shrimp and oyster fishing in the Gulf 
of Mexico. 
Voluntary Action 
As a lefel^of various oil spill* from Unkers, an 
arrangement wee readied between* the majority of the 
world's tanker owners to provide compensation to 
governments .who incur izpmmm clean-up. This ar-
rangement i known as TOVALOP (Tanker Owners 
Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil 
Pollution). These is a corresponding scheme for 
owners of cargo- CRISTAL (Contract Regarding 
Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil 
Pollution). 
A special Canadian act. The Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act, has been pasesd in recogni-
tion of the fact that oil pollution in arctic areas 
would takf Jar tai^se to dlapesea than m a wexmer 
climate.0Although, puetd byvPlrttement the Act wdl 
not come into-fctfet until prodnfcatioa and it uk-main-
lyr ^ skeleton" l e g ^ t i M * btf fleshed oi* by ftgula. 
tioits^ProvMon is o*do, amnrif.£h« ***£"< f o t 
evidence of. financial responsibility "by way-Sf insur-
ance** be required of developers, shipowners, etc. 
The Arctic Waters Act ia complementary to the 
proposed changes in the Canada Shipping Act. 
Other Causes, Effects 
There est, of course, other types of water poilu-
tion. For instance, there has been s 1 ^ * f j V" 
news recently about mercury, which ^ ^ " . 
result of the industrial process, is P « ™ * ^ * :*! 
Great Lakes. Subsequently, wanungi have tnsuto 
i s 
about estmg fish from these wttin. As a rtsult the 
livelihood of commercial fishermen has been affected 
and the tourist fishing industry has suffered a blow. 
The discharge of great quantities of domestic deter-
gents, which contain phosphates, is also a problem. 
Near the city of Elliot Lake, Ontario, radioactivity 
has been discovered in certain waters to an undue 
extent as the result of uranium mining. Various indus-
tries have unfortunately allowed their effluents to 
flow into waters of lakes or nvers in quantities that 
foul the waters and prevent safe swimming. Insuffi-
ciently treated sewage has caused the rivers and lakes 
near some of our big cities to become polluted. 
Regulations have been introduced recently forbidding 
pleasure boats over a certain size to dump their sew-
age in the waters they use. 
'In conjunction with the proposed changes in the 
Canadt Shipping Act to control water pollution (Bill 
C-2), an attempt is being made to obtain U.S. 
agreement so as to lead to some international 
standards regarding sewage dispose! from commercial 
vessels. Incidentally, this same bill will likely impose 
heavy fines for the discharge of oil or other pollutants 
and set up a fund to compensate anyone whose 
property is affected by such dischargee, the money 
being obtained from a levy on oil imported into 
Canada. 
Liability under the Act, aa amended by the bill, 
would be absolute. No proof of negligence would be 
necessary, but there would be a limit of $140 per ton 
of the ships tonnage with a total limit of S14 million. 
Of course it is not yet known what will be the final 
terms of the bill when pasted. In the VS. the Water 
Quality Control Act has been peased to handle similar 
mature though the Canadian bill appears broader in 
scope. 
Air Pollution 
Another Arte of concern ie over air pollution, (n 
Toronto and many other large cities a special watch ia 
kept on the extent of air poUution and when it 
reaches a certain level* industry ie warned to reduce 
its activities. Recently a number of large concerns 
wen cited aa being warned about the extent of the 
emissions they were permitting and the press report 
stated that relatively speakinf the emissions by 
smaller concerns were probably just aa bad, but it was 
impossible to identify them individually. 
Airliners can be seen every day trailing black 
smoke from their engines and this undoubtedly adds 
o the air pollution. Attempts are being made to 
reduce the extent of the fouling of the air from this 
cause. Then there ie pollution from automobile 
exhausts. Loe Angeles, for example, has had particu-
lar problems with smog and **s taken sups against 
the pollution caused by automooile exhausts. Vinous 
devices have been developed by auto manufacturers 
to reduce the exhaust emissions and the intention is 
to make the installation of these compulsory m new 
model cars. Lead free gas, which has bt^n the suoject 
of advertising campaigns by certain oil companies and 
counter-campaigns by others, is another attempt to 
reduce the emissions from car exhausts. 
Not only is water and air being polluted, but the 
ground and even the animals we use for food can oe 
afTected. Govern menu have become satisfied 
DDT, although of great use in killine 
dangerous in large quantities 
taken to ban its use. 
The above gives some idea ,» the 
problem and the fact that it crops up in so many 
different situations. 
Public Interest Awakened 
Some of the pollution which is now being so wide-
ly publicized is inevitable. It is the pnee of living in 
urban areas which supply the types of service and 
comforts to which we have become accustomed. 
Also, pollution has crept up over a penod of genera-
tions and it will take a long time and a great deal of 
money to reverse the trend and imorove matters to an 
acceptable level. 
We have to face the fact that pollution is one of 
the social concerns of the day and a happy hunting 
ground for politicians. It's like motherhood; one can-
not be against motherhood. Who can be against purer 
environment? 
Just recently the Canadian Government announced 
the formation of a new departm* ;, to be controlled 
by the present Minister of Fisheries, that will be 
called the Department of the Environmental and 
Renewable Resources. This development appears to 
be in line with the increased interest in what is loose-
ly called consumer protection. Industry of all kinds. I 
feel, is going to be under increasing pressure o reduce 
poUution and will be subject to considerable penalties 
where it seems to have fallen short. 
Another trend which ia appearing over the honxon 
in Canada ia the "class action/9 a legal action by one 
or a few persona on behalf of a number of others 
having the same interest. The enormous suit arising 
out of the oil drillinf spills off the California coast 
and that in the Gulf of Mexico are class actions 
Thus we have on the 6ne hand a recent awakening 
of the public to the extent of pollution and me 
continued dramatixation of thia in the media coupitd 
Z*uJSaladve pressure on industry to reduce .t by 
2 poaSSe m e S T w d perhape increasing opportu-
nitits for actions for damages where pollution dots 
occur. It is chis combination of circumstatnces which 
provides tht background to tht action taken by the 
insurtrs in restricting thtir policies. 
Position of Central Liability Policies 
I believe that wt art foinf to stt endorsements 
plactd on most Gtntril Liability policies rtstnctinf 
tht covtrtft providtd in rtsptct of pollution. This 
may btcomt as routine as exclusions relating to 
nucitar risks. 
Somt po lie its will no doubt continue in forct with-
out any special rtstnetion and it is well to consider 
how far pollution liability may be covered by these 
policies. Of course, we can only deal in general terms, 
but even this has some value. 
First of all, inevitable damage is not covered under 
any type of wording. The relevant legal cases have 
usually been concerned with policies providing 
coverage on an accident basis. But even in -policies 
extended to include occurrence basis property dam* 
age, there is normally some provision which requires 
that tht damagt must bo unexpected. 
Accordingly, a couple of Ontario dtcisions art 
rtltvant. Tht first ont was Crisp v. Great Amtrican 
(CILR 1-046 1961) in which tht insured contractor 
undertook to grind teraxao tilee at a customer's 
houst. Tht contractor took virtually no precautions 
with tht result that dust permeated throughout tht 
house causing considerable damagt to tht furnishings. 
Although there was no doubt that tht contractor was 
Habit to tht homeowner, ht failed to recover undtr 
his Liability policy on tht grounds that what ht had 
dont intviubly ltd to tht damagt. In tht cast of 
McCoUum v. Economical Mutual (ClUt 1-064 1962), 
tht insured was cltening tht outside of a building by 
sandblasting. Soma of tht windows of tht building 
were damaged in tht very ctnter, which indicated 
that tht workman had mode no uae at all of wooden 
shields which won providtd to protect tht windows. 
Again tht decision was that no recovery was allow* 
able since damagt was virtually certain. 
Must Bt Accidental 
It, therefore, stems that coverage win not apply if 
an insured has madt pollution damagt virtually tntvtt* 
ablt by his set of-omission. Furthtr, while un-
txptcted damagt will bt covered, unites tht insured 
takes prompt sups as soon as ht realixas that damagt 
has arietn, subttqutnt damagt will not bt covered. 
With property damage coverage on en ecodtnt 
isie, somt insurers maintain that en accident must 
-akt place at a specific point in time end if uninten-
tional pollution occurred over a period of time with-
out being discovered, the policy would not apply. 
While most insurance companies would use this 
contention, it is doubtful whether it is correct m isw 
snd 1 do notice that most of the indorsements rtiat-
ing to pollution, where they permit limited coverage, 
require what happens to be mddert as w«n u acciden-
tal, indicating that the word accident or accidtntal 
does not necessarily imply suddenness. 
In summary and in general terms, if you have iiabil-
jty coverage without any special endorsement - md 
how long this state of a/fain will be tnjoyed is 
questionable — you almost cartainly do not have 
coverage if the actions of your company inevitably 
lead to oollution and no reasonable steos have been 
taken to avoid it. If you have accident rather1 than 
occurrence basis property damage insurance you will 
be faced probably with a further contention that only 
a sudden happening is covered. 
Endorsements Limiting Coverage 
( A number of different endorsements are now being 
used by various insurers to limit or exclude their 
liability for pollution risks. They seem to have uktn 
separate legal advice on what to say. Lloyd's produc-
ed ont stt of clauses, INA produced another, and still 
other versions have been set forth by Great Amtrican 
and other insurers. Perhaps eventually we shall have 
some type of standardisation. In the meantime here is 
a general review of common features although it is 
most important to examine throughly the wording 
actually employed in a particular instance. 
Theet endorsements generally exclude completely 
sny liability in connection with the oil business and 
sometimes the gas business — often closely connected 
wtthoi. 
As regards other typee of risks, they tend to 
provide coverage for a happening which is accidental 
Md sudden, although the exact wordings vary. Some 
sped out what is meant by pollution in dttail 
(references to smoke, gases, alkalis, aeida etc.) and 
some deal with it in general terms only, so that in 
examining a clause at least three questions should be 
. botnt m mmd. 
(1) Doaa it attminata a eo««faf« for pollution 
cauaad by o i and gM?If M. how ia thia 
phnaad? 
(3) Art poButioa, contamination or otfttr 
Basilar word* dafinad and if » . in "**' 
unna? If not daflnad. how fax would tht 
tanani tama afctand in tha eireuiniuncts 
(3) la a m n f a Umitad to fuddan and aceidtn. 
tal haopanam? 
• • • f- * — » t t ? i 
Short Ttrtn Phtnomtnon 
Takmf fint tht tradta which are fortunate tnoufh 
to havt bttn Itft with torn* form of covaraft, it 
sttms eltir that if damaft ta inevitable, owing to tht 
actions of tht inmirad, thtra is no covtraft. As 
ex pit in td previously, this almost certainly exists tvtn 
if there is no iptcial endorstmtnt. but tht situation is 
now spelled out. It is usually suttd that tht damaft 
must bt sudden and this ctrtainly is ntw to tht 
majority of insureds who havt proptrty damaft 
covtrtfts on an oceurrtnet basis. What sttms to bt 
tht intent is to provide for somt vtty short ttrm 
phtnomtnon, for example, a breakdown in somt 
filttnnf apparatus which ptrmits tht discharge of a 
polluunt into a nvtr or a lakt. How far the use of 
such a word as "sudden" limita tht umt dunnf which 
damaft must occur is uncertain, but it dots sttm that 
tht insured must takt prompt sttpa to remtdy what* 
tvtr ltd to tht pollution. Ptrhapt somt form of 
dtvtct which would pvt warning of pollution ovar 
tht minimum acctpublt limit is implitd by tht 
word inf. 
Tht imposition of thtst tndorsmtnts has bttn so 
recant that no casts on tht subject havt ytt comt to 
court which makts it virtually impossible tvtn for 
lawytrs to sty what thtir txact tfftet will bt. 
Whit Can Bt Doot About PoOuttoa 
Wt art In tht tarty sttfltt of daaiing with, pollution 
at an insurmnct probitm. Thtrt appttn to bt no 
chanct of an ovtrall solution whicn wouia apoiy :o 
all insureds. Rather. I btittvt that wntntvtr tne 
question of restricting or eiiminstmg pollution ,110m-
ty covtraft is raistd by an insurer, tnd it is liktiy to 
bt raistd tn virtually tvtry insunct whtre aiert is any 
chanct of tht nsk arising, that tach cast must bt 
dtalt with on its own mams. We, if I may spaa* for a 
momtnt for our compttiton in tht ig*ncy *nd 
broktragt fitld as wall as my own firm, will havt to 
bt vtty tnttfttic on your bthalf m making rtpresen-
utions to tht insurers and I am confidant that wt 
shall bt. 
You as risk manaftn should. I suggest, provide us 
with somt additional ammunition. Wt shall havt a 
much bttttr chanct nagousting if wt can say that 
A.B.C. Company it vary much alivt to tht pollution 
problem, although it has ptrhapa ntvtr had a claim 
madt against it on thtst pounds. Wt should hkt to 
bt ablt to sty, tor instance, somtthing to tht tfftet 
that a stnior company official has bttn given tht task 
of prevtntinf pollution and that undtr his direction a 
special survty of tht company's operations has bttn 
earned out to pm-pomt typas of pollution which 
might occur and to tliminata any wtak spota whtre it 
could Ukt plact. If dtfinitt amounu of money havt 
bttn sptnt tor spteial machintry such aa fUttrs of 
somt sort, ths would ctrtainly bt a htlp. Wt should 
alto Ukt to ttttak that thtit a, if tht orcumstancta 
are appropriate, soma sptcml monitocvigdtvact from 
POLLUTION ANO INSURANCE C**n*m* him # f» t$ 
which a warning is immadiatafty 
pvtn if an accaptabla Itvtl ii « • 
caadad. If spacial investigation has 
been made by tht company's re-
starch staff, or by soma oulsida 
Ann at its request, or perhaps by a 
trade association, with a view to 
changing mathoda so that pollution 
is raada leas likely, thia too will bo 
heipftiL 
If wo can jointly put togather a 
caaa which showa considerable 
activity by your particular group, 
than wo can go to tht mauiar with a 
good hopo of succeaa. You may 
think that thia sounds aa though tho 
insurer will only ghra cotet whan 
thara m vary Uttla likelihood of a 
claim, but no amount of precaution 
will tiiminata all chance of aoaaa 
thing going wrong and ! augpal 
that tha procedure ! hate outlined 
is in accordance with ona or tha 
basic risk managamant philo* 
sophias: to tiiminata risks aa far aa 
possible and only insura what can-
not ba tiiminatad. 
Probably insurars will gradually 
coma to raaliaa that tha riak in 
soma industries is far iaaa than in 
otheti and wa may ba able to 
sacura batter tarms for soma of our 
diants accordingly. It may ba thai 
tha uaa of conaidetmblo deductible 
w i l eventually provide partial 
aniwats whaia inaurars still oppoaa 
wida forma of coverage. 
Out of our afforta to obtain 
improvements, wa C M hopa thara 
will gradually tvotve a mora logical 
and Iaaa restrictive approach to tha 
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POUUTION - THI RISK AND INSURANa FROtUM 
W A I U W C Btoc&Mtm* 
iMTteeucnoN 
Through the centuries RUA his proceeded on the 
assumption that there are uncoid acres of land on 
*hich to dump refuse: thai there are billions of gal-
lons of water in the rivers, lakes and oceans to dilute 
anv effluent placed in them; thai there is a great 
blue skv whose winds can disperse whatever is thrust 
up there by our chimneys and smokestacks. 
Today such assumptions are being questioned in 
our social and political arenas in which the contra 
verrv over environmental pollution is being fought. 
In more immediate and particular terms, the pollution 
question mav be posed by the president of a company 
asking the treasurer: "Our insurance manager knows 
which insurance policy applies to this pollution claim, 
doesn t he?" And meanwhile, back at the office, un. 
derwriters are busy formulating underwriting pro 
grams with respect to the haxards of pollution and 
contamination. 
This Defense Memo will discuss in pan the history 
and development of pollution insurance with respect 
to the general liability policy. However, this is only 
a part of the total impact of the pollution problem 
on industry and risk management. In fact, pollution 
and its attendant problems are truly problems in in-
dustrial risk management and not problems in insur-
ance. Industrial management must be involved in the 
identification of the risk, in the elimination or rt» 
duction of the haiard. in the decision of whether or 
not to assume tht risk and in the determination of 
how the risk might be transferred, if at alL 
on the 
tke 19M revised 
terage prior m the I M C re 
nt" basis. Untam a large. 
Most of the attention relative so i 
for pollution 
eral liability poise** * * o r <• 
prehensave general liability 
industry was not pr tkuiar iy 
tion from an u n A i n riling m 
covt 
de  
charge of a poita 
age under the 
preferred insureds usually hod "occurrence 
either on a manoempt policy or by 
die standard policy.-
Sometimes occurrence" was not defined and an en-
dorsement would simply Mite thai wherever the 
the is 
about poUt> 
L Most of the 
accidental das* 
took place, there was no 
AmmMJ M a i M I 2 A M . S I 
t of 
Central (Nov I fM| 
r ftte Me. #447. Ise 
' m s mat tavetvtag 
ss s mm* ef 
accident" apoeared in the policv. the word occur-
rence was substituted. Other endorsements defined 
occurrence" simply to mean an event or happening 
Still others defined "occurrence to mean an event or 
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions. *hich 
unexpectedly causes injury during the polio period 
During the late IMO's and eariv 1960s, the granting 
of -occurrence" coverage by underwriters became more 
frequent and was easier to secure. A common premium 
requirement durine those years was 1% of the bodiW 
injurywerage » d 3% of the propem dam ace co*er. 
age. The granting of bodily injurv occurrence cover-
age was effected with few questions asked and little or 
no resistance by the underwriters. The granting ot 
property damage "occurrence* coverage was a little 
more difficult, as indicated by the higher premium 
requirement. However, there were few problems m 
securing property damage occurrence coverage. Except 
tions to this general rule were posed bv an occasional 
pronounced exposure situation, such as a nurserv ad-
joining an asphalt plane or a contractor using large 
machinery and causing continuous heav> vibrations 
Claims were confined to common law liabiht\ The 
following examples illustrate the types of occur-
rences" which gave rise to typical damage claims: 
flooding as a result of earth movement b% a grading 
contractor; cracked walls as a result of a contractor s 
use of heavy equipment (including dump trucks) m 
proximity to affected buildings; pollution of a water 
well from seepage of a gasoline underground tank of 
With tht advent of the 1964 revised comprehensive 
liability policy, virtually all insureds were 
" basis. Underwriters talked 
on risks who had Urge poten-
occurrence exposures. As a re-
occurrence* property dam-
would be amended by endorsement back 
Such restrictions, however, af-
only an insignificantly small number of in-
r was denied to some m-
*s done principally with 
its who had poor loss experience and 







approach was to tm 
\ deductible with 
a modest prot> 
to accounts with 
This was a tech-
"underwriters tor many \ears 
nit N * ts 2« *t+ 
mm. mawm* vt *co-
mi ofCTtfiom 
«rtor 10 the 1966 polky revision. Painting contractors 
?lhri«. tor******- w « commonlv written with a 
£ £ £ ; ^ d l m a ^ S u c t i b k of SiOO or $250 per acci-
dent. 
POUUtlOM COHTIOVBST MVBOM 
HoHcxrr " w h more was happening during the 
GO % than mrreh the appearance of che revised com-
prehemnc Kcnerai liabilm polio. Environmental 
pollution, ome the mm era of onh a few small and 
ineffectual ercKjpv developed into an issue ol world-
wide HXMI ami puliiKal concern.* Wideh read books 
and periodicals have tpelled out the consequences ol 
continued fouling ol our environment in a nation 
where each tear che population increases in M amount 
equal co that ol Rhode Island. Delaware. Idaho, Mon-
tana Mnd Nevada combined: where conspicuous con-
sumption and pUnn^d obsolescence are pans ol our 
way ol life: where in 100 years die amount ol land 
per person has declined from 4f acres per person to 
10 acres per person with only 2J acres ol cropland 
per -person. 
The Torre* Canvon disaster gave definition and 
impetus to the vague general concern ol the public 
Thu disaster was followed by others. Oil spills in 
1970 from wells in the Cull ol Mexico were attended 
bv wide publicity regarding the lack ol safety devices. 
That event, following the California off-shore drill 
oil spill in 1969. caused concern among underwriters 
which substantially led to the present restrictive en-
dorsemenu employed by Lloyd's and by moat domestic 
insurers. 
POiUmON COVttAOl OOUSIONt 
Most domestic insurers are now using two standard 
endorsements designed by the Insurance Rating Bu-
reau.1 
The first, which follow* the Lloyd's restriction, is 
Standard Provision Endorsement IH1-G336. It is a 
restricting endorsement applicable to 
or pollution as a result oil oil and natural gaa 
operations, oil pipeline operations (inch " 
tenancc). and oil rig or derrick erasing or 
tling. Coverage is excluded for bodily injury or 
property damage arising out of the discharge. di> 
penal* release or escape of oil or other petroleum 
substances or derivatives (inducting oil residues or oil 
mixed with wastes) loan or upon any water course or 
body ol water. Covorasje is excluded er*#tAer m not 
such discharge, dtsparml. release or ocape is 
and accidental. It is noteworthy that this exck 
applies only to diachar^ into a water course or body 
of water. This spodni *dorscmcnt is emitted "Coa-
laminaoon or relation-Described Operations Supple 
mentary Each 
'See Hirst*, fnwi—ifrssaf 
Far THe Defense if (Ma* If70) far a 
four lapses* ef OeJendMg Pstfh»J»oa Sous, 
Mesa*. I I Pee The Ortenae IS (Mav ItTt) iar a 
of Use Idnwa el 
far Tke 
It supplemenu Bureau Endorsement IRB-G335 en-
titled Contamination or Pollution Exclusion The 
latter endorsement excludes bodily injurs or prooertv 
damage arising out of the discharge, dispamf release 
or escape ol smoke, vapors, soot fumes, acids, alkalis 
toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste materials or 
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or 
upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or 
body ol water. However, this exclusion does not apply 
if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden 
and accidental. Therefore, even with these two en-
dorscmenta. coverage would be afforded for a spilled 
oil leak on land providing the occurrence was sudden 
and accidental." 
Those restrictions were obviously of momentous 
concern to petroleum insureds, particular!* to ship-
pers ol petroicum product* by boat or barge and bv 
operators ol oil drilling platforms o%er water * 
The impact ol pollution on the oil mdustn and its 
insurance coverage, and the industry s response co the 
situation are worth considering m some detail This 
is a striking and informative example of the far-
reaching consequences which can affect an industry 
as a result ot concern over environmental problems. 
The restrictive endorsement problem, along with ris-
ing coats ol insurance, caused a number of ^\ com-
panies to form a new company (Oil Insur * Urn* 
ttcd). This company affords insurance to inoemmfy 
an insured for afl risk ol loss or damage to us prop* 
enr up to S70.000.000: in addition, such expenses as 
suit and labor costs, well control costs and debris 
removal costs are covered. The policy also indemnifies 
or pays on behalf ol the insured any sum or sums for 
which die insured may be legally liable (whether as-
turned under contract or imposed by law). as a result 
ol bodily injury or loss ol or damage co property ol 
any kind occurring or alleged to have occurred as a 
result ol teenage, pollution or contamination. 
The Oil Insurance Limited policy does not cover 
watercraft or their cargoes owned or chartered bv the 
insured except watercraft normally used in explora-
tion, drilling and producing operations. Other exclu-
sions art aa follows: any business interruption tou or 
extra expense; injury or destruction caused by in-
tentional or wilful introduction of waste products 
into any soil or inland or tidal waters unless caused 
by accident: liability for fines or penalties, or anv 
lots, damage, or expense caused by or resulting from 
inherent defect, wear and tear, or gradual detenora. 
^ ^ - ^ ia therefore provided for on-short and 
off-shore property and lor pollution damages - up to 
$70 million during any one policy year. Coverage is 
subyect to deductibles of Sl.0ft0.000 to $10.000 000 dc-
pending on the assess of the insured. It should be ijs   
noted tKat . _ _ — this venture involves: (I) a *ery high de-
ductible, and (J) a loss pay-beck agreement which is 
intended to provide only chronological stabtluacion. 
rather than any true mswfar of risk over the long 
Oil HMmm 1 jea (Jan rfsrt) 
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Another development has btta tht formation of 
TOVALOPjfTenkcr Own*, Voluntan Agreement 
Concerninf t a t i l l i y far Oil Pollution). This agree-
mem is available to tanker owners throughout the 
world. It provides a participating arrangement to 
reimburse national governments for expense* reason-
ably incurred to prevent or clean up pollution ol 
coast lines as the result of tht negligent discharge of 
oil from tankers. The agreement provides for reim-
bursement of costs up to a maximum of $100 (US.) 
per gross registered ton of tht unktr. or SI0.000.000 
(U.S.) whichever is less. TOVALOP also provides tor 
reimbursing a tanker owner for exptnsts reasonably 
incurred to prevent or clean up pollution from a dis-
charge of oil. Coverage applies only to physical con-
tamination to land adjoining waters navigated by 
tankers. Coverage dots not extend to fire or explo-
sion damage, consequential damage or ecological 
damage. 
These two infants of the 70s. OIL and TOVALOP. 
were born of the immediate and urgent insurance 
needs of the petroleum tndustrv and tht unktr own-
en. Protection was required which was unavailable 
from private insurers and bevond tht financial ca-
pacity of an individualpttroltum company or a ship 
owner to self-insure. These developments give testi-
mony to what may well become common practice in 
the 70s, namely tht creation of an industry captive. 
There were some indications in IMS when Lloyd's 
announced its restrictive endorsements, that "clean 
up" coverage for oil spills would bt madt available 
although tht premium requirement would be severe. 
However, to the authors knowledge, no such coverage 
was written. Such reluctance on the part of insurers 
may bt expected to force tht afftcttd industry into 
consideration of a captive for sharing of large and 
infrequent losses. Substantial dtductiblts art a pre* 
requisite in theory (as well as in fact, to data) far tht 
success of such an undertaking. Othtr industrits. cur-
rently leas pressed by tht pollution crisis, may yet 
follow tht lead of tht oil industry. Thty may bt 
forced by economic ntccmity to form insuranct com-
panies to indemnify against tht risk of loss by environ-
mental pollution, or to farm agreements along tht 
lints of TOVALOP. 
TM "CONTAJMMA1ION Ot POUVTION 
We have conridtrod in SOSM dtcatl tht difficulties 
and the respooat ol tht oil industry as an example of 
an industry rnrnmUm under severe pressure caused by 
pollution problem w t now m a to soot consider*, 
tiorn primarily of concern to othtr induscrits. parties* 
lariy tht eicharioa of coverage lor contamination or 
pollution other than through oil or gas operations. 
Underwriters d a t e that Endorsement 1H*G3SS. 
tht Contamination or Pollution tadusion," dots not 
take away any coverage that was formerly intended to 
be providM and thai, in fact, tht endorsement is 
inertly for clarification/ Tht endorsement specifies 
that tht exclusion docs not apply if the discharge, die* 
penal, release or escape is "sudden and accidental." 
Underwriters maintain that this is merth an explana-
tion of the definition of "occurrence;' which reads in 
part: an accidental exposure to conditions winch re-
sults during the policy penod in bodiiv injur* or 
property damage which is neither e*pteted nor m-
tended from the standpoint of the insured." The 
emission of fumes into tne air or discharge of harmful 
waste products into a stream which an insured knows 
is occurring continuous^ and which he can reasonably 
conclude will cause property damage or bodiiv injur* 
is not a proper subject matter of insurance. Arguabiv. 
it would be against public poltcv to afford such in^  
surance. An insured who knowmglv emits into the 
air or discharges into a stream waste products which 
contain harmful elements, and who chooses to pur-
chase insurance rather than to eliminate such emit-
sion or discharge, would find few svmpathucrs if in-
surance protection becomes unavailable. With these 
underwriting anas we must all agree. 
However, the exception to the exclusion states that 
the dispersal, release or escape must be Sudden and 
accidental/* In othtr words, it must be both sudden 
and accidental rather than etthrr sudden or accidental. 
However, there can be emissions or discharges which 
are accidental but may not be sudden, in that they 
continue for a pthod of time before being detected. 
For example one such incident was recently reported 
in Wisconsin. A leak of mercury into a watercourse 
had gone undetected for some ume. and therefore was 
not a sudden dispersal, release or escape. However, it 
was accidental and unintended to the degree that 
there was no intent to discharge this quantity of mer* 
cury into tht stream as waste. Purely as an economical 
measure, systems have been established to recover as 
much mercury as possible. To account for such situ* 
atiooa. it is arguable that coverage should be worded 
"not inttndtd by tht insured" in lieu of 'sudden and 
accidental." This type of problem gets us back close 
to the policy definitions and has caused insurance 
buyers to ask. "Why is tht endorsement necesaarv*" 
Rather than clarifying coverage, it appears to becloud 
the already nebulous definition of "occurrence." 
Fitting a definition of "accident" to fact situations 
may also be quite difficult where one is dealme with 
pollution control devices. Them are inherentW high 
maintenance devices. Dry precipitators and * rubbers 
involve considerable maintenance activity, without 
which they btcomt increasingly less effective and on 
occaaoo will suffer total breakdown. If a steel plant 
starts emitting clouds of dirty and no&ious grime due 
to a breakdown in its pollution control system, caused 
by poor maintenance, a serious question ma* arise as 
to tht applicability of insurance coverage. 
POIUfflON UIWATWN AN* UMUTWN 
Tht ipk of legal and coverate problems 
by'mtrcury pollution alone is highlighted by 
; litigation. Large rUminli have been made (for 
leToytht Ohio Association of Commercial Fish-
a) for mercury pollnooo of ams of Uke Erie. 
Tht m«a*Y wobltm mamd governmental bans *n* 
rtwictions on commercial Oekingjn certain areas. 
It seems fairly certain that the ^9% «tll tee many 
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more of such <lMP- -Astronomical amounts in com-
pensator? and punitive damages will bt involved: 
large defense costs seeOT a certainty.' Whether manv 
*«*rd% will actually be made is uncertain, but based 
on che present social and political climate, some ap-
pear likelv. 
The 70s will certainlv witness a number of new 
laws, both state and federal, imposing greater iiabtl*» 
oes on polluters. In the state of Illinois, as an exam-
pie, we have the Environmental Protection Act.9 whose 
purpose is to provide a unified ttate»wide program. 
This act creates an environmental protection scene? 
wuh the duty and authority to inspect, establish a 
program of surveillance and investigate violations. 
The act also creates a state water pollution agency 
and a pollution control board. Recent examples of 
federal concern include the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act.1" the Clean Air Act41 and the Water 
Quality Improvement Act of 1970." 
It seems certain that pollution claims will go bevond 
outright claims for damages as a direct result of neg-
ligently caused pollution. Pollution de facto will be 
alleged as a sufficient basis for liability. For example 
last November a chartered airliner earning 37 mem-
bers of the Marshall University football team plus 
twelve members of the university staff and several 
civic leaders approached the Huntington. West Vir-
ginia airport. The night was rainy and very poor 
visibility prevailed — a not unusual condition in an 
area subject to heavy fogs and industrial haae. The 
plane crashed on the mountainside short of tht run-
way, with no survivors. A suit has subsequently been 
filed on behalf of the estates of most of those killed 
in that crash. The suit names as parties defendant 
the twelve leading industrial firms of the Ashland-
fronton area upwind from the airport, alleging that 
the air pollution generated by these firms caused the 
visibility which resulted in the airplane 
This is no claim for mere property damage, nor it 
there any allegation that the rmiision of pollutants 
was sudden or accidental, although tht daim 
out of an accident allegedly caused by die poll 
This. then, lives nst to an interesting; area of iptculs-
tht me (ion as to aning, of "accident" in relation 
pollution coverage. 
^a»t»o*w% w%auOe»aam.Cana*tlSCi teas (IfTl). 
DAI ftnef Ian* Cam Mb *a M ( in whist *e Cane* 
Mates Supreme Cents dadtaa* m ofte arietta! tanaSftaieo ef 
2 case imehing mmmtf paHttia* In Lake Inr m atao 
Hit* Camrt Omar (Mya/ Jw%a4wtmm. if far Tie Otftmm 
49 <Ma% 1971) far sejaahns ef tfcs eat 
Mil fte% Scat Ann Chap Illy* |I0M et sag (Iff!) 
'*« i sc «ee et sag 
• us I K l«7etsan 
i.-Aes el Apnl 1 1990. Ptft • » . M Urn 91. 
water FeUeuon Central Act 
Zhl!!^™J!d?^nd *? iftd*"™i nsk man. 
'eer wlU. of coune. be « i 5 ^ T S t ? X 
••on insurance other than public liability PrTume 
••* * moment that you are the risk maiu» of ! 
•onelomerate with a foundry division. One*?* "our 
foundries u forced to shut down because of mabitm 
»o comply with pollution control laws. Are v™ £L. 
- <«inpiy i« pouuuon control la s. re vou ore-
Paired to explain to your managtmenc whv the bW 
?P\J?A<r??lo<l '"««"« you cam does not applv 
VE^^S**"* •* *•circum ,tnin* i h « d r v 
precipitation system in your sucks Let us also as-
sumethat you have comprehensive boiler \nd ma 
erage) but excluding production machmerv 1, the 
S l ^ l ? ? ^ u ^ T L ^ ^ 1 ^ I^ dMCUon ma. 
chinery? It the lots caused by the breakdown of the 
mtem. or by the appAxauon el a Uw or ordinance* ss 3*5 as,nttmcing «»«*« < — 
Each industrial concern can take certain item m 
limit its risks and to minimise its potential insurance 
and legal problems. The first step it to undertake a 
thorough examination of the sources of pollution in 
the operations of the company. After identifying 
these risks, the risk manager should work wi<h the 
operating management of the compant to ctiure 
them insofar as they may be reduced. The risk m*t\. 
agar should then be aMe to give management a dear 
identification of what risks remain and the extent to 
which they are self-assumed, as well as the extent to 
which insurance might be applicable. Follo%m* th.v 
management at every level has an obligation to the 
company to remain involved in a continued effort «> 
cope with the probkmi in this Geld which the torn-
pany faces.u 
We must perhaps (ace the fan that the result* oi 
pollution are. by and large, really not a subject oi 
insurance For one thing, the results of certain acmi 
tics are fairly ioratctabk in many instances. Seconal* 
pollution may be viewed as a dynamic risk rather 
than a static risk. In this contest, we must realue that 
a certain degree of pollution is inevitable m an* in-
dustrial society. The balance between die benefit <•> 
society resulting from earning on the industrial M 
tivity in a particular manner must be weighed agam*i 
the lorn to society due to the resulting decrease in the 
quality of the environment. This balancing prmr** 
will be largely a matter of the consensus of mien 
to be amend at through the political process. 
iiSseMeses » Tkvert Marffief Mhuen. IS Par THe Deft** 
9 (Jan Iffl) 
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AFFIDAVIT 
1. Motrin L. Senussrhays, do depose u follows: 
1.1 began my aujerance career la 1951 tf a casualty agent for s u e Para bourne* Conujjeny. 
In 19591 left Sane Para and joined an tmrtcrjeodent insurance agency in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
1 joined the Stale of Utah Department of Insurance (the Department") in 1970 is the general 
liability rates and forms analyst. I held that position until I retired in 1979. 
2. We were a small drpartmrstt in those days. I handled all of the general nobility fDmgs 
myself. I discussed these miners with Conunisrioner Ottesen, but bs always took sry 
reccsnnienontJons. O v job was to protect die public. At the nunc time wc were mindful to 
(TWiidcr proposed tartan filings flirty. (I use "Bureau" to mean the Insurance Rating Board 
(1RB) which later chsiiged its onme to ISO.] We had sn on-going diaJogne with the local Bureau 
office. If a problem developed over a Bureau matter I would just can sod work it out with them. 
3. While 1 do not actually recall the "sodden and accidental" poOurJon exchnioa, it would have 
been handetod by me. I have now reviewed that exclusion tod die Bureau's B«p»-«—»««* 
4. Ta» p^iwi^* ^ t n * ^ H^ wwpititt^i — .httphi ^ ^ n ^ M ^ y ^ n They used 
language in 1970 that I was long familiar wirh. 'Sudden* was something "abrupt" or "quack" .< 
An "accident* was a sudden event which happened by chance. An "occurrence" was defined in 
the policy to cover gradual damage and also an "accident". 'Sudden and accidental" referred 
to an "accident", not to an "occurrence-". 
5. In 19701 would certainly have maWsfiwHl these rjoDudon exclusion dornmrnts in line with 
the way I undcruuud the word! they used. The language was so obvious mere would have been 
oo reason for OK to ssfc fe Boreeo office whet it meuisL Ctssrfy, coverage for gradual poBotion 
discharges would be excluded. The only exception was coverage for "sudden and accidental" 
poUntion discharges. The +fi-**» also said the only thing now covered was a potturjon 
"accident". It was the same thought 
6. ItishBjdformetoufxiDTsimidttOwta Toreadkany 
a h a wiy a t t j n m d i a r e g J r i r ^ p ^ I can say without any leservadon mat I 
would not have been misled by the Bureau*! * Y M , A " There ie no basis whatsoever for 
anyone to think 1 was milled. 
7. Whiklaeiasw pollution ww tatog 
a pollution ejahB. I alwevt rteui>t repedtWe buahv» 
The damage i caeeed would most ftnr/be ermected. The first senJence of the Esjfauttarj 
indkaSM the Bureau Okought so also. 
8. <Xcc*rsec*-tpsngbueine»j>cJ^^ 
expected damage. At stated hi urn fJTtmmmtiM (he exdusioo dearly "casrrAes" the existing 
sfeatfiOQthttpoUationwrja^ Certainly the exclusion would ate) apply as well 
to any xmrtpetmi gradual pollution discharges, if coy. 
9. Snmonirastrictka of coverage to c«ly toddep pcilutkM tcddein did ac< natty reduce tbe 
actual tmovtt of existing covenge under an "occurrence", no rate leduUton would have been 
waxxiond. Wtt no tun capakine for pollution claims even under "occurrence* uaguagc, • 
premlnm adjwaes for dw gradoaJ pollution exclusion would not have been considered. 
10. My spprovil of this excJuskx helped conou^ Besides, hostesses did 
oot expect to law pollubon coverage under their general Uabltty pottcks except (tar a tree 
"accident". The exclusion was fair and appropriate for endorsement to puocfcs in Utah. 
MBLVIN L. SUMMERHAYSf 
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A CASE OF MISPLACED RELIANCE: 
ANDERSON A MIDDLETOWN LUMBER COMPANY RFVTSITFn 
By Victor C. Harwood, m 
[Editor's Note: The author's New Jersey law firm, Harwood Lloyd, routinely represents 
insurers in environmental insurance coverage litigation. The author's views are his own. The author 
would like to thank his partner, Edward Zampino, for his assistance in the preparation of this article. 
Responses to this commentary are welcome.] 
For policyholders to succeed in their battle for insurance coverage for their decades of 
environmental pollution under post-1970 CGL policies, they must convince courts that the clear 
language of the pollution exclusion says something it doesn't. One would expect that an insurance 
clause excluding coverage for harms caused by pollution discharges, excepting only damage stemming 
from a "sudden and accidental" pollu-
tion discharge, would not cover gradual 
pollution discharge claims.1 How-
ever, policyholders have persuaded 
some courts that the pollution exclu-
sion is ambiguous. Their position is 
that the pollution exclusion merely 
restates the limitation of coverage under the occurrence definition to damage that is "neither expected 
nor intended/*1 In other words, policyholders contend the pollution exclusion excludes exactly 
nothing. The policyholder fallback position is, even if the "discharge" focus of the exclusion is to be 
recognized, "sudden" must be interpreted as "unexpected," without according it any temporal 
component 
COMMENTARY 
The partial success of the policyholders on the latter position has been made possible by one 
segment of the judiciary's patent misuse of dictionaries, and by some courts accepting the meritless 
argument that "sudden and accidental" had been construed as "unexpected" under boiler and 
machinery policies prior to the drafting of die pollution exclusion in 1970.3 (Thus, the drafters of the 
pollution exclusion are "presumed" to have intended to provide coverage in accord with this purported 
judicially determined meaning.)4 
In many respects, the main ingredient in this policyholder pollution coverage recipe has been 
a single 1959 boiler and machinery case from the State of Washington, Anderson A Middletown 
Lumber Co. v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company. 333 P.2d 938 (Wash. 1959) (hereinafter 
"Anderson"). 
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that the Anderson analysis was factually and 
fatally flawed, and that the assertions made by policyholders about it are unfounded. Most important, 
the reliance in turn placed upon Anderson by various courts has been seriously misplaced, resulting 
in a small but distressing body of unreliable law. 
k / " » / ^ « W « * ^ « _ * » « A A « 1 
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A. Lexicographic Confusion 
1. Misuse of Dictionaries 
The factual scenario in Anderson involved a handsaw wheel that began to oscillate. Two days 
later it started to vibrate. Three days later, the vibrations were so severe that the saw was shut down. 
Inspection revealed cracks in the spokes. The boiler and machinery insurance policy covered loss 
caused by "the sudden and accidental breaking" of the wheel.5 The carrier contended the breaking was 
not sudden, rather it constituted a gradual process.6 The court agreed the breaking process was 
not instantaneous, even though the last stage occurred in an instant."7 However, it still found coverage 
for the insured. 
The focus for Anderson's analysis of the "sudden and accidental" clause was grounded in a 
purely academic inquiry. The court purported to accord policy language its "ordinary meaning" by 
extracting one word, "sudden," and turning to dictionaries to elicit that ordinary meaning. Thus, 
Anderson's lexicographic analysis was flawed at the outset. 
First, dictionaries caution against examining the meaning of a word in a vacuum. They 
emphasize contextual significance. For example, as dictionaries typically state: 
Any effort to tailor all words to fit a rigid pattern of definition would 
result in distortion rather than clarification of meaning. Instead of 
following a standard formula for defining, the editors have constantly 
kept in mind the need to study the meanings of words in phrases * 
Second, in their listing possible meanings of a word, dictionaries do not suggest that all such 
listings reflect common usage. Rather, most dictionaries establish a time sequence for the ordering of 
word meanings. Some dictionaries order meanings of a word by common usage (such as Funk &. 
Wagnall's and Random House dictionariesV Thus, the common, ordinary meaning of a word is listed 
first in those dictionaries. Other dictionaries (such as Mcrriam-Webster* s dictionaries) list meanings 
of a word in the order of historical usage. Thus, the earliest known usage of a word would be listed 
first in such dictionaries. The ordinary meaning of a word would follow the historical definitional entry 
for the word. 
The Anderson court was clearly unaware of the differing usage instructions set forth in the 
dictionaries it referred to. Thus, it misapprehended the ordinary meaning of "sudden." It misfocused 
on the (historical) "unforeseen" sense of "sudden" listed first in the historically-ordered Webster's 
New International Dictionary (2d Ed.). It downplayed the (ordinary meaning) temporal definition 
listed first in the common meaning-ordered Funk & Wagnalt's Standard Dictionary Of The English 
Language.9 
There can be no disputing that the Webster's dictionary cited in Anderson (as with all Mcrriam-
Webstcr's dictionaries) advised its readers in its usage instructions that the order of arrangement of 
senses was historical. 
In general the arrangement of meanings of words of many meanings 
in this dictionary has been according to the following practice. Jhs. 
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earliest meaning ascertainable is always first wheth»r j | j 5 HtfinirY, 
technical, historical, or obsolete. Meanings of later derivation are 
arranged in the order shown to be most probable by dated citations and 
semantic development.10 
Thus, unbeknownst to the Anderson court, the ordinary temporal meaning of "sudden" was 
actually set forth in sense number five of Webster's, which provides: 
5. Hastily prepared, arranged, effected, etc.; very quickly made, 
provided, or brought about; as a sudden cure, departure, trip, or 
dinner.11 
The common meaning-ordered Funk & Wagnall's Standard Dictionary of the Fnglfah 
Language International Edition confirms that the ordinary definition of "sudden" includes a temporal 
element: 
1. Happening quickly and without warning: 
sudden death.12 
Accordingly, even when taken in the abstract and out of context, "sudden" is clearly expressed 
in the Anderson-cited dictionaries (and all dictionaries) as having an ordinary temporal meaning, 
provided that the express usage instructions of those dictionaries are not ignored.13 
2. Ltriwgrapbfc Lcmminga 
Anderson's misapprehension of this lexicographic reality has, unfortunately, led the way for 
other lemming-like decisions to parade into an ocean of semantical confusion.14 
A few courts rely upon Anderson, but take dictionary misuse even a step further. In 
lu&t,15 the Wisconsin Supreme Court compared Webster's and Random House's definitions, 
commenting that " . . . [t]he very fact that recognized dictionaries differ on the 'primary' definition 
of 'sudden' is evidence in and of itself that the term is ambiguous."1* Of course, when used properly, 
these dictionaries do not ''differ.'* Rather, they corroborate that the ordinary meaning of "sudden" has 
a temporal element17 Thus, it is simply not proper to ascribe more than one reasonable (common) 
meaning to "sudden."11 
Another pro-policyholder case, Hecta Mining." improperly utilized Webster's Third Nc^Y 
International Dictionary and the Random House Dictionary of the English Language in the same 
manner as did Just. The Colorado Supreme Court also erroneously assumed that major dictionaries 
"differ" on the ordinary meaning of "sudden" when, if used correctly, they actually confirm the word's 
ordinary temporal meaning.20 Accordingly, Hecla Mining's multiple "reasonable" meanings echo is 
likewise flawed. fcLat 1092. 
In Claussen.21 the Georgia Supreme Court misapprehended that the "primary" definition of 
"sudden" is "unexpected," misciting Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986). This error 
led that court to incorrectly characterize "sudden's" ordinary temporal meaning as only "secondary" 
(even though the Court recognized the temporal meaning of "sudden" as ". . . common in the 
vernacular").22 
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In Broadwell.23 the New Jersey Appellate Division construed "sudden" to mean unexpected, 
which the court inaccurately stated was ". . . consistent with the common meaning of the word in 
everyday parlance."24 It cited and misused, as did Anderson, Webster's New International Dictionary 
2nd ed. (1954). 
An interesting situation has developed in Anderson's home, the State of Washington. The 
Court of Appeals in Queen City Farms23 purported to follow Anderson, citing to it in great detail. 
However, its analysis of "sudden" is unreliable.26 Queen Citv Farm* did not question the correctness 
of Anderson's use of dictionaries (nor Anderson's comment on the purported "purpose," i.e. drafting 
intent, of "sudden and accidental" language in boiler and machinery policies — $s& discussion, infra). 
Queen Citv Farms cited C l a u s e as an example of courts which have found "sudden" to be 
ambiguous ". . . in and of itself."27 However, as pointed out by the Massachusetts Judicial Supreme 
Court in Sdkvilk,28 Claussgn fell into error (as did Anderson, and Queen Citv fr^s which relied 
upon Anderson) by construing ". . . Sudden' in isolation without recognizing the significance of the 
companion word 'accidental.'"29 
The Washington Supreme Court has granted certification. 
B. The Drafting Intent Behind. And Public Understanding Of. 
Coverage Provided In Boiler And Machinery Policies 
l. Misplaced Reliance Upon Couch 
Couch's treatise is often cited authoritatively by policyholders to fortify their position that the 
primary meaning of "sudden" is "unexpected/* not "instantaneous/'30 However, Couch cites only 
Anderson and a 1953 decision of the Massachusetts Judicial Supreme Court, New England Gas.31 to 
support its statement. First, Couch merely paraphrases comments from those cases, echoing their joint 
misuse of dictionaries as to what is obviously Webster's first listed "historical" definition of 
"sudden."32 Couch made no independent analysis, mechanically perpetuating the dictionary misuse.33 
Moreover, Couch inexplicably failed to cite the uniform construction of "sudden and 
accidental" in many other boiler and machinery cases which accorded that language its temporal 
limitation.34 Indeed, the Massachusetts Judicial Supreme Court has recently made clear that New 
England Gas has no bearing on the interpretation of the pollution exclusion.35 (That court has also 
interpreted the exclusion as constituting a temporal restriction of coverage for pollution discharges.)36 
Thus, Anderson is the only boiler and machinery case in the country that is arguably inconsistent with 
the reality that "sudden and accidental" expressed a temporal element.37 Applying the observations 
of Couch on boiler cases to a pollution exclusion interpretation, as confirmed by the Massachusetts 
Judicial Supreme Court, is simply wrong. 
In fact, any court examining why and how "sudden and accidental" language was utilized and 
understood in boiler and machinery policies would find that the goal of underwriters was to impose 
a temporal restriction of coverage - and that this reality was clearly understood by the policyholder 
community. 
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2. Pre-Anderson Historical Perspective 
The Anderson court was clearly unaware of the reasonable coverage expectations of corporate 
insureds and insurers in the real world. It was also totally uninformed about the "purpose" or drafting 
intent behind the boiler and machinery policy language, and its "assumption" on that score com-
pounded its error. 
"Sudden and accidental" has always been used in boiler policies to express the "classical 
accident" concept - describing a quick and unexpected situation. The Anderson court inexplicably 
felt, without any cited basis, that it was "more reasonable to assume" that "sudden" was not limited 
to an instantaneous event, but would cover "a crack which developed over a period of time . . . as long 
as its progress was undetectable."31 
Four years before Anderson was decided, Walter R. White Jr., Second Vice President for 
Lumberman's Mutual Casualty Company (the defendant company in that case) wrote an article in the 
National Insurance Buyer on boiler and machinery insurance for the benefit of policyholder purchas-
ers.39 Therein he explained "sudden and accidental's" temporal context, and the lack of coverage for 
"progressive," slowly developing "cracks." 
Usually, though, such cracks [in a steam chest or cylinder head] are 
progressive and not sudden and accidental and, therefore, are not 
usually covered under the definition of accident, (emphasis added).40 
The general expansion of coverage in boiler and machinery policies in 1961 to insure a 
classical accident breakdown of the machinery from many new causes, including "cracking,"41 was 
reflected in 1955 Bureau43 drafting minutes. It was pointed out that the proposed new "sudden and 
accidental" coverage for cracks would still not cover those which developed gradually. 
The Chairman distributed copies of a letter from a member asking that 
consideration be given by the committee to broadening the definition 
of Accident for Machinery Objects to include sudden and accidental 
cracking. This member pointed out that at times cracking failures 
occur which are of a sudden, unexpected and truly accidental nature 
and not of a godlttl development, (emphasis added).43 
That the element of temporal abruptness, characterized as "sudden," was always a prerequisite 
for boiler and machinery coverage is also illustrated in an early treatise which explained old boiler 
policies in England.44 Therein, it was clearly expressed that such policies covered liability ". . . due 
to explosion or collapse as hereinafter defined of any boiler.. ."45 "Explosion" was defined to mean 
the"... sudden and violent rending ortearing apart of the permanent structure of aboiler.. ."(emphasis 
added).46 "Collapse" was defined to mean the ". . . sudden and dangerous distortion by bending or 
crushing... by force of steam or fluid pressure... it shall not mean the alfladbt developing deformation 
of a plate or plates due to any cause." (emphasis added).47 Specifically excepted from coverage were 
gradual situations such as 
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... [d]efects due to wearing away or wasting of the materials of a boiler 
or other apparatus whether by leaking corrosion or by the action of the 
fuel or otherwise the grooving . . . deterioration generally or the 
development of cracks, blisters, laminations and other flaws; or for 
fracture failures... (unless such defects, fractures or failures result in 
'explosion' or 'collapse' as hereinafter defined). . . .4I 
Thus, decades of temporal usage of "sudden and accidental" in boiler and machinery policies 
preceded Anderson- That historical usage convincingly refutes Anderson's erroneous "assumption'' 
that the only "purpose" for placing "sudden and accidental" in the insurance contract was the exclusion 
of coverage for unforeseen (but not instantaneous) breaks.49 
3. Post-Anderson Historical Perspective 
Several years after Anderson was decided, policyholders were given a detailed explanation of 
changes in boiler policies. At an address before the Annual Insurance Conference sponsored by 
ASIM's Delaware Valley Chapter in October of 1961, risk managers were reminded that the "old 
machinery definitions of accident" (the definition considered in Anderson^ required a "breaking into 
two or more parts."50 The "intent" behind coverage was "... to limit the machinery accident to those 
occurrences where there was actual breaking."51 The intent to provide limited coverage was 
accomplished by utilizing the traditional insurance concept of the "classical accident," as expressed 
in the language "sudden and accidental." This risk manager/poiicyholder audience was told that, while 
the new form granted coverage in more situations, it still required a precipitating "sudden accidental 
breakdown." The temporal requirement for a covered event was highlighted in the new policy 
definition, which specifically excluded coverage for gradual* undetected and unforeseen progressive 
failures such as depreciation, deterioration, corrosion, erosion, wear and tear and leakage.52 
In the 1970s, a small, select group of policyholders, "Highly Protected Risks" ("HPR"), were 
offered a variety of property insurance coverage, including a different type of boiler policy, by 
insurers. These policies afforded even broader coverage than that written under standard 
policies.53 These "HPR's" were "preferred" risks with "superior underwriting characteris-
tics." They were provided ". . . broad coverage at reduced cost in exchange for minimal risk 
of loss to the underwriter.. ."54 A key ingredient in qualifying as an "HPR" was"... management's 
attitude toward loss prevention. A conscientious and systematic effort to protect property . [and] 
reduce the chance of loss . . . is essential."55 The Factory Mutual boiler policy extended gradual 
coverage on an "occurrence basis" for "undetectable" and "unforeseen" situations.56 These "unfore-
seen" situations are of the type Anderson had erroneously permitted to be covered under the earlier 
"sudden and accidental tearing asunder" standard form.57 
The fact that broad boiler "occurrence" coverage (where the only limitation was an "unfore-
seen" limitation) eventually came to be offered on a sekCiiYfi basis for special "HPR" policyholders 
further refutes Anderson's "assumption" in 1959 that the temporal limitation expressed in the 
traditional boiler policy could be ignored. The historical evidence also belies Anderson's assumption 
that the underwriting risk (and cost of insurance) for all policyholders was the same whether the 
breaking was instantaneous or merely undetected ". . . over a period of time."51 
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Indeed, although the boiler policies purchased by most policyholders have undergone many 
changes over the years to cover additional situations, standard coverage continues to be available on 
a "classical accident" basis, and a policyholder may still obtain by special endorsement traditional 
"Limited Coverage" that covers only boiler explosions.59 
4. The Consistent Temporal Application Of "Sudden and 
Accidental" In Diverse Underwriting Effort* 
The historical "classical accident" basis for underwriting standard boiler and machinery 
coverage, utilizing "sudden and accidental" language, was further recognized by insurers in their 
exclusion of such losses in other types of property policies. 
In 1983, one insurance trade publication explained: 
Essentially, Boiler and Machinery insurance is designed to cover 
losses resulting from: (1) explosion of boilers and other types of 
pressure vessels... and (2) accidental breakdown of boilers and other 
mechanical or electrical equipment. Such losses are not covered under 
standard Property policies. Nor are they covered under most non-
standard "all-risk" contracts, such as a Difference in Conditions 
policy, (emphasis added).60 
Accordingly, the inter-relationship of special boiler coverage with other types of first-party property 
coverages was always expressed with a recognition of the temporal "classical accident" feature of 
boiler coverage. 
Anderson has sometimes been used successfully by policyholders as providing a basis for 
demonstrating how "sudden and accidental" was purportedly understood by the drafters of the 
pollution exclusion when they picked up their pens in 1970. However, the contemporaneous pollution 
exclusion drafting documents demonstrate that the express aim of utilizing "sudden and accidental" 
language was to accomplish a restriction of coverage along the lines of the "boom" or "classical 
accident" concept. The drafters' subsequent testimony also confirmed they were unaware in 1970 of 
any court that purportedly interpreted "sudden and accidental*9 in a boiler policy without a temporal 
element. This evidence has been addressed at length elsewhere.61 
Moreover, the insurance world was always well aware that "sudden and accidental" operated 
in the same temporal way in both boiler policies and in CGL policies containing a pollution exclusion. 
For example, an insurance trade consultant in 1973 told its readers that the CGL covered pollution 
which is both "sudden and accidental and unintentional." It also stated that the boiler policy could only 
cover pollution losses caused by a "sudden and accidental breakdown of an insured object."*2 
POLLUTIONLAWSAFFECTBOIlXR.MAanNERYPR(X3 
The strong anti-pollution statutes that have been enacted in recent 
years have created a number of problems for risk managers. One 
major question, for example, is the extent to which Liability policies 
cover pollution damage. We discussed this in depth in February 1970, 
and our feeling then and now is that pollution damage which is sudden 
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and accidental and unintentional on the part of the insured is covered 
under the standard C.G.L. The pollution exclusion which became part 
of the new Comprehensive General Liability policy in 1973 supports 
this view. It states clearly that injury of damage caused by pollutants 
is covered if the "discharge, dispersal, release, or escape" of such 
pollutants is "sudden and accidental/* 
There is also coverage of accidental pollution liability under Boiler 
and Machinery contracts. We understand that the insurance compa-
nies subscribing to the Boiler and Machinery division of the Insurance 
Services Office have taken the position (without issuing a formal 
pronouncement) that pollution losses caused bv a sudden and acciden-
tal breakdown of an insured object are covered. The insured object 
may be any type of equipment... not merely an anti-pollution device 
or installation, (emphasis added).63 
The insurance usage of "sudden and accidental'* language in the exception clause of the CGL's 
"failure to perform" exclusion "(m)/' was also temporally oriented along "classical accident" lines. An 
ISO Legal Review Committee memorandum in 1981 succinctly comments upon the drafting intent of 
exclusion (m): 
An exception to the exclusion [(m)] provides that it does not apply to 
"loss of use of other tangible property resulting from the sudden and 
accidental physical injury to or destruction of the named insured's 
products or work performed by or on behalf of the named insured after 
such products or work have been put to use by any person or 
organization other than an insured." 
The thought behind this exception is that if a dlMfc « t i # n l arises 
out of the use of the named insured's products or work, then the loss 
of use of other tangible property not physically injured or destroyed 
is covered. On the other hand, no coverage is intended if the insured's 
product or work gradually sustains physical injury resulting in the 
loss of use of other tangible property that is not destroyed, (emphasis 
added).64 
Therefore, the history of "sudden and accidental" in boiler and machinery policies, m the 
CGL's pollution exclusion, and in the CGL's failure to perform exclusion, confirms a consistent 
temporal usage and understanding of that phrase in all insurance underwriting efforts over many 
decades. 
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CONCLUSION 
Anderson*s suggestion in 1959 that "sudden" has no temporal component was contrary to the 
definition that the proper use of dictionaries would disclose. Further, Anderson was defective in its 
considering the meaning of "sudden" in isolation and out of the contextual phrase within which it was 
contained. The pro-policyholder pollution coverage cases which have subsequently used dictionaries 
to ascertain the meaning of "sudden" have not given proper consideration to the correct usage of the 
dictionaries upon which they purported to rely. 
Anderson's conclusions were also contrary to the temporal drafting intent behind, and public 
understanding of, the "sudden and accidental" language as used in boiler and machinery policies. 
Indeed, Anderson's interpretation of "sudden and accidental" prior to 1970 constituted a unique 
minority, and its ruling was unsupported by other boiler and machinery cases. Anderson's observa-
tions are further contrary to the temporal insurance usage of the phrase "sudden and accidental" in 
policy language other than boiler and machinery policies, such as the CGL's pollution exclusion and 
the CGL's "failure to perform" exclusion. 
Understandably, Anderson continues to be heavily relied upon in the briefs of policyholders 
and their ami£I submitted to courts across the country. Regrettably, some courts are being persuaded 
that Anderson has an important bearing on how the pollution exclusion should be interpreted. For a 
single boiler and machinery case decided in 19S9 to so greatly affect the litigation of environmental 
insurance cases in the 1990s is more than a bit disconcerting. This is especially so when that cases 
purported analysis of the ordinary meaning of "sudden," and the underwriting purpose behind "sudden 
and accidental" language in boiler policies, was patently erroneous in so many respects. 
Insurers are therefore encouraged to urge courts to reject the flawed boiler and machinery and 
dictionary assumptions behind Anderson, and to reject Anderson's extension to a pollution exclusion 
interpretation as wholly insupportable. The Massachusetts Judicial Supreme Court has recognized that 
its 1953 boiler case, New England Gas, was flawed and irrelevant in interpreting the pollution 
exclusion. It is hoped that the Washington Supreme Court will take advantage of the opportunity 
presented in Queen Citv Farms to do likewise. 
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